[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-1-en-105":3,"doc-seo-255103-105":53,"doc-detail-255103-en":126},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,14,19,24,29,34,39,44,49],{"id":8,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":11,"show_sort_weight":12,"slug":13},11,1,"Template","Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":15,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":16,"show_sort_weight":17,"slug":18},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":20,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":21,"show_sort_weight":22,"slug":23},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":25,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":26,"show_sort_weight":27,"slug":28},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":30,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":31,"show_sort_weight":32,"slug":33},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":35,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":36,"show_sort_weight":37,"slug":38},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":40,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":41,"show_sort_weight":42,"slug":43},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":45,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":46,"show_sort_weight":47,"slug":48},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":50,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":51,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":52},158,"General","general-158",{"code":4,"msg":54,"data":55},"ok",{"site_id":56,"language":57,"slug":58,"title":59,"keywords":60,"description":61,"schema_data":62,"social_meta":119,"head_meta":121,"extra_data":123,"updated_unix":125},105,"en","the-leaky-leviathan-why-the-government-condemns-and-condones-unlawful-disclosures-of-information-article","The Leaky Leviathan - Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information - Article","","The United States government leaks classified information to the media while presidents and national security professionals publicly condemn such disclosures and the legal regime against leaking is rarely enforced. The article challenges standard explanations focused on prosecutorial difficulty and instead treats “leakiness” as an adaptive response to external liabilities and internal administrative pathologies, including mistrust from presidential secrecy, media manipulation, overclassification, and bureaucratic fragmentation. It argues that overlapping institutional interests sustain permissive disclosure culture and that informal social controls increasingly govern leak regulation, shaping executive power, national security, democracy, and the rule of law.",{"@graph":63,"@context":118},[64,80,101],{"@type":65,"itemListElement":66},"BreadcrumbList",[67,71,74,77],{"item":68,"name":69,"@type":70,"position":9},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":72,"name":10,"@type":70,"position":73},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/",2,{"item":75,"name":51,"@type":70,"position":76},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/",3,{"item":78,"name":59,"@type":70,"position":79},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/the-leaky-leviathan-why-the-government-condemns-and-condones-unlawful-disclosures-of-information-article/255103/",4,{"url":78,"name":59,"@type":81,"image":82,"author":87,"headline":59,"publisher":90,"fileFormat":93,"inLanguage":57,"description":61,"dateModified":94,"datePublished":95,"encodingFormat":93,"isAccessibleForFree":96,"interactionStatistic":97},"DigitalDocument",{"url":83,"@type":84,"width":85,"height":86},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-leaky-leviathan-why-the-government-condemns-and-condones-unlawful-disclosures-of-information-article/255103.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":88,"@type":89},"Margaret","Person",{"url":68,"name":91,"@type":92},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-09-20","2026-09-13",true,{"@type":98,"interactionType":99,"userInteractionCount":79},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":100},"ViewAction",{"@type":102,"mainEntity":103},"FAQPage",[104,110,114],{"name":105,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":107},"Why does the U.S. government condemn unlawful leaks but seldom enforce leak laws?","Question",{"text":108,"@type":109},"The article describes a disconnect between formal condemnation and practical permissiveness, arguing enforcement is rare because it is difficult to punish violators and because key institutional actors share interests in sustaining a permissive disclosure culture.","Answer",{"name":111,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":112},"What alternative theory of “leakiness” does the article propose?",{"text":113,"@type":109},"Instead of viewing leakiness primarily as organizational failure, it argues the executive branch’s leaking is an adaptive response to external liabilities and internal administrative pathologies of the modern state.",{"name":115,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":116},"How does the article explain regulation of leaks beyond formal legal discipline?",{"text":117,"@type":109},"It argues that informal social controls supplement and largely supplant the formal disciplinary scheme, mapping a sociology of governmental leak regulation with implications for executive power, national security, democracy, and the rule of law.