Philosophy Study - Vol. 2 - No. 2 - A Cool Hand on My Feverish Forehead: An Even Better Samaritan and the Ethics of Abortion

Oct 28, 2026

An academic paper examines Judith Jarvis Thomson’s abortion ethics, focusing on her argument by analogy, including the “violinist analogy” and related narratives. It argues that Thomson’s reasoning is not fully conclusive because the number and relevance of similarities are insufficient, while key moral parameters governing abortion are overlooked. The paper situates the debate within autonomy versus personhood, reviewing positions on when personhood begins and assessing how Thomson’s pro-choice framing supports moral permissibility.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages9

Reading Time23 min

AccessFree to download

Introduction

Thomson’s Argument by Analogy

Philosophy Study, ISSN 2159-5313 February 2012, Vol. 2, No. 2, 115-123 D DAVID PUBLISHING A Cool Hand on My Feverish Forehead: An Even Better Samaritan and the Ethics of Abortion Evangelos D. Protopapadakis National and Kapodistrian University of Athens The debate concerning abortion abounds in miraculous narratives. Judith Jarvis Thomson has contrived the most celebrated set among related ones, to wit the “violinist analogy,” the “Good Samaritan” narrative, and the “Henry Fonda” allegory, by virtue of which, she intends, on the one hand, to argue that women’s right to autonomy outweighs the alleged fetus’s right to life, and on the other, to prove that no positive moral duties can be derived towards other persons alone from the fact that a moral agent is ascribed certain rights. What this short paper endeavors to prove is that Thomson’s argumentation by analogy is a weak one, since neither the number nor the relevance of similarities invoked is adequate or satisfactory, while crucial parameters concerning the morality of abortion are being totally overlooked. Keywords: abortion, fetus, rape, violinist analogy, Good Samaritan, duty, right, morality 1. Introduction Anybody who has taken even a quick glance at the field of applied ethics can only admit that it more or less deals with considerable, sometimes stiff, and even grave issues. If one, however, decides to probe a little further into the relevant literature, in many cases, one may experience the bizarre feeling that has unexpectedly visited some peculiar playground designed especially for the recreation of philosophers, who once in a while feel the urge to leave aside their solemn demeanor and give in to a merrily hopping around carefully chosen maypoles. This is true of many issues that fall under the domain of applied ethics, but never truer than when it comes to abortion, regarding which one could read about space explorers who encounter aliens (Warren 1973, 54), chocolate boxes (Thomson 1971, 56), people seeds that drift about in the air like pollen and make them pregnant (Thomson 1971, 59), transparent wombs (Wertheimer 1971, 91), monster-missiles (Thomson 1986, 26-27), miraculous injections to kitten brains (Tooley 2006, 36), and rapidly growing giant-kids trapped within tiny houses (Thomson 1971, 52) . When it comes to abortion, many philosophers seem reluctant to deal with the human condition directly, moving thus into a world of fantasy (Abbott 1978, 318) . However, there is nothing wrong with that. As a matter of fact, ever since the celebrated Platonic myths and Zeno’s paradoxes, philosophy takes an overt fancy to indirect approaches concerning crucial issues, either by necessity—due to lack of appropriate and clear terms—or by choice. Therefore, as far as the ethics of abortion is concerned, philosophers’ propensity for turning to imaginative allegories on purpose of clarifying notions and presenting their case stands for nothing more than tagging along with a long lasting and vivid tradition in philosophical Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, Ph.D., Lecturer in Applied Ethics, Department of Philosophy, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece; main research field: Applied Ethics. 116 AN EVEN BETTER SAMARITAN AND THE ETHICS OF ABORTION meditation. In this paper I intend to critically examine one of the most influential—as well as challenging—approaches concerning the ethics of abortion, namely, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s set of celebrated analogies, by virtue of which she argues in favor of the moral admissibility of abortion on grounds of the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy and self-determination. I will argue that, although Thomson sheds light on previously uncharted aspects of the issue and promotes the moral debate, her argument by analogy is not an irrefutable one. 2. Thomson’s Argument by Analogy The main axes for the contemporary abortion debate are two: on the one hand, the right to unlimited autonomy and self deter

FAQs

What central argument does the paper make against Thomson’s abortion ethics?

The paper claims Thomson’s argument by analogy is weak because the similarities are not sufficiently numerous or relevant, and important moral factors are ignored.

How does the paper frame the contemporary abortion debate?

It frames the debate around two axes: a right to autonomy and self-determination versus questions of personhood and the fetus’s moral status.

What positions on personhood are discussed in relation to abortion?

The paper outlines three main positions: personhood from conception, personhood at or right after birth, or personhood based on criteria such as self-awareness, viability, and sensibility.

Oct 28, 2026

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