Induced Institutional Innovation - Plant Variety Rights, Patents, Genetic Engineering and all that

Sep 4, 2026

Uploaded by Noah

Plant Variety Rights (PVR) create policy puzzles through unexpected consequences for public breeding, variety evaluation, and genetic conservation. The paper frames these issues through Ruttan’s induced institutional innovation theory, linking institutional change to shifts in relative factor/product prices, income distribution, resource allocation for institutions, and subsequent developments. It applies the concepts to evolving public–private breeder relationships after PVR, re-examining links between PVR and genetic erosion, including the rise of “farmers’ rights.”

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages27

Reading Time1 h 8 min

AccessFree to download

ABSTRACT

Introduction

Induced Institutional Innovation:Plant Variety Rights,Patents,Genetic Engineering and all that David Godden* Contributed paper presented to the 33rd Annual Conference of the AustralianAgricultural Sconomics Society,Lincoln College,Canterbury,New zealand,7-9 February,1989 *Senior Research Scientist,Division of Rural and Resource Economics,NSWAgriculture &Fisheries,P.o.Box X220 Haymarket NSW 2000.Views expressed in this paper are the authors,but are not necessarily those ofNSH Agriculture &Fisheries. Induced Instztutional Innovation;Plant Variety Rights,Patents,Genetic Bagineering and all that David Godden # ABSTRACT The operation of Plant Variety Rights(PVR)throws up puzzles in the formof unexpacted consequences.Puzzles of curzent interest include thegovernment*s role undez PVR with reapect to public breeding,variety鲁valuation and genetic conservation;"farmers'rights"in germplasm incentres of genetie diversity;and the potential impact of geneticengineering on a plant breeding industry with PVR,and especially theinteraction of patents with PVR, A useful way of investigating the puzzles在ssociated with the evolution ofPVR in practice is to consider PVR as an institution,and to investigatethe causes of“institutional innovation"in PVR.Ruttan's theory ofinduced institutional innovation provides a mechanism for explaining theprocess of institutional innovation in terms of changes in relative factorand/or product prices; the effect of new resource-and/or product-economising technologies on income distzibution;the effect of changedincome distribution on the allocation of resources to maintaining and/orcreating institutions;and exogenous institutional innovations spawningsubsequent institutional developments.The mechanisms of induced institutional innovation are drawn from standard public choice theory andthe theory of economic regulation. Concepts教器sociated with induced institutional innovation are used toexplain the evolving relationships between public and private breedersfollowing enactment of PVR, These concepts also provide &useful mechanismto re-examine the link between PVR and genetic erosion originally proposedby P.R.Mooney,It is particularly appropriate to re-examine this issuegiven the emergence in FAO forums of the concept of "fazmers’zights"as aresponse to PVR. Inczeases in the numbez of commercially-availablevarieties folloving PVR heightens the importance of reliable informationabout new varieties and the role of public evaluation.With PVR,competition between public and private breeders focuses importance onmechanisms for the unbiased evaluation of varieties.Additionally,theincreased number of varieties with PVR raises queations about the efficientallocation of resources to public variety testing.Developments in geneticengineering are likely to have a major impact on plant breeding processesand the structure of the plant breeding industry.Developments in geneticengineering are reinforcing previous complaints about the inadequacy of PVRas an effective property right;unless major changes are made to theconditions of PVR grants,PVR may be supplanted as the intellectualpzoperty right of choice for plant breeders using genetic engineeringmethods. 3 # 1. Introduction In 1987,Austzaz.ia enacted legislation for Plant Variety Rights(PVR)¹after a protracted and often acrimonious debate,²Austzalia thus followedin the footsteps of most Westezn industrialised countries-and someEastezn bloc and developing countries -who had enacted PVR 1egislation upto thzee decades earlier.PVR were usually enacted with 1itt1e controversy,Exceptions to this genezalisation occurred in Austzalia andCanada where publication of Mooney's(1979)Seeds of the Earth raised astorm of controversy and resulted in farmers and urban interest groupsbecoming directly involved in the process of conaidering PVR enactment. An interesting feacuze of the adoption of PVR around the world has beenthat,in general,ehactment of PVR has not bee

FAQs

What does the paper identify as the main puzzles created by Plant Variety Rights (PVR)?

The paper highlights puzzles involving the government’s role in public breeding, variety evaluation, and genetic conservation; “farmers’ rights” in germplasm centers; and the interaction between genetic engineering, PVR, and patents.

How does the paper explain institutional change in the context of PVR?

It uses Ruttan’s induced institutional innovation theory, which explains institutional innovation via changes in relative factor/product prices, the effect of new economising technologies on income distribution, subsequent changes in resource allocation for institutions, and exogenous institutional innovations.

Why does the paper argue that genetic engineering may challenge PVR as an effective property right?

Developments in genetic engineering are said to reinforce complaints about PVR’s inadequacy, and unless major changes are made to PVR grant conditions, PVR could be supplanted by alternative intellectual property rights for plant breeders using genetic engineering methods.

Sep 4, 2026

Uploaded by Noah