Pseudonym Scheme Based on Hybrid Certificates for Security Credential Management System in Vehicular Communications

Aug 30, 2026

Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and related vehicular-security standards rely heavily on elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) and include mechanisms such as Butterfly Key Expansion (BKE) to protect vehicle privacy. With the anticipated threat from quantum computing to RSA/ECC, this study proposes a hybrid certificate that combines ECC with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to strengthen resilience. It also introduces a generalized pseudonym scheme compatible with multiple cryptographic algorithms to prevent correlation between pseudonym and enrollment public keys. A performance comparison covers message length and computation time across RSA, ECC, and NIST-standardized PQC.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages22

Reading Time55 min

AccessFree to download

Abstract

Introduction

Pseudonym Scheme Based on Hybrid Certificates for Security Credential Management System in Vehicular Communications Abel C. H. Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, F. J. Hwang, Yu-Chih Wei, Chin-Chen Chang, Fellow, IEEE, and Bon-Yeh Lin Abstract—In recent years, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have developed a series of security communication standards for vehicular communications. These standards include mechanisms such asthe Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Butterfly Key Expansion (BKE) to protect vehicle privacy. However, these standards are mainly based on the Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), which may be vulnerable to attacks from quantum computing in the future. In response to this potential risk, this study proposes a hybrid certificate that combines the ECC with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This approach enables infrastructure systems to be built on cryptographic foundations that are more resilient to quantum-based attacks. Furthermore, this study presents a generalized pseudonym scheme that is compatible with various cryptographic algorithms for generating pseudonym certificates. This design aims to eliminate the possibility of inferring any correlation between the public key in a pseudonym certificate and that in an enrollment certificate. This study also conducts a comprehensive performance evaluation of the RSA, ECC, and PQC algorithms, particularly those standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The comparison considers factors such as message length and computation time. Based on the findings, this study recommends suitable pseudonym schemes that adopt hybrid certificates for secure and efficient use in vehicular communications. Index Terms—Pseudonym scheme, hybrid certificate, ellipticcurve cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, security credential management system, vehicular communication. I. INTRODUCTION WITH the widespread adoption of information and communication technologies and artificial intelligence applications, the security of Vehicle Abel C. H. Chen and Bon-Yeh Lin are with the Information & Communications Security Laboratory, Chunghwa Telecom Laboratories, Taoyuan 32661, Taiwan (e-mail: [chchen.scholar@gmail.com](chchen.scholar@gmail.com); [bylin@cht.com.tw](bylin@cht.com.tw)). (Corresponding author: Abel C. H. Chen) F. J. Hwang is with Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung 804201, Taiwan (e-mail: [fengjanghwang@gmail.com](fengjanghwang@gmail.com)). Yu-Chih Wei is with the Department of Information and Finance Management, National Taipei University of Technology, Taipei 106344, Taiwan (e-mail: [vickrey@mail.ntut.edu.tw](vickrey@mail.ntut.edu.tw)). (Co-Corresponding author: YuChih Wei) Chin-Chen Chang is with the Department of Information Engineering, Feng Chia University, Taichung 407802, Taiwan (e-mail: [alan3c@gmail.com](alan3c@gmail.com)). to-Everything (V2X) communications has emerged as a critical topic of global concern. In recent years, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has proposed the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [1],[2], while the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has introduced the Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) Security Credential Management System (CCMS) [3],[4] . These efforts have led to the development of relevant standards for vehicular communications, such as certificate structure specifications defined in IEEE 1609.2 [5] and ETSI TS 103 097 [6], and certificate request procedures outlined in IEEE 1609.2.1 [7] and ETSI TS 102 941 [8] . To ensure interoperability, working groups from both IEEE and ETSI have referenced each other’s designs and architectures, with the expectation that many structures and processes will eventually align. For instance, Version 2.1.1 of ETSI TS 103 097 defines its certifi

FAQs

How does the generalized pseudonym scheme protect privacy?

It prevents correlation between the public key in a pseudonym certificate and the public key in an enrollment certificate, including under a generalized design compatible with multiple algorithms.

Aug 30, 2026

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