Kimball on Goh - H-Diplo Article Commentary

Aug 26, 2026

Uploaded by Kyle

Jeffrey Kimball provides an article commentary on Evelyn Goh’s study of Henry Kissinger’s “Soviet card” in the U.S. opening to China from 1971 to 1974. Goh analyzes Kissinger’s policy evolution across three phases and argues that the Soviet card was used to keep pressure and leverage toward Moscow rather than to win concessions from Beijing. The commentary highlights Chinese skepticism, the diplomatic failure of tacit alliance tactics, and broader reflections on triangular realpolitik, détente, and the management—or mismanagement—of U.S.-USSR rivalry.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages2

Reading Time5 min

AccessFree to download

Overview

Goh’s core argument and three phases

Chinese responses and policy implications

Kissinger’s tactics and concluding questions

H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Goh Evelyn Goh,“Nixon, Kissinger, and the‘Soviet Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971- 1974”, Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, Issue 3 (June 2005): 475-502. Commentary by Jeffrey Kimball, Miami University of Ohio Published by H-Diplo on 28 October 2005 Evelyn Goh, a professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, describes how and asks why Henry Kissinger increasingly emphasized the Soviet military threat to China’s security in his negotiations with Beijing between 1971 and 1973. Drawing from the archival record and the literature on U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China during the Nixon presidency, she traces Kissinger’s evolving policy through three phases: parallel détente with a tilt toward China (1971 to early 1972); “formal symmetry” but “tacit alliance”(mid 1972 to early 1973); and strategic shifts, attempted secret alliance, and stymied normalization (mid 1973 to 1974) . Her purpose is to “understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino-American relations”(477), because, she asserts, histories of triangular diplomacy have given more attention to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s playing of the China card vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than of the Soviet card vis-à-vis China. Goh argues that in pursuing rapprochement Nixon and Kissinger “sought to manage . . . Chinese expectations” about improved Sino-American relations and dissuade Beijing from thinking that the U.S. aim was really that of playing “the China card in order to persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate détente with the United States”(479, 489) . From 1969 on, she suggests, the“immediate aim” of Nixon and Kissinger’s “opening to China ... had been to boost the momentum of détente with the Soviet Union; that is, it was conceived as leverage to improve relations with and seek cooperation from Moscow, not to form a quasi-alliance to contain it” (499) . Kissinger’s deployment of the “Soviet card”was not designed to win concessions from Beijing but had the purpose of keeping the China card in play in order to win concessions from Moscow. The Chinese were skeptical throughout. Although accepting the reality of a Soviet threat, they differed with Kissinger’s assessment of its immediacy and dangers, disagreed with American policies to cope with it, and questioned Nixon-administration intentions. They accepted Kissinger’s offer of American intelligence but rejected Kissinger’s proffers of a tacit then secret semi-formal alliance. In the end, Kissinger’s tactics vis-à-vis the PRC failed. Beijing would have preferred more U.S. concessions on Taiwan, swifter movement toward normalization of relations, and a turn away from U.S. efforts to bring about détente with the Soviet Union. Détente, meanwhile, ran aground on the shoals of the U.S.-USSR rivalry, Moscow’s disgruntlement with détente’s putative benefits, and domestic pressures upon both governments. Concluding that Kissinger was “injudicious” and somewhat reckless in proposing an alliance with China, Goh therefore asks why Kissinger hazarded this ploy. She proposes that hemiscalculated Beijing’s need for reassurance regarding the Soviet threat and then fell into a H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Goh “discursive” trap; that is, because he “over-perceived Beijing’s need for reassurance,” he either decided that a tilt toward China was in order or he engaged in “cheap talk”—or both (501) . Perhaps she is correct. But one can also speculate that Kissinger fell into a mind-set trap; that is, his diplomatic world-view was one rooted in nineteenth-century Metternichian-Bismarckian notions of Realpolitik mixed with Nixonian notions of threat and bluff that were in reality naive—in part because Beijing and Moscow understood triangular diplomacy and bluff very well. (Regarding Nixon’s contributions, White House tapes reveal

FAQs

What does Evelyn Goh argue about Kissinger’s “Soviet card” toward China?

Goh argues that Kissinger emphasized the Soviet military threat primarily to keep the China card in play and to extract concessions from Moscow, not to secure concessions from Beijing.

How does Goh structure the evolution of Kissinger’s policy from 1971 to 1974?

She traces three phases: parallel détente with a tilt toward China (1971 to early 1972), “formal symmetry” with a “tacit alliance” approach (mid 1972 to early 1973), and strategic shifts including attempted secrecy and stalled normalization (mid 1973 to 1974).

Why did Goh conclude that Kissinger’s tactics vis-à-vis the PRC failed?

Beijing remained skeptical, accepted some intelligence-related offers, but rejected tacit/semi-formal alliance approaches; it also wanted stronger U.S. concessions on Taiwan and faster normalization than Kissinger’s strategy delivered.

Aug 26, 2026

Uploaded by Kyle