The Principles of Philosophy - known as Monadology - G. W. Leibniz - 1714

Oct 20, 2026

A philosophical exposition of Leibniz’s monadology, presenting monads as simple substances without parts that function as the true atoms of nature. It argues for the necessity of simple substances underlying composites, denying monads extension, shape, and internal divisibility. The text claims monads cannot naturally begin or end except by instantaneous creation or annihilation, and that they have no windows for external influence. It further explains that monads must possess qualities, that all monads differ qualitatively, and that their continual natural change arises from internal forces rather than external causes.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages13

Reading Time33 min

AccessFree to download

Monad and simple substances

Composite things and the need for monads

No natural beginning or end except creation/annihilation

No external influence

No windows and rejection of accidental causation

Qualities and qualitative distinction

Monads differ from one another

Continual change from internal force

Natural change and internal causes

The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology G. W. Leibniz 1714 Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017 . All rights reserved [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots · enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates theomission of a brief passage that seems to present more difﬁculty than it is worth. First launched: 2004 * * * * * * * * 1. My topic here will be the monad, which is just a simple substance. By calling it `simple' I mean that it has no parts, though it can be a part of something composite. 2. There must be simple substances, because there are composites. A composite thing is just a collection of simple ones that happen to have come together. 3. Something that has no parts can't be extended, can't have a shape, and can't be split up. So monads are the true atoms of Nature—the elements out of which everything is made. 4. We don't have to fear that a monad might fall to pieces; there is no conceivable way it could •go out of existence naturally. 5. For the same reason, there is no way for a simple substance to •come into existence naturally, for that would involve its being put together, assembled, composed, and a simple substance couldn't be formed in that way because it has no parts. 6. So we can say that the only way for monads to begin or end—to come into existence or go out of existence—is •instantaneously, being created or annihilated all at once. Composite things, in contrast with that, can begin or end •gradually, through the assembling or scattering of their parts. 7. It doesn't make sense to suppose that a monad might be altered or re-arranged internally by any other created thing. Within a monad there's nothing to re-arrange, and there is no conceivable internal motion in it that could be started, steered, sped up, or slowed down, as can happen in a composite thing that has parts that can change in relation to one another. [The passage from here to * is not by Leibniz. It makes explicit what was presumably at work in his mind when he made his remarkable jump.] That rules out every sort of inﬂuence that one might think a created thing might have on something else. (I stress `created' because of course I don't rule out God's affecting a monad.) Some philosophers have held that one thing can affect another by sending an `accident' across to it, understanding an accident to be an instance of a property as distinct from the thing that has the property. According to these philosophers, in addition to the •universal property heat and the •particular thing this poker there is a •particular property, an instance, an accident, namely the heat of this poker; and they hold that when the poker is plunged into cold water which then becomes warmer, the poker sends an accident—some of its particular heat—across to the water. Now, you might think that although a created thing can't cause re-arrangements ina simple substance it might be able to affect it in a different way by sending an accident across to it. And because you might think this I should add that * monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out! And ·anyway, quite apart from the imperviousness of monads to them, these supposed migrating accidents are philosophical rubbish·: accidents can't detach themselves and stroll about outside of substances! So neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from outside. 8. Monads, ·although they have no parts·, must have some qualities. There are two reasons why this must be so. (1) If they didn't have qualities they wouldn't be real things at all. (2) If they didn't differ from one another in their qualities, there would be no detectable changes in the world ·ofcompos- ite things · . Here is why. [Le

FAQs

What is a monad in Leibniz’s monadology?

A monad is a simple substance with no parts, functioning as an ultimate element from which composite things are formed.

How do monads begin or end?

Monads can begin or end only instantaneously, by being created or annihilated all at once; gradual assembly or scattering applies to composites instead.

Can other created things influence a monad from outside?

No. The text argues that monads have no windows for anything to come in or go out, so neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from outside.

Oct 20, 2026

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