[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-165276-en":3,"doc-seo-165276-105":30,"detail-sidebar-cat-1-en-105":91},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":11,"category_id":12,"category_name":13,"doc_title":14,"doc_description":15,"doc_content":16,"file_id":17,"file_url":18,"file_type":19,"file_size":20,"view_count":4,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":11,"is_downloadable":11,"audit_status":11,"page_count":21,"language":22,"language_code":23,"site_id":24,"html_lang":23,"table_of_contents":25,"faqs":26,"seo_title":27,"seo_description":15,"update_tm":28,"read_time":29},165276,1099513958762,"Logic","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/1000023916a998db790?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1784791008015729253",1,158,"General","Theories of Consciousness - David Papineau - Introduction - Consciousness as a Determinable Property","The paper examines “theories of consciousness” and argues that many prominent accounts misunderstand what the target should be. It distinguishes determinable consciousness-as-such from determinate conscious states like pain, tasting, or seeing. The central critique is that theories identifying consciousness with mechanisms such as quantum collapse, global workspace operations, action-control competition, informational content, or higher-order thought misfire because they address the wrong level. The author also develops a physicalist framework for determinate conscious properties and clarifies related concepts.","Theories of Consciousness\nDavid Papineau\nIntroduction\nMy target in this paper is \"theories of consciousness\". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories of consciousness are trying to answer a question that isn't there.\nConsciousness as a Determinable Property\nLet me begin with a useful distinction. We can think of consciousness as a determinable property, whose determinates are more specific modes of consciousness like being in pain, tasting chocolate, seeing an elephant and so on. By way of analogy, contrast the determinable property, having a shape, with the more specific (determinate) properties square, triangular, elliptical. Or again, contrast the determinable property being a car, with the determinates being a Ford, a Rover, a Rolls-Royce, and so on. The idea here is simply the notion of a genus, which then divides into a number of more restrictive species. In this way, then, being conscious is a general property, whose instances then all have some more determinate conscious feature like being in pain. (1)\nThe theories of consciousness which are my target in this paper are theories of the determinable property of consciousness-as-such, not determinate conscious properties like pain, or seeing an elephant, or whatever. Many theories of just this kind are on offer nowadays. Thus, to pick a quick sample, consider the identification of consciousness with quantum collapses in cellular microtubules (Penrose, 1994), or with operations in the global workspace (Baars, 1988) or with competition for action control (Challice, 1988), or with informational content (Chalmers, 1996, Tye, 1995, Dretske, 1995) or, again with, higher-order thought (Armstrong, 1968, Rosenthal, 1996, Lycan, 1996, Carruthers, forthcoming). These are all theories of what it takes to be conscious at all, not of more determinate states like feeling a pain, and so on. My argument will be that theories of this kind are barking up the wrong tree.\nBefore I get on to theories of the determinable property, being conscious, it will be useful first to explain at some length how I think of determinate conscious properties, as my analysis of general \"theories of consciousness\" will be informed by this understanding.\nDeterminate Conscious Properties are Physical Properties\nI am a physicalist about determinate conscious properties. I think that the property of being in pain is identical to some physical property. This is not because I want to be provocative, or because I am caught up by current philosophical fashion, but because I think that there is an overwhelming argument for this identification, namely, that conscious mental states would have no influence on our behaviour, which they clearly do, were they not identical with physical states.\nThis is not the place to analyse this argument in any detail. But three quick comments will be in order.\nFirst, you might want to ask, if so simple an argument can establish physicalism, why everybody hasn't always been persuaded by it? My answer is that it is a simple argument, but that until recently a crucial premise was not available. This is the premise that physical effects, like behaviour, are always fully determined, insofar as they are determined at all, by prior physical causes. This is a highly empirical premise, and moreover one which informed scientific opinion didn't take to be fully evidenced until some time into this century. It is this evidential shift, and not any tide of philosophical fashion, which has been responsible for the recent rise of physicalism. (For more details on this history, see Papineau, 2000.)\nSecond, let me say some","cbCaisXt4iLV7Wqm","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaisXt4iLV7Wqm","docx",52151,24,"English","en",105,"# Introduction\n## Consciousness as a Determinable Property\n## Determinate Conscious Properties are Physical Properties\n## Phenomenal Concepts and Third-Person Concepts","[{\"question\":\"What does the author mean by “determinable property” of consciousness?