The End of the Teapot Argument for Atheism

Jul 3, 2026

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The paper examines atheists’ use of Bertrand Russell’s teapot argument and teapot-type variants with substituted imagined objects to defend atheism against agnosticism. It argues the approach is unacceptably circular: the invoked objects are intrinsically improbable, and there is indirect evidence against them. Because rational doubt about these objects should extend to their existence claims, the argument fails to justify dismissing belief in God.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryReligion & Spirituality

FormatPDF

Pages15

Reading Time38 min

Introduction

The original teapot argument

Variants used in contemporary atheism

Why the Teapot Argument Fails

Intrinsic improbability and circularity

The End of the Teapot Argument for Atheism (and All Its Tawdry Imitators) Mark F. Sharlow Abstract Atheists sometimes use Bertrand Russell’s teapot argument, and its variants with other objects in place of the teapot, to argue for the rationality of atheism. In this paper I show that this use of the teapot argument and its variants is unacceptably circular. The circularity arises because there is indirect evidence against the objects invoked in the arguments. 1. Introduction Atheistic authors often use Bertrand Russell's teapot argument to build a case for disbelief in God. [1] Here is the argument as Russell originally presented it: If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. [2] On its face, this argument points to a seemingly reasonable conclusion: one should not feel compelled to believe that God exists unless one has evidence that God exists. However, some atheists use the teapot argument in a substantially different way. They use it to show that if one lacks evidence for God then one should believe that there is not a God. According to this line of argument, if you feel there is insufficient evidence for God, the rational course of action is to dismiss the whole idea of God instead of just remaining undecided. In other words, if you don't feel there's convincing evidence for the existence of God, you should be an atheist instead of just being an agnostic. Today’s atheistic authors also use variants ofthe teapot argument for the same purpose asthe original argument. In these variants, the teapot is replaced by other imagined objects: the Invisible Pink Unicorn, the Tooth Fairy, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, leprechauns, and others. [3] These arguments, along with the original teapot argument, will be the main topic of this paper. Another variant, which I will mention only briefly here, frames the argument in terms of the burden of proof. According to this variant, if the theist cannot meet the burden of proof for the existence of God, then we should conclude that there probably is not a God – just as we believe there probably is not an orbiting teapot (or leprechaun or whatever) . [4] This outcome is different from the prima facie more reasonable move of simply refusing to believe there is a God. Adding the concept of burden of proof does not change the nature of the argument, but it leaves the argument vulnerable to additional criticisms. Michael Antony has cast doubt on the New Atheists’claim that only the theists, and not the atheists, bear a burden of proof. [5] In this paper, when I refer to “the teapot argument” I will mean Russell’s teapot argument used in support of atheism instead of agnosticism. By “teapot-type arguments” I will mean variants on the teapot argument (as just defined) with other objects replacing the teapot. I will not have much to say about other uses of Russell’s teapot and its variants, though some ofwhat I say might carry over, with suitable changes, to those other uses. 2. Why the Teapot Argument Fails Unfortunately for the New Atheists, the teapot argument is fallacious. It is a circular argument. To find out where the circularity comes in, first notice that the imaginary object used in the teapot argument is intrinsically improbable. If you replace the orbiting teapot with other objects that are more probable, the argument ceases to be convincing. The observation that there is something implausible (not just unproven) about Russell’s teapot and similar objects is not new. I am not the first to point it out. Michael Antony, in an

FAQs

Why does the paper say the argument becomes circular?

Circularity arises from indirect evidence against the substituted objects invoked in teapot-type arguments; the arguments rely on assertions about improbable entities whose existence is not supported by non-ridiculous evidence.

Jul 3, 2026

Upload by Riley