Joe Weiss DOE October 2021 Secretary of Energy Public Comments - Process Sensor Cyber Security and Paradigm Change

Sep 4, 2026

Uploaded by Dozel

Joseph Weiss submits public comments to the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board in October 2021, drawing on decades of experience in industrial control system instrumentation, diagnostics, and cyber security program development. The comments argue that network-based IT/OT approaches are insufficient because process sensors feeding control networks are often assumed uncompromised and unauthenticated. Weiss highlights real incidents and adversary capabilities, including failures tied to safety pressure transmitter requirements and risks from spoofed or counterfeit sensor inputs. A paradigm shift is proposed: out-of-band, real-time monitoring of process sensor electrical characteristics to detect anomalies and improve resilience.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages2

Reading Time5 min

AccessFree to download

My background

Process sensors

IT and Operational Technology (OT) cyber security

Control system cyber incidents are real

Paradigm change

Comments of Joseph Weiss to the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board, October 28, 2021 My background I am an independent consultant specializing in cyber security of industrial control systems used throughout all industries, manufacturing, buildings, transportation, and defense. I have been involved in instrumentation, control systems, and equipment diagnostics for almost 50 years and cyber security of control systems since I helped start the control system cyber security program for the electric industry while at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in 2000. I helped the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) start the INL SCADA Test Bed, and supported NIST in extending SP800-53 for control systems, supported FERC, the National Association of Water Companies, the National Academies Federal Facilities Council on cyber security for federal buildings , the February 2021 NNSA 5G and Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. I am the Managing Director of the International Society of Automation (ISA) Nuclear Plant Standards (ISA67), Fossil Plant Standards (ISA77), and Industrial Automation and Control System Standards (ISA99) . I also wrote the first book on consequence-based engineering for control system cyber security in 2010 – Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats. Consequence-based engineering means determining what impacts can, and have, occurred and reducing risk by design, training, and procedures. Process sensors Process sensors measure pressure, level, flow (e.g. , steam, liquids, electric power, etc. ), temperature, voltage, current, etc. These devices are essential for cyber security, process safety, reliability, product quality, and resilience by providing critical input to field controllers, actuators, motors, drives, analyzers, robots, and Windows-based operator stations. All organizations that monitor or control physical processes utilize similar types of process sensors from common vendors with common cyber limitations. That includes DOE’s operating portfolio of commercial and military nuclear facilities, electric power generation including hydro and renewables, electric grids including microgrids, smart manufacturing, smart buildings, high-power usage devices including electric motors, etc. IT and Operational Technology (OT) cyber security practitioners take a network-based approach that monitors the Internet Protocol (IP) networks for network anomalies. This is necessary and sufficient for IT networks but is not sufficient for full control system cyber security. That is because process sensors , which are input to OT networks, have been wrongly assumed to be uncompromised, authenticated, have cyber logging capabilities , and provide correct readings throughout their operating cycle. Erroneous process sensor readings, whether from unintentional or malicious causes, have contributed to major catastrophic impacts yet process safety standards do not address the cyber security of the process sensors. As a result, process sensor cyber vulnerabilities were examined in a joint ISA84 (process safety)/ISA99 (cyber security) assessment of a state-of-the-art safety pressure transmitter installed in a Liquified Natural Gas facility. The pressure transmitter failed 69 of the 138 individual cyber security requirements that could have prevented safe operation of the facility 1. All infrastructures and equipment are at risk as the process sensors aren’t secure and authenticated (that is, knowing the sensor measurement signal come from the sensor) . Control system cyber incidents are real Our adversaries are aware of these limitations. An industrial security specialist for the Electric Industry of Iran has in-depth knowledge of industry control system security frameworks and best practices such as 1 [https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/ot-network-security-often-does-not-view-control-system](https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/ot

FAQs

What paradigm change does Weiss propose to protect crucial infrastructures?

He proposes monitoring the electrical characteristics of process sensors out-of-band in real time, not connected to Internet networks, to detect process anomalies regardless of cause.

Sep 4, 2026

Uploaded by Dozel