\",\"answer\":\"Consciousness is treated as a determinable property, whose determinates are specific modes such as being in pain or seeing an elephant. The distinction parallels determinables like “having a shape” and determinates like “square” or “triangular.”\"},{\"question\":\"Which kinds of theories does Papineau target and why?\",\"answer\":\"He targets theories that explain what it takes to be conscious at all, rather than theories about specific conscious states like pain. He argues these theories are directed at a question that does not properly arise for the intended level of analysis.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the author defend physicalism about determinate conscious properties?\",\"answer\":\"He argues that conscious mental states must be identical with physical properties because otherwise they would lack influence on behavior. He also explains “physical” broadly to include functional and physiological properties, aiming to avoid irreducibly conscious “sui generis” properties.\"}]","Theories of Consciousness - David Papineau - Introduction - Consciousness as a Determinable Property | DOCX",1788168792,8,{"code":4,"msg":31,"data":32},"ok",{"site_id":24,"language":23,"slug":33,"title":14,"keywords":34,"description":15,"schema_data":35,"social_meta":86,"head_meta":88,"extra_data":90,"updated_unix":28},"theories-of-consciousness-david-papineau-introduction-consciousness-as-a-determinable-property","",{"@graph":36,"@context":85},[37,54,68],{"@type":38,"itemListElement":39},"BreadcrumbList",[40,44,48,51],{"item":41,"name":42,"@type":43,"position":11},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":45,"name":46,"@type":43,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/","Template",2,{"item":49,"name":13,"@type":43,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/",3,{"item":52,"name":14,"@type":43,"position":53},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/theories-of-consciousness-david-papineau-introduction-consciousness-as-a-determinable-property/165276/",4,{"url":52,"name":14,"@type":55,"author":56,"headline":14,"publisher":58,"fileFormat":61,"inLanguage":23,"description":15,"dateModified":62,"datePublished":62,"encodingFormat":61,"isAccessibleForFree":63,"interactionStatistic":64},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":57},"Person",{"url":41,"name":59,"@type":60},"DocShare","Organization","application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document","2026-08-31",true,{"@type":65,"interactionType":66,"userInteractionCount":4},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":67},"ViewAction",{"@type":69,"mainEntity":70},"FAQPage",[71,77,81],{"name":72,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":74},"What does the author mean by “determinable property” of consciousness?","Question",{"text":75,"@type":76},"Consciousness is treated as a determinable property, whose determinates are specific modes such as being in pain or seeing an elephant. The distinction parallels determinables like “having a shape” and determinates like “square” or “triangular.”","Answer",{"name":78,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":79},"Which kinds of theories does Papineau target and why?",{"text":80,"@type":76},"He targets theories that explain what it takes to be conscious at all, rather than theories about specific conscious states like pain. He argues these theories are directed at a question that does not properly arise for the intended level of analysis.",{"name":82,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":83},"How does the author defend physicalism about determinate conscious properties?",{"text":84,"@type":76},"He argues that conscious mental states must be identical with physical properties because otherwise they would lack influence on behavior. He also explains “physical” broadly to include functional and physiological properties, aiming to avoid irreducibly conscious “sui generis” properties.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":52,"og:type":87,"og:title":14,"og:site_name":59,"og:description":15},"article",{"robots":89,"canonical":52},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":24},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":92},[93,98,103,108,113,118,123,128,133],{"id":94,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":95,"show_sort_weight":96,"slug":97},11,"Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":99,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":100,"show_sort_weight":101,"slug":102},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":104,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":105,"show_sort_weight":106,"slug":107},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":109,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":110,"show_sort_weight":111,"slug":112},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":114,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":115,"show_sort_weight":116,"slug":117},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":119,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":120,"show_sort_weight":121,"slug":122},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":124,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":127},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":129,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":130,"show_sort_weight":131,"slug":132},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":12,"doc_module":11,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":13,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":134},"general-158"]