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":78,"og:type":120,"og:title":59,"og:site_name":91,"og:description":61},"article",{"robots":122,"canonical":78},"index,follow",{"doc_id":124,"site_id":56},255103,1789285787,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":127},{"doc_id":124,"user_id":128,"nickname":88,"user_avatar":129,"doc_module":9,"category_id":50,"category_name":51,"doc_title":59,"doc_description":61,"doc_content":130,"file_id":131,"file_url":132,"file_type":133,"file_size":134,"view_count":79,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":9,"is_downloadable":9,"audit_status":9,"page_count":135,"language":136,"language_code":57,"site_id":56,"html_lang":57,"table_of_contents":137,"faqs":138,"seo_title":139,"seo_description":61,"update_tm":125,"read_time":140},137451207643,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_3d24733baf745e90a7e4bdd5f77d97b2","ARTICLE  \nTHE LEAKY LEVIATHAN:  \nWHY THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS AND CONDONES UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION  \nDavid E. Pozen  \nCONTENTS  \nINTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................513  \nI. WHAT WE KNOW (AND THINK WE KNOW) ABOUT LEAKS......................................521  \nA. The Legal Framework ....................................................................................................... 522  \nB. Leaking Practices ..............................................................................................................528  \nC. Enforcement Practices ...................................................................................................... 534  \nD. Consequences .....................................................................................................................542  \nII. ORDER IN “DISORDER”: THE LOGIC OF LEAKINESS ..................................................544  \nA. The Inadequacy of the Constraint-Based Narrative .................................................... 548  \n1. Catching Culprits ........................................................................................................548  \n2. Bringing Cases .............................................................................................................551  \n3. Additional Evidence....................................................................................................554  \nB. Leaking’s Systemic Rewards ............................................................................................ 559  \n1. Plants Need to Be Watered—with Leaks..............................................................559  \n2. Plants, Leaks, and Pleaks...........................................................................................565  \n3. External Signaling and Executive Self-Binding......................................................573  \n4. Manufactured Scarcity and Intragovernmental Communication.........................577  \n5. Pacifying and Coopting Powerful Groups ...............................................................579  \nIII. “ORDER” IN DISORDER: DISCIPLINING LEAKERS WITH AND WITHOUT LAW ....586  \nA. Internal Signaling and Informal Sanctions ................................................................... 587  \nB. Senior Officials, Junior Officials, and Mixed Deterrence ........................................... 592  \nC. Substantive Norms ............................................................................................................596  \nIV. SOME NOTES ON LEAKINESS AND EXECUTIVE POWER ..........................................605  \nA. Revisiting the Source/Distributor Divide ...................................................................... 606  \nB. Silver Linings and Media Narratives ............................................................................. 609  \nC. Seeing Like a National Security State ........................................................................... 616  \nD. Democracy, Discourse, and Rule of Law ....................................................................... 621  \nE. Comparative Convergence, Obama’s Uptick, and the Road Ahead.............................626  \nV. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................633  \nTHE LEAKY LEVIATHAN:  \nWHY THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS AND CONDONES UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION  \nDavid E. Pozen∗  \nThe United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the ","cbCaigWsVGD2NQHr","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaigWsVGD2NQHr","pdf",755145,124,"English","# Introduction\n# What We Know (and Think We Know) About Leaks\n## The Legal Framework\n## Leaking Practices\n## Enforcement Practices\n## Consequences\n# Order in “Disorder”: The Logic of Leakiness\n## The Inadequacy of the Constraint-Based Narrative\n## Leaking’s Systemic Rewards\n# “Order” in Disorder: Disciplining Leakers With and Without Law\n## Internal Signaling and Informal Sanctions\n## Senior Officials, Junior Officials, and Mixed Deterrence\n## Substantive Norms\n# Some Notes on Leakiness and Executive Power\n## Revisiting the Source/Distributor Divide\n## Silver Linings and Media Narratives\n## Seeing Like a National Security State\n## Democracy, Discourse, and Rule of Law\n## Comparative Convergence, Obama’s Uptick, and the Road Ahead\n# Conclusion","[{\"question\":\"Why does the U.S. government condemn unlawful leaks but seldom enforce leak laws?\",\"answer\":\"The article describes a disconnect between formal condemnation and practical permissiveness, arguing enforcement is rare because it is difficult to punish violators and because key institutional actors share interests in sustaining a permissive disclosure culture.\"},{\"question\":\"What alternative theory of “leakiness” does the article propose?\",\"answer\":\"Instead of viewing leakiness primarily as organizational failure, it argues the executive branch’s leaking is an adaptive response to external liabilities and internal administrative pathologies of the modern state.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the article explain regulation of leaks beyond formal legal discipline?\",\"answer\":\"It argues that informal social controls supplement and largely supplant the formal disciplinary scheme, mapping a sociology of governmental leak regulation with implications for executive power, national security, democracy, and the rule of law.\"}]","The Leaky Leviathan - Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information - Article | PDF",43]