[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-1-en-105":3,"doc-seo-201038-105":53,"doc-detail-201038-en":126},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,14,19,24,29,34,39,44,49],{"id":8,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":11,"show_sort_weight":12,"slug":13},11,1,"Template","Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":15,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":16,"show_sort_weight":17,"slug":18},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":20,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":21,"show_sort_weight":22,"slug":23},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":25,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":26,"show_sort_weight":27,"slug":28},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":30,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":31,"show_sort_weight":32,"slug":33},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":35,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":36,"show_sort_weight":37,"slug":38},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":40,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":41,"show_sort_weight":42,"slug":43},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":45,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":46,"show_sort_weight":47,"slug":48},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":50,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":51,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":52},158,"General","general-158",{"code":4,"msg":54,"data":55},"ok",{"site_id":56,"language":57,"slug":58,"title":59,"keywords":60,"description":61,"schema_data":62,"social_meta":119,"head_meta":121,"extra_data":123,"updated_unix":125},105,"en","the-hexagon-of-opposition-thinking-outside-the-aristotelian-box","The Hexagon of Opposition - Thinking Outside the Aristotelian Box","","The essay examines arguments about divine omniscience and future contingents that traditionally claim God knows the future exclusively in terms of what will or will not occur. It evaluates the bivalence-based premises supporting this view and argues that the key restriction is unwarranted. By developing a future-tense Square of Opposition, the work shows that future statements allow an indeterminate mode—neither inevitable nor impossible—yielding a Hexagon of Opposition model. The result supports denying the traditional conclusion while retaining bivalence.",{"@graph":63,"@context":118},[64,80,101],{"@type":65,"itemListElement":66},"BreadcrumbList",[67,71,74,77],{"item":68,"name":69,"@type":70,"position":9},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":72,"name":10,"@type":70,"position":73},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/",2,{"item":75,"name":51,"@type":70,"position":76},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/",3,{"item":78,"name":59,"@type":70,"position":79},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/the-hexagon-of-opposition-thinking-outside-the-aristotelian-box/201038/",4,{"url":78,"name":59,"@type":81,"image":82,"author":87,"headline":59,"publisher":90,"fileFormat":93,"inLanguage":57,"description":61,"dateModified":94,"datePublished":95,"encodingFormat":93,"isAccessibleForFree":96,"interactionStatistic":97},"DigitalDocument",{"url":83,"@type":84,"width":85,"height":86},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-hexagon-of-opposition-thinking-outside-the-aristotelian-box/201038.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":88,"@type":89},"\tCallum ","Person",{"url":68,"name":91,"@type":92},"DocShare","Organization","application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document","2026-09-28","2026-09-04",true,{"@type":98,"interactionType":99,"userInteractionCount":47},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":100},"ViewAction",{"@type":102,"mainEntity":103},"FAQPage",[104,110,114],{"name":105,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":107},"What is the traditional argument the essay challenges about God's knowledge of the future?","Question",{"text":108,"@type":109},"The tradition argues that omniscience means God knows the future solely in terms of what will or will not come to pass, based on bivalence, God's knowledge of proposition truth values, and an exhaustive description of the future in those two terms.","Answer",{"name":111,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":112},"How does the essay use the future-tense Square of Opposition?",{"text":113,"@type":109},"It models statements about whether a future event S will obtain or will not obtain, and it also includes the subcontraries that S might obtain and might not obtain. The Square shows cases where both subcontraries can be true while both contraries are false.",{"name":115,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":116},"What is the Hexagon of Opposition, and how does it affect the conclusion about omniscience?",{"text":117,"@type":109},"The essay argues that making the logical possibility of genuine indeterminacy explicit transforms the Square into a Hexagon. This framework implies the future cannot be exhaustively described only as will/not-will, so an omniscient God must know the future partly in terms of what might and might not come to pass.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":78,"og:type":120,"og:title":59,"og:site_name":91,"og:description":61},"article",{"robots":122,"canonical":78},"index,follow",{"doc_id":124,"site_id":56},201038,1790087962,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":127},{"doc_id":124,"user_id":128,"nickname":88,"user_avatar":129,"doc_module":9,"category_id":50,"category_name":51,"doc_title":59,"doc_description":61,"doc_content":130,"file_id":131,"file_url":132,"file_type":133,"file_size":134,"view_count":47,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":9,"is_downloadable":9,"audit_status":9,"page_count":135,"language":136,"language_code":57,"site_id":56,"html_lang":57,"table_of_contents":137,"faqs":138,"seo_title":139,"seo_description":61,"update_tm":140,"read_time":141},137451211410,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/2000bb0a9246f588df?