Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability - Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela

Jul 19, 2026

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Investigates how state censorship during Venezuela’s 2007 closing of RCTV affected political accountability and voter behavior under Hugo Chavez. Using ratings to measure media switching, the study finds viewership declines on the progovernment replacement in areas where it replaces RCTV, but rises on Globovision where viewers retain access. Using Latinbarometer surveys, electoral returns, and protest data, it further shows Chavez support falls more in municipalities that keep access to uncensored opposition television.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages33

Reading Time1 h 23 min

Introduction

Opposition media and voter accountability

Venezuela and the 2007 RCTV closing

Identifying variation from Globovision access

Empirical approach and evidence sources

Pub lic Disclosure Authorized Pub lic Disclosure Authorized The World Bank Economic Review, 36(2), 2022, 455–487 [https://doi.org10.1093/wber/lhab018](https://doi.org10.1093/wber/lhab018) Article Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela Brian Knight and Ana Tribin Abstract This study investigates the effects of state censorship in the context of the 2007 government closing of RCTV, a popular opposition television channel in Venezuela. Some parts of the country had access to a second opposition channel, Globovision, while other parts completely lost access to opposition television. The first finding, based upon ratings data, is that viewership fell on the progovernment replacement, following the closing of RCTV, but rose on Globovision in areas with access to the signal. Based upon this switching, the paper investigates whether support for Chavez fell in areas that retained access to opposition television, relative to those that completely lost access. Using three measures, Latinbarometer survey data, electoral returns, and data on protest activity, the second finding is that support for Chavez fell in municipalities that retained access to opposition television, relative to municipalities that lost access to opposition television. Taken together, these two findings suggest that voters switching from censored outlets to uncensored outlets can limit the effectiveness of state censorship. JEL classification: D70, D80 Keywords: censorship, media bias, voting 1. Introduction Opposition media has the potential to help voters hold incumbent politicians and parties accountable. By reporting on the performance of government, including coverage of scandals and corruption, the media provides information to voters that is useful when deciding whether or not to reelect incumbent politicians and parties.1 In this way, the media also provides incentives for officials to act in the best interests of their constituents.2 Despite these potential benefits of opposition media to society, Brian Knight (corresponding author) is a professor at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA; his email address is [brian_knight@brown.edu. Ana Tribin is a Public Policy Specialist at](brian_knight@brown.edu. Ana Tribin is a Public Policy Specialist at) the Regional Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); her email address is [ana.tribin@undp.org. The](ana.tribin@undp.org. The) authors thank audiences at the California Institute of Technology, Columbia University, Harvard University, London School of Economics, Nottingham University, Stanford Graduate School of Business, the University of Warwick, the Paris Empirical Political Economy Seminar, the New York City Media Seminar, and the RIDGE/LACEA-PEG Workshop on Political Economy. Julia Cage, Greg Martin, Adam Szeidl, Ferenc Szucs, and Maria Petrova provided helpful comments. Thanks to Juan Pereira for careful research assistance. A supplementary online appendix is available with this article at The World Bank Economic Review website. 1 On media coverage of government performance, see, among others, Ferraz and Finan (2008) . 2 On these incentives provided by media coverage, see, among others, Besley and Burgess (2002) and Ferraz and Finan (2011) . © The Author(s) 2021 . Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [journals.permissions@oup.com](journals.permissions@oup.com) Downloaded from [https://academic.oup.com/wber/article/36/2/455/6364498 by LEGVP Law Library user on 08 December 2023](https://academic.oup.com/wber/article/36/2/455/6364498 by LEGVP Law Library user on 08 December 2023) incumbent governments, given the threats to their power, face incentives to limit press scrutiny of their office via censorship.3 When the gov

FAQs

What event does the study analyze in Venezuela?

The study examines the 2007 government closing of RCTV, a popular opposition television channel, and the resulting replacement by TVES.

How does the paper measure media effects after the shutdown?

It uses viewership ratings to track switching between the progovernment replacement and Globovision where opposition access remains available.

What data sources support the paper’s second finding on political support?

It combines three measures: Latinbarometer survey data, electoral returns, and protest activity data to compare municipalities with and without opposition television access.

Jul 19, 2026

Upload by Ezra