JFK and de Gaulle - How America and France Failed in Vietnam, 1961-1963

Aug 7, 2026

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An analysis of U.S.–France alliance dynamics during the Vietnam War’s early phase, focusing on how American and French leaders approached planning, coordination, and political-military decision-making between 1961 and 1963. Drawing on evidence from high-level simulations and NATO-related interactions, the study reconstructs the Kennedy administration’s contingency-planning style and contrasts it with French perceptions of its limitations. The narrative explains how crisis-era assumptions and institutional culture shaped strategic choices, contributing to mutual failure.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages291

Reading Time12 h 13 min

AccessFree to download

Introduction

Cultural Imaging of the French “Other”

Building the Perfect Candidate

Masculinity and Modernization in Democratic Party Politics during the 1950s

Toward the First Encounter

Drinking Sour Wine

Making the Best of It

Ignoring Nosey Charlie

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

[OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) JFK and de Gaulle [OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) JFK and de Gaulle How America and France Failed in Vietnam, 1961-1963 Sean J. McLaughlin [OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) Due to variations in the technical specifications of different electronic reading devices, some elements of this ebook may not appear as they do in the print edition. Readers are encouraged to experiment with user settings for optimum results. Copyright © 2019 by The University Press of Kentucky Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth, serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University. All rights reserved. Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky 663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508–4008 [www.kentuckypress.com](www.kentuckypress.com) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: McLaughlin, Sean J., 1978– author. Title: JFK and de Gaulle : how America and France failed in Vietnam, 1961–1963 / Sean J. McLaughlin. Description: Lexington : University Press of Kentucky,[2019] | Series: Studies in conflict, diplomacy, and peace | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019014999| ISBN 9780813177748 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780813177762 (pdf) | ISBN 9780813177779 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963. | Gaulle, Charles de, 1890–1970. | Vietnam War, 1961–1975—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—France. | France—Foreign relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—1953–1961 . | United States--Foreign relations—1961–1963 . Classification: LCC DS558 .M425 2019 | DDC 959.704/32—dc23 This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials. Manufactured in the United States of America Member of the Association of University Presses [OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) To Selina, Olivia, and the hope of a more peaceful American future. [OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) Contents Introduction 1. Cultural Imaging of the French “Other” 2. Building the Perfect Candidate 3. Masculinity and Modernization in Democratic Party Politics during the 1950s 4. Toward the First Encounter 5. Drinking Sour Wine 6. Making the Best of It 7. Ignoring Nosey Charlie Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index [OceanofPDF.com](OceanofPDF.com) Introduction At the end of January 1963, France’s long-tenured ambassador to the United States, Hervé Alphand, reported back to Paris on a top secret American exercise at Camp David that laid bare many of the stark differences between the two NATO allies. As Alphand noted to French foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville, his old colleague from the Free French days of World War II, the Kennedy administration had decided the previous October (either before, during, or after the Cuban Missile Crisis—he does not specify) to include representatives from Britain, France, and West Germany in a three-day series of politico-military simulations of potential conflict scenarios in divided Berlin. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, French president Charles de Gaulle had barely concealed his frustration from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson when he discovered that the Kennedy administration had no intention of coordinating strategy with the NATO allies it could have plunged into nuclear war. This may have convinced the White House to pull back the veil and show Washington’s closest allies how its planning culture operated.1 Never before had foreigners been invited into this w

FAQs

What historical timeframe does the book examine?

The book examines U.S. and French interactions surrounding the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1963.

What role do politico-military simulations play in the argument?

Simulations are used to show how American planning culture operated and how that approach affected allied coordination and expectations.

How do French officials interpret the Kennedy administration’s planning approach?

French accounts describe the contingency-planning style as tedious and useless, emphasizing perceived weaknesses despite the exercises’ technical sophistication.

Aug 7, 2026

Upload by Maeve