IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS - No. 03-0498 - Evelyn Little v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice and Gary Johnson, Director - Opinion and Legal Analysis

Sep 21, 2026

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Unanimous Texas Supreme Court opinion on Evelyn Little’s petition for review regarding whether she had a “disability” under Texas Labor Code chapter 21 at the time of adverse employment actions. The Court evaluates summary-judgment evidence concerning her amputated left leg, prosthesis use, and noticeable limp. It analyzes the statutory definitions of “disability,” the historical evolution from “handicap” under the Commission on Human Rights Act, and related legislative and precedent interpretations.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages17

Reading Time43 min

AccessFree to download

Case Background

Petition for Review and Procedural History

Statutory Framework

Texas Labor Code: Unlawful Employment Practice

Definition of “Disability”

Legislative and Precedent History

Commission on Human Rights Act (“Handicap”)

1987 Chevron Corp. v. Redmon

1989 CHRA Amendments to “Disability”

Issue for Review

Sufficiency of Summary-Judgment Evidence

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO. 03-0498 444444444444 EVELYN LITTLE, PETITIONER, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND GARY JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, RESPONDENTS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 Argued on September 8, 2004 JUSTICE SMITH delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 21.051 of the Labor Code provides that “[a]n employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer: (1) fails or refuses to hire an individual . . . .” TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051 (emphasis added) . For purposes of chapter 21 of the Labor Code, the term “disability”means “with respect to an individual, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity of that individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. . . .” Id. § 21.002(6) (emphasis added) . The question in this case is whether the plaintiff-petitioner, whose left leg has been amputated at the knee, produced legally sufficient evidence that, at the time of the adverse employment actions of which she complains, she had a “disability.” More specifically, the question is whether there is any probative summary judgment evidence that Evelyn Little, who wears a prosthesis on her left leg and walks with a noticeable limp, had at that time a “physical impairment that substantially limit[ed] at least one major life activity.” The trial court granted the defendants’motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Little had “failed to make a threshold showing that she has a disability.” S.W.3d , . We will reverse and remand to the court of appeals. I In 1983, the Legislature enacted the Commission on Human Rights Act (CHRA) . See CHRA, 68th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 7, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 37 (compiled as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k) . The CHRA created the Commission on Human Rights and designated it the state agency responsible for administering the statute. Id. §§ 3.01(a), 3.02. Under the CHRA, as enacted, employers and other covered entities were generally prohibited from discriminating against an individual “because of race, color, handicap, religion, sex, national origin, or age” with respect to hiring and other employment actions. Id. §§ 5.01-5.03. The CHRA, as enacted, provided: “Handicap” means a condition either mental or physical that includes mental retardation, hardness of hearing, deafness, speech impairment, visual handicap, being crippled, or any other health impairment that requires special ambulatory devices or services, as defined in Section 121.002(4), Human Resources Code, but does not include a condition of addiction to any drug or illegal or federally controlled substances or a condition of addiction to the use of alcohol. Id. § 2.01(7)(B) . In 1987, in Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1987), this Court construed the term “handicap.” Redmon, after being denied employment as a maintenance helper, sought relief under the CHRA. The vision in one of her eyes could not be corrected to better than 20/60, and it was undisputed that she was not hired because of her vision. Id. at 315. The Court determined asa matter of law that she was not “handicapped,” concluding that “Redmon’s minor visual problems do not constitute those severe barriers to employment or other life functions which necessitate protection by the State.” Id. at 318. With regard to legislative intent, the Court stated: “[T]he legislature obviously chose not to employ the definition of ‘handicap’ in the federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S.C. § 701-796i.” Id. In 1988, the Sunset Advisory Commission issued a report that, inter alia, recommended that“[t]he definition of handicap in the Texas Commis

FAQs

What legal issue did the Texas Supreme Court decide in this case?

Whether Evelyn Little produced legally sufficient evidence that, at the time of the alleged adverse employment actions, she had a “disability” under the Texas Labor Code.

How did the Court treat the summary-judgment evidence?

The opinion focuses on whether there was probative summary-judgment evidence showing that Little’s impairment substantially limited at least one major life activity.

What historical change from “handicap” to “disability” is discussed?

The document explains that the Legislature replaced “handicap” with “disability” throughout the CHRA, adopting federal statutory language and lowering the threshold for what qualifies as a disability.

Sep 21, 2026

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