The Management, Supervision and Control of Operation Safe Trains - 26 April 2002

Sep 20, 2026

Western Australia Ombudsman report assessing how Operation Safe Trains (OST) was managed, supervised, and controlled by a joint Police Service and Railways Commission taskforce. OST ran from 11 August 2000 to mid November 2000 with aims to reduce anti-social and criminal behaviour on trains and to mentor WAGR special constables. The report concludes that OST lacked accountable records, operated in an audit vacuum, and did not adequately achieve the mentoring objective. It addresses complaints, charge outcomes, costs, and recommends reforms to BAMR record keeping, management structures, statistical reporting, and joint evaluation for rail transit accountability.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages145

Reading Time6 h 5 min

AccessFree to download

Executive Summary

Introduction

Historical context

Why we are involved

What the Ombudsman is required to do

Our investigation

The objectives of OST

Accountability

Management of OST

Intelligence

Did OST meet its objectives?

Recommendations

Appendix A-Chronology of Investigation

Appendix B-Timeline

Appendix C-OST Objectives

Appendix D-Training and Mentoring

Appendix E-Accountable Record Keeping

Appendix F-Intelligence Gathering

Appendix G – Success of OST

Appendix H-Submission by the Commissioner of Police

Appendix I-Submission by Assistant Commissioner D

Appendix J-Submission by Sergeant A

Appendix K-Submission by Inspector H

Appendix L-Submission by Inspector K

Appendix M-Submission by Superintendent E

OMBUDSMAN Western Australia The Management, Supervision and Control of Operation Safe Trains 26 April 2002 Index Executive Summary 3 Introduction 5 Historical context 5 Why we are involved 6 What the Ombudsman is required to do 7 Our investigation 8 The objectives of OST 9 Accountability 12 Accountability in the WAPS and BAMR audits 13 Accountable records in OST 15 BAMR audits in OST 17 Management of OST 18 Day-to-day management 20 Statistics 21 Frontline supervision 24 The 'Lathlain' incident 24 The 'Showgrounds' incident 25 The second 'Showgrounds' incident 25 The 'Warwick' incident 26 The 'red man' incident 27 The 'firearm' incident 28 Intelligence 29 Operation Carrier 30 Operation Safe Trains 30 Did OST meet its objectives? 31 Summary of conclusions 32 Opinion 33 Recommendations 34 Appendix A-Chronology of Investigation 37 Appendix B-Timeline 39 Appendix C-OST Objectives 43 Appendix D-Training and Mentoring 45 Appendix E-Accountable Record Keeping 47 Appendix F-Intelligence Gathering 49 Appendix G – Success of OST 50 Appendix H-Submission by the Commissioner of Police 51 Appendix I-Submission by Assistant Commissioner D 57 Appendix J-Submission by Sergeant A 100 Appendix K-Submission by Inspector H 131 Appendix L-Submission by Inspector K 135 Appendix M-Submission by Superintendent E 140 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1.1 This report deals with the management, supervision and control of a joint Police Service and Railways Commission Taskforce known as Operation Safe Trains ("OST") . OST ran for approximately three months, from 11 August 2000 to mid November 2000. Its brief was: • To reduce anti-social and criminal behaviour on trains. • For police officers to mentor special constables about how to deal with criminal and anti-social behaviour. 1.2 In the view of this Office, there is no definitive way of measuring whether OST met its anti-social and crime-reducing objective. This is because OST operated in what might be described as an audit vacuum: • It operated on a system of trust instead of accountability. • Its records were insufficient to determine what its officers did or where they were on a day-to-day basis. • In the main, statistics compiled during the operation amounted to little more than informed guesswork. • Its records were not subjected to the usual Business Area Management Review ("BAMR") audit process at any time. 1.3 In our view OST did not meet its mentoring objective either. Notwithstanding that mentoring special constables was both a primary objective of OST and the factor that differentiated it from the single agency Metropolitan Taskforce that preceded it, it would appear that no substantive effort was ever made to achieve this objective. 1.4 OST attracted a number of complaints that suggested it adopted overly aggressive policing tactics. Videotape evidence in relation to one of the complaints captured what appeared to be acts of serious misconduct in the presence of the OST supervisor, without his intervention. 1.5 Six complaints gave rise to this investigation. In relation to them: • Seven charges preferred by OST were withdrawn. • Six charges were dismissed. • Over $20,000 costs were awarded against police. • One man was subjected to force, handcuffed and then released without charge - OST records incorrectly indicated that he was charged. 1.6 The lack of accountable records maintained by OST means that it is not now possible to determine whether the approach highlighted by these complaints typified OST's tactics or whether these particular matters were aberrations. 1.7 I have made four recommendations to deal with the problems highlighted by OST: 1. I recommend that the Commissioner of Police review the BAMR system, focussing on: • Standardisation of record keeping. • Auditability of records. • Identification of accountability risks and failures. The review should proceed wi

FAQs

What was the purpose and duration of Operation Safe Trains (OST)?

OST was formed as a joint taskforce to reduce anti-social and criminal behaviour on trains and to mentor WAGR special constables. It ran for approximately three months, from 11 August 2000 to mid November 2000.

Why does the report say OST’s success is hard to measure?

The report states there was an “audit vacuum,” with trust-based operations, insufficient records to show day-to-day actions or locations, and statistics that amounted to informed guesswork. It also notes OST records were not subjected to the usual BAMR audit process.

What recommendations did the Ombudsman make to address OST-related problems?

Recommendations include reviewing the BAMR system with a focus on standardised and auditable record keeping and accountability risks; reviewing OST management and reporting structures in the Metropolitan Region; reviewing how statistics are compiled and used in WAPS; and conducting a joint evaluation of rail transit authority management and communication structures, including accountability and statistical recording practices.

Sep 20, 2026

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