The tragedy of the commons model and the revisionist criticism - An assessment on basis of an analysis of flat fish sector regulation in the Netherlands

Sep 4, 2026

The paper evaluates the adequacy of the Tragedy of the Commons model for fisheries policy and the recommendations derived from it. It explains how commonly owned natural resources face overexploitation pressures through a Prisoner’s Dilemma–type situation, leading to a proposed shift toward individualised user rights and individual transferable quotas. The revisionist school challenges this, arguing that individual quota systems undermine community social bonds that support sustainability. Based on Netherlands cutter fleet regulation since 1976, neither framework fully explains Dutch flat fish regulatory problems.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages79

Reading Time3 h 19 min

AccessFree to download

Introduction

Tragedy of the Commons model and dominant policy theory

Revisionist common-property resource perspective

Assessment using Netherlands flat fish sector regulation

The tragedy of the commons model and the revisionist criticism. An assessment on basis of an analysis of flat fish sector regulation in the Netherlands Dr. Martijn van Vliet, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands Abstract This paper addresses the adequacy of the Tragedy of the Commons model and the policy recommendations that are based upon this model. In its explanation why commonly owned natural resources like fisheries are easily prone to overexploitation, the Tragedy of the Commons model focuses on the Prisoner’s Dilemma type of situation the users of commonly held resources are facing. Therefore the model recommends individualisation of user rights, preferably the introduction of individual transferable quotas, as the most effective and efficient means to prevent overexploitation in fisheries. This model, that seems to be the dominant economists’ approach, is challenged by the revisionist school, mainly but not only supported by sociologists and anthropologists. The revisionists stress that individualisation of rights and individual quota systems cut through the social bonds and linkages on community level that often form good bases for sustainable managed fisheries. On basis of an analysis of the cutter fleet regulation in the Netherlands since 1976, when a system of individual quotas was introduced, the Tragedy of the Commons model and its criticisms are assessed. It is concluded that neither the ToC model nor the revisionist alternative is satisfactory in explaining the problems that have occurred in regulating Dutch flat fish fishery. However, the recent development in Dutch fishery policy to include fishermen's organisations in managing the resource can be considered as a recognition that the revisionist critique cuts some ice. The paper, therefore, stresses the need for more multidisciplinary research that takes into account the social embeddedness of economic action. 1. Introduction The built-in tension between individual rationality and collective rationality is one of the great attractions for scientists from various disciplines to study fisheries. A constrained exploitation of this renewable natural resource will lead to a sustainable stream of fish. However, if too much of the fish is taken in the short run, the fish stock is affected and future proceeds will diminish. On the one hand there seems to be an obvious need for management. On the other hand fisheries are known as ‘stubborn’ economic sector, in which managers are confronted with difficult problems and in which management inter- ventions often fail. The ‘problem’ of managing fisheries can be considered as a prime example of the problems that governments nowadays has to deal with when trying to regulate a highly complex and diversified society, in which sectors and social fields seem to follow their own paths (to have their ‘Eigendynamik’) that is difficult to influence from the outside. Not only is fisheries management the example par excellence of managing renewable natural resources, many of the problems of regulating economic sectors, of creating welfare, of balancing equity and efficiency and of the limits of government intervention come together in fisheries management. Therefore fisheries management is not only challenging for those who have to manage fisheries or those whose jobs and lives are dependent on adequate management of the resource, but also for those studying fisheries, fishermen, fish and management of fisheries. The complexity of fisheries makes it a seemingly endless goldmine for scientists to develop and test their new ideas, theories and models. Ideas, theories and models, that have a broader scope than fisheries alone. Within economics, some even argue that fishery economics has become 'almost unique in the breadth of its demands on modern economic concepts' (Quirk and Smith cited in Conrad, 1996, p. 405) . I would add to this statement that the problem of fisheries management, is maybe not unique, but

FAQs

What core problem does the Tragedy of the Commons model explain for fisheries?

It explains why commonly owned resources like fisheries tend to be overexploited by framing fishermen’s choices as a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation that leads to rapid harvesting and eventual depletion.

What policy solution does the Tragedy of the Commons model recommend?

It recommends individualisation of user rights, preferably through individual transferable quotas, as an effective and efficient way to prevent overexploitation.

How does the revisionist school critique the model and its quotas?

Revisionists argue that individualised rights and quota systems disrupt social bonds and community linkages that often underpin sustainably managed fisheries.

Sep 4, 2026

Uploaded by 8796093062539