Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India

Oct 17, 2026

Uploaded by ahduag

Analyzes how preferences for noneconomic traits such as caste shape equilibrium matching patterns and tests the theory using middle-class Indian arranged marriages. Provides theoretical results showing equilibrium effects differ depending on whether preferences favor one’s own group or “marrying up.” Empirically estimates caste and other attribute preferences from a dataset of individuals placing matrimonial advertisements, finding only a strong in-caste preference. Concludes that, in equilibrium, caste has limited impact on matching patterns across non-caste attributes.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages40

Reading Time1 h 41 min

AccessFree to download

Introduction

Marriage as an economic decision

The role of caste in marriage outcomes

Motivation and research question

Why stated caste preferences remain strong

Methodology for identifying actual preferences

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2013, 5(2): 33–72 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.33](http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.33) Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India† By Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune* This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one’sown group or for “marrying up.” We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements and find only a strong preference for in-caste marriage. This translates, in equilibrium, in caste doing little to alter the matching patterns on non-caste attributes. (JEL C78, J12, O15, O17, Z13) Marriage is, among other things, an important economic decision. Sorting in families has an impact on child outcomes and the accumulation of human capital, and consequently, on long-term economic development and inequality (Fernández and Rogerson 2001; Fernández 2003) . In developing countries, where many women do not work outside their homes, marriage is arguably the single most important determinant of a woman’s economic future.1 In India, the setting for this paper, several studies have shown that marriage is indeed taken as an economic decision, managed by parents more often than by the prospective spouses. For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that parents marry their daughters in villages where incomes co-vary less with respect to their own village. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that demand for healthy women in the marriage market influences investments in girls. * Banerjee: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive Building E52, Room 252G, Cambridge, MA ([e-mail: banerjee@mit.edu](e-mail: banerjee@mit.edu)). Duflo: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive Building E52, Room 252D, Cambridge, MA (e-mail: eduflo@mit. edu) . Ghatak: Department of Economics, R530, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, UK ([e-mail: m.ghatak@lse.ac.uk](e-mail: m.ghatak@lse.ac.uk)). Lafortune: Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Vicuña MacKenna 4860, Macul, Santiago, Chile (e-mail: [jlafortune@uc.cl](jlafortune@uc.cl)). We thank the Anandabazar Patrika for their cooperation for this project, and Prasid Chakrabarty and the team of SRG investigators for conducting the survey. We thank Raquel Fernández, Ali Hortaçsu, Patrick Bajari, George Mailath, Whitney Newey, Parag Pathak, Debraj Ray, Alvin Roth, Ken Wolpin, many seminar participants and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Finally, we also thank Sanchari Roy and Tommy Wang for outstanding research assistance. The authors have no financial or other material interests related to this project to disclose. † To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the article page at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.33](http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.33) . 1 Even in our sample of highly educated females and males, fewer than 25 percent of matched brides were working after marriage. 34 AMErIcAn EconoMIc JournAL: MIcroEconoMIcs MAy 2013 Yet, “status”-like attributes, such as caste, continue to play a seemingly crucial role in determining marriage outcomes in India. In a recent opinion poll in India, 74 percent of respondents declared to be opposed to inter-caste marriage.2 The institution is so prevalent that matrimonial advertisements (henceforth, ads) in Indian newspapers are classified under caste headings, making it immediately obvious where prospective brides or grooms can find someone from their own caste. It is well

FAQs

How does the paper explain the effect of caste preferences on matching equilibrium?

It shows that equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether individuals prefer partners from their own group or prefer “marrying up,” which changes how preferences translate into matching patterns.

What data does the paper use to estimate preferences for caste and other attributes?

It uses a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements, estimating their preferences based on observed choices in that marriage market setting.

What is the empirical finding about caste’s role in partner matching?

The paper finds only a strong preference for in-caste marriage, and argues that caste then does little to alter matching patterns on non-caste attributes in equilibrium.

Oct 17, 2026

Uploaded by ahduag