FinanceFacts - A Monthly Publication on Consumer Financial Behavior - Interest Rate Ceilings and Controls

Sep 21, 2026

Uploaded by Riley

FinanceFacts is an October 1982 monthly publication examining consumer financial behavior and the policy debate over interest rate ceilings and controls. It argues that high interest rates are symptoms of deeper economic conditions, including inflation expectations, risk premiums, and operating costs, and that credit controls misallocate investment and can create credit shortages. It also summarizes macro indicators for August, including leading and coincident indexes, consumer installment credit, and industrial production trends.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages5

Reading Time13 min

AccessFree to download

Interest Rate Ceilings and Controls

Leading Economic Indicators

Consumer Installment Credit

Industrial Production

# FinanceFacts A Monthly Publication on Consumer Financial Behavior Interest Rate Ceilings and Controls The problem of high interest ratesin recent years has produced a widevariety of suggestions offered as pain-less solutions. These suggestions havebeen as diverse as increasing monetarygrowth rates,decreasing monetary growthrates,raising taxes,lowering taxes,and becoming either more or less selec-tive in tax policy.In such an environ-ment,when even understanding the causesof high interest rates is difficult,itis not especially surprising to learnthat some people have advanced interestrate ceilings or controls as seductivelysimple "solutions"to the interest rateproblem. Although professional econo-mists are virtually unanimous in theiropposition to interest rate ceilings andcontrols,a number of interest-ceilingand control bills were introduced in thelast session of Congress. Congressadjourned on October 1 without enactingany of these bills,but control schemesmay surface again in the next Congress.For this reason it seems worthwhile tooutline briefly the major economicarguments against such proposals. First,the argument that controlswill improve the economy suffers from abasic misconception that at least somecredit use is nonproductive. Usuallysome element of private sector creditdemand is cited as an example.However,private sector borrowers do not borrowto waste the resources;instead,theyborrow to make investments in productiveassets. Consumers invest in houses,automobiles,appliances,education,andmedical care that provide flows ofreturns over time,and businesses investin factories,machines,equipment,andinventories that provide investmentreturns to business. None of theseshould be considered nonproductive.Even borrowing for corporate takeovers(which may not limit credit availabilityfor other purposes anyway,since sellersof securities receive cash which they OCTOBER 1982 can re-lend)is not necessarily nonpro-ductive. Takeovers can eliminate poormanagement,can produce economies ofscale,and even,in some cases,canprevent bankruptcies and significantlosses.If any government borrowing isdone for nonproductive purposes,thereare political processes in place thatare better choices than credit con-trols. Second,credit controls and ceil-ings attempt to operate on symptomsrather than on underlying economic ills.Market interest rates are composed ofthe cost of forebearance(the ultimatelender's required real return),operat-ing costs,a premium for risk(includinga volatility premium),and a premium forexpected inflation (compensation forbeing repaid in dollars of lower pur-chasing power). High interest ratesindicate an economic ailment in one ormore of these areas. Unfortunately,government policies have contributed tohigher interest rates through each ofthese components of market rates.Inflationary expectations,which havebeen especially important,are likely tosubside only slowly. Attempting tocontrol rates without reducing inflationand inflationary expectations is notlikely to be very successful because itamounts merely to attacking symptoms. Third,below-market interest ceil-ings produce credit shortages.In fact,the impact of any below-market priceceiling is not to reduce the price of agood or service,but to create a short-age at the artificial price. One'smemory need not be very long to rememberthe shortages and gas-station lines whengasoline prices were controlled. Thesame would occur in credit markets ifbelow-market ceilings were the rule.Below-market price would encouragedemand but limit supply causingshortages to occur. There wou1d belittle encouragement in knowing that the(text continued on back page) Composite Indexes By Months 1973-1982 Sourcer Department of Commerce Index ofIndustrial Productionby months(seasonally adjusted)1973-1982 Source:Board of Governors of the ## LEADING ECONOMIC INDICATORS The composite index of leading economic indicatorsdecreased 0.9%in August,based on preliminar

FAQs

Why does the publication oppose interest rate ceilings and controls?

It states that professional economists are largely opposed and that such controls target symptoms rather than underlying drivers of market rates, especially inflation expectations.

How does the document explain why credit controls can hurt the economy?

It argues that below-market ceilings create credit shortages by limiting supply at an artificial price, producing outcomes like shortages seen in other controlled-price markets.

What macroeconomic measures are reported in the issue for August?

It reports changes in leading and coincident economic indicator indexes, consumer installment credit outstanding, and industrial production declines alongside revisions to prior months.

Sep 21, 2026

Uploaded by Riley