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1786362646172706240","The Hexagon of Opposition:\nThinking Outside the Aristotelian Box\nGregory A. Boyd, Thomas Belt, Alan Rhoda\nIt has traditionally been believed that omniscience means God’s knowledge of the future may be expressed exclusively in terms of what either will or will not come to pass. One common line of reasoning supporting this traditional belief is the following:\nP1:\tAll propositions are either true or false (bivalence).\nP2:\tGod knows the truth value of all propositions (omniscience).\nP3:\tThe future can be exhaustively described in terms of what either will or will not come to pass.\nC:\tTherefore, God knows the future exclusively as that which either will or will not come to pass.\nThe argument is formally valid. Accordingly, those who deny the conclusion (C), such as open theists, have to deny one or more of the premises.  Some deny the first premise (P1) and argue that propositions expressing future contingencies are neither true nor false.  Others deny the second premise (P2), arguing that the truth value of propositions about future contingencies is logically impossible to know and thus not within the domain of God’s omniscience. For reasons too involved to explore presently, we find both positions to be problematic. We also deem such moves unnecessary to the denial of the conclusion (C), for, we shall argue, the third premise (P3) can be plausibly denied. This premise, we maintain, is arbitrarily restrictive. There are three, not two, distinct modes in terms of which future events may be described. It may be that (1) a future event S will obtain and it may be (2) that S will not  obtain. Both of these possibilities are countenanced by P3.  What P3 overlooks, however, is that it may also be the case (3) that S might and  might not  obtain.\nIf we grant that there are three, not two, distinct modes in terms of which future events may be described, then it is not the case that the future can be truly described solely in terms of what either will or will not come to pass.  And if, in fact, the future cannot be truly described solely in terms of what either will or will not come to pass, then it follows that an omniscient God will not know the future solely in terms of what either will or will not come to pass. Rather, an omniscient God must also know the future partly in terms of what might and might not come to pass.\nTo say that S might and might not  obtain is to say that S’s obtaining is indeterminate— neither inevitable nor impossible.  The logical possibility of S being indeterminate is implicit in the structure of a future-tense Square of Opposition modeled after the traditional Square of Opposition from Aristotelian categorical logic.  But this possibility has been largely overlooked in Western philosophy which has tended to assume that the future could be expressed solely in terms of what either will or will not  come to pass.  The structure of the Square is partly to blame, for it fails to make the logical possibility of genuine indeterminacy sufficiently explicit.  When we make this possibility explicit, we find that the Square of Opposition transforms into a Hexagon of Opposition, in light of which it becomes clear how one may affirm genuine indeterminacy and thus deny (C) while at the same time affirming bivalence (P1) as well as God’s knowledge of the truth value of all propositions (P3).\nIn this essay we first show how the future-tense Square of Opposition allows for the possibility of a partly indeterminate future (I).  We then point out two problems with the Square with respect to its ability to handle future indeterminacy (II).  Following this, we demonstrate how a consistent working out of the logic of the Square leads to a future-tense Hexagon of Opposition (III). After highlighting several advantages of the Hexagon over the Square (IV) we conclude by applying insights gained from the Hexagon to assess the assumption (P3) that the future can be exhaustively described in terms of what either will or will not come to ","cbCainihGxWSJage","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCainihGxWSJage","docx",342135,22,"English","# The Hexagon of Opposition\n## Indeterminacy and the Square of Opposition\n## Problems with the Square and Future Indeterminacy\n## The Future-Tense Hexagon of Opposition\n## Advantages and Conclusion","[{\"question\":\"What is the traditional argument the essay challenges about God's knowledge of the future?\",\"answer\":\"The tradition argues that omniscience means God knows the future solely in terms of what will or will not come to pass, based on bivalence, God's knowledge of proposition truth values, and an exhaustive description of the future in those two terms.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the essay use the future-tense Square of Opposition?\",\"answer\":\"It models statements about whether a future event S will obtain or will not obtain, and it also includes the subcontraries that S might obtain and might not obtain. The Square shows cases where both subcontraries can be true while both contraries are false.\"},{\"question\":\"What is the Hexagon of Opposition, and how does it affect the conclusion about omniscience?\",\"answer\":\"The essay argues that making the logical possibility of genuine indeterminacy explicit transforms the Square into a Hexagon. This framework implies the future cannot be exhaustively described only as will/not-will, so an omniscient God must know the future partly in terms of what might and might not come to pass.\"}]","The Hexagon of Opposition - Thinking Outside the Aristotelian Box | DOCX",1788515841,8]