Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U.S. institutions

Sep 17, 2026

Uploaded by William

Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps investigates how biosafety and biosecurity professionals and researchers understand and manage Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (ePPPs) across U.S. sectors. Survey data from 541 participants (March–April 2024) are used to compare practices, reporting mechanisms, and policy implementation challenges. Larger teams correlate with higher likelihood of high-risk research and stronger noncompliance reporting, while sector differences shape oversight capacity and review scope.

LanguageEnglish

CategoryResearch & Report

FormatPDF

Pages23

Reading Time58 min

AccessFree to download

Overview

Methods

Results

Discussion

Introduction

TYPE Original Research PUBLISHED 25 September 2024 DOI 10.3389/fbioe.2024.1476527 OPEN ACCESS EDITED BY Segaran P. Pillai, United States Department of Health and Human Services, United States REVIEWED BY Gerald Epstein, National Defense University, United States Ryan Ritterson, Deloitte (United States), United States *CORRESPONDENCE David R. Gillum, [dgillum@unr.edu](dgillum@unr.edu) RECEIVED 06 August 2024 ACCEPTED 09 September 2024 PUBLISHED 25 September 2024 CITATION Gillum DR, Tran A, Fletcher J and Vogel KM (2024) Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U. S. institutions. Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol. 12:1476527 . doi: 10.3389/fbioe.2024.1476527 COPYRIGHT © 2024 Gillum, Tran, Fletcher and Vogel. This isan open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. Bridging biosafety and biosecurity gaps: DURC and ePPP policy insights from U.S. institutions David R. Gillum 1,2*, An Tran 3, Jennifer Fletcher 4 and Kathleen M. Vogel 1 1School for the Future of Innovation and Society, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States, 2Research and Innovation, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, United States, 3Environmental Science and Health, University of Nevada, Reno, NV, United States, 4Accountability, Assessment and Research, Chandler Uniﬁed School District, Chandler, AZ, United States Overview: This study provides empirical data on the knowledge and practices of biosafety and biosecurity professionals and researchers involved in research on enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens (ePPPs) and Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) within various U. S. sectors. The goal is to improve public health interventions and oversight for DURC and ePPP, contributing valuable insights for policy development. A notable ﬁnding was the association between larger biosafety/biosecurity teams and a higher likelihood of conducting high-risk biological research. Methods: A survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals was conducted between March 8 and 10 April 2024, with results analyzed using SAS at asigniﬁcance level of 0 .05. The study received approval from the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) at Arizona State University and the University of Nevada, Reno. Results: Government organizations were more likely to conduct DURC compared to other sectors (e. g., Academic, Commercial, Consulting) . Public institutions reviewed more experiments outside the scope of the U. S. DURC Policy than private for-proﬁt institutions. Institutions with larger biosafety/ biosecurity teams reported greater research activity and more effective noncompliance reporting mechanisms (e. g., anonymous hotlines, reporting forms) . Additionally, ﬁnancial support and the challenges of policy implementation varied signiﬁcantly across sectors. Discussion: The ﬁndings emphasize the need for appropriate stafﬁng and resource allocation for high-risk biosafety and biosecurity research. A differentiated regulatory approach and equitable distribution of resources are essential for effective oversight. Moreover, robust non-compliance reporting systems are critical to mitigating the risks associated with DURC and ePPP research. KEYWORDS dual use research of concern (DURC), enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP), biosafety, biosecurity, non-compliance reporting, risk management, biosafety survey, organizational safety Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology 01 [frontiersin.org](frontiersin.org) 1 Introduction Research that involves dual use research of concern (DURC) and enhanced potential pand

FAQs

What is the main purpose of the study?

To provide empirical insights into knowledge and practices related to DURC and ePPPs, supporting improved public health interventions and oversight for these research areas.

How was the study conducted?

The study used a survey of 541 biosafety and biosecurity professionals conducted between March 8 and April 10, 2024, with results analyzed using SAS at a 0.05 significance level.

What key findings relate team size to research activity?

Institutions with larger biosafety/biosecurity teams reported greater research activity and more effective noncompliance reporting mechanisms, such as anonymous hotlines and reporting forms.

Sep 17, 2026

Uploaded by William