The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism - Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism

Aug 22, 2026

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A chapter examines how the mind-body debate shaped by logical empiricism arose, focusing on Herbert Feigl’s role and the framework of psychophysical parallelism. It reviews the widely held claim that the 1950s marked the beginning of the analytic tradition through Smart and Feigl, then challenges this view from a German-speaking scholarly perspective. The discussion reconstructs nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German/Austrian philosophical background, explains Feigl’s anti-Cartesian pattern, and outlines how the chapter analyzes related writings and Feigl’s 1958 essay.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages30

Reading Time1 h 16 min

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The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism

Origins of the 1950s analytic debate

Reassessing Feigl’s German-speaking context

Psychophysical parallelism from the 1850s

Feigl, Schlick, Carnap, and the 1958 essay

From: Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, and Merrilee H. Salmon (eds.) . Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press 2003, 233-262 The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism MICHAEL HEIDELBERGER Universität Tübingen It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, deriving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967) . Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the debate that has continued to this day" (Kim 1998, 1) . Nonetheless, it is not at all obvious why these particular articles sparked a debate, nor why Feigl's work in particular came to play such a prominent part in it, nor how and to what extent Feigl's approach rests on the logical empiricism he endorsed. Following the quotation cited, Kim offers an explanation backed by a widespread (mis)conception of logical empiricism. He claims that work concerning the mind-body relation done prior to Feigl and Smart dealt either with the logic of mental terms – as Wittgenstein's and Ryle's work had – and therefore missed the point, or lacked the sophistication of our modern approaches. One exception, C. D. Broad's laudable work, could not alter this, for it "unfortunately . . . failed to connect with the mind-body debate in the second half of this century, especially in its important early stages" (Kim 1998, 1) . Kim seems to extend his verdict on Ryle and Wittgenstein to include all authors writing on the mind-body problem throughout the decades preceding Feigl and Smart. If we ask what distinguishes the young mind-body dispute of the late 1950s from older debates on the topic, we are told that Feigl and his friends and precursors of the Vienna Circle introduced new methods of logical analysis for solving or dissolving the mind-body problem. Feigl himself would probably have given that very answer. Others might say that the debate grew out of general frustration with Cartesian dualism and that it acquired its own specific character in dealing with the problems created by refuting that position (Jackson 1998, 395; see also Bieri 1997, 5-11) . The story goes that reflection on the mind-body relation was horribly wrapped in Cartesian obscurity and confusion until Feigl and the Australian materialists entered the scene. Their "brain state theory," writes Kim,"helped set basic parameters and constraints for the debates that were to come – a set of broadly physicalist assumptions and aspirations that still guide and constrain our thinking today" (Kim 1998, 2) . Interpreting the difference between the older and younger mind-body debate in the United States in this way may contain a grain of truth, but from the perspective of German-speaking scholars, it is entirely wrong. Seen against the backdrop of nineteenth-century German and Austrian philosophy, Feigl's approach was neither novel nor audacious; he merely revived a tradition that had once been a mainstream topic turned unfashionable; to be exact, he modified and spelled out one specific traditional position. It is time to readjust our appraisal of Feigl. I intend to show that Feigl's treatment of the mind-body problem upheld an active anti-Cartesian tradition; it follows a pattern in philosophy that was widespread in German-speaking countries throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, even after World War I.1 According to Thomas Kuhn's categories, not only Feigl, but almost all the scholars who discussed the mind-body problem within the Vienna Circle and similar movements, were doing "normal science," guided by one single paradigm, so th

FAQs

What explanation is criticized regarding the rise of the analytic mind-body debate?

The text critiques a widespread view that treats Smart’s and Feigl’s papers as the sole source that mainstreamed the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy, arguing it is not obvious why those particular articles sparked the debate and why Feigl’s approach became so prominent.

How does the chapter reinterpret Feigl’s position in relation to anti-Cartesian traditions?

From the perspective of German-speaking scholars, Feigl’s approach is presented as a revived tradition rather than a novel break, forming an active anti-Cartesian pattern that had been present through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.

What topics will the chapter cover to understand Feigl’s project?

Sections 1 and 2 address psychophysical parallelism and its development from the 1850s through the late 1920s, the third section explains the special twist introduced by Schlick and Carnap, and the fourth section analyzes Feigl’s essay “The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'” (1958) and compares it to earlier positions.

Aug 22, 2026

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