Modeling Accountant Whistleblowing Intentions Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Fraud Triangle

Jul 6, 2026

Accounting fraud poses a serious threat to the public interest, and whistleblowing is treated as the most effective mechanism for fraud discovery. This study integrates the theory of planned behavior with the fraud triangle to structure prior whistleblowing research and to model professional accountants’ intention to report material accounting fraud. Results from 284 professional organizational accountants show that attitudes and perceived control over whistleblowing positively predict whistleblowing intention. Supplemental analyses also link gender and management level with whistleblowing intent, supporting the integrated model for explaining and predicting reporting behavior.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages30

Reading Time1 h 16 min

Abstract

Introduction

Background and public interest

Rationale for modeling intentions

ACCOUNTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST American Accounting Association Vol. 16, No. 1 DOI: 10 .2308/apin-51675 2016 pp. 28–56 Modeling Accountant Whistleblowing Intentions: Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Fraud Triangle J. Owen Brown Baylor University Jerry Hays The University of Texas at Austin Martin T. Stuebs, Jr. Baylor University ABSTRACT: Accounting fraud represents a severe threat to the public interest, and whistleblowing remains the most effective fraud discovery mechanism. In this research, we integrate the theory of planned behavior with the fraud triangle to organize prior whistleblowing literature and model the intention of professional accountants to blow the whistle on a material accounting fraud. The results, based on responses from 284 professional organizational accountants, support our theory development and indicate that attitudes and perceptions of control over whistleblowing are positively related to whistleblowing intention. In supplemental analyses, we also find that gender and management level are significantly associated with whistleblowing intent. Our results provide evidence for using our integrated theoretical model to explain and predict the reporting intention of corporate accountants. Findings should aid organizations and regulators seeking to improve corporate ethical culture and aid governance researchers in their understanding of the complex environmental and individual factors impacting whistleblowing intent. Keywords: whistleblowing; theory of planned behavior; fraud triangle; perceived control; perceived norms; attitude. We thank Laurie Burnie, Amy M. Hageman (associate editor), Eileen Taylor, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2015 Public Interest Section Midyear Meeting and the 2014 AAA Annual Meeting for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. We also thank the Institute of Management Accountants and its members for supporting this research project. Editor’s note: Accepted by Amy M. Hageman. Submitted: May 2015 Accepted: January 2017 Published Online: January 2017 INTRODUCTION A ccountants are often in key positions to uncover and blow the whistle on corporate wrongdoing because of their access to accounting information and their understanding of financial statement fraud. As noteworthy examples, accountants Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper were named Time’s 2002 Persons of the Year for blowing the whistle on the accounting frauds at Enron and WorldCom, respectively. And yet whistleblowing has become oneof the most debated issues in ethics and accounting (Teo and Caspersz 2011, 237) because individuals often choose not to blow the whistle and instead remain fallaciously silent (MacGregor and Stuebs 2014) . In spite of its imperfections, whistleblowing remains an important and effective fraud discovery tool.1 The importance of understanding the key determinants to whistleblowing intent, especially within the corporate accounting setting, is further highlighted by the recent legislative attempts to encourage whistleblowing by corporate employees (e.g. , the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 [SOX] and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) . This paper models the incentives and deterrents involved in organizational accountants’ intention to blow the whistle based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) integrated with and supported by the fraud triangle (Cressey 1953) . This information will not only lead to a better understanding of the motivations for whistleblowing, but may also suggest whistleblowing improvements that could include improved management policies, training programs, and whistleblowing legislation. Fraud continues to be ‘‘pervasive, persistent and pernicious,’’ with accounting fraud growing the fastest and nearly quadrupling (from 10 percent to 38 percent) over the past decade (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009, 4) . Other global fraud surveys (Deloitte 2013; Ernst & Young [EY] 2014; KPMG 2013) support these f

FAQs

What is the main purpose of the study on whistleblowing intentions?

To model professional accountants’ intention to report material accounting fraud by integrating the theory of planned behavior with the fraud triangle and organizing prior whistleblowing literature.

Which factors were found to be positively related to whistleblowing intention?

Attitudes toward whistleblowing and perceptions of control over whistleblowing are positively related to whistleblowing intention.

Do demographic or organizational variables relate to whistleblowing intent?

Supplemental analyses indicate that gender and management level are significantly associated with whistleblowing intent.

Jul 6, 2026

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