[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-1-en-105":3,"doc-seo-173894-105":53,"doc-detail-173894-en":126},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,14,19,24,29,34,39,44,49],{"id":8,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":11,"show_sort_weight":12,"slug":13},11,1,"Template","Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":15,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":16,"show_sort_weight":17,"slug":18},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":20,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":21,"show_sort_weight":22,"slug":23},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":25,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":26,"show_sort_weight":27,"slug":28},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":30,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":31,"show_sort_weight":32,"slug":33},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":35,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":36,"show_sort_weight":37,"slug":38},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":40,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":41,"show_sort_weight":42,"slug":43},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":45,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":46,"show_sort_weight":47,"slug":48},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":50,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":51,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":52},158,"General","general-158",{"code":4,"msg":54,"data":55},"ok",{"site_id":56,"language":57,"slug":58,"title":59,"keywords":60,"description":61,"schema_data":62,"social_meta":119,"head_meta":121,"extra_data":123,"updated_unix":125},105,"en","philosophical-naturalism-aug-24-2013-revised-introduction","Philosophical Naturalism - Aug 24 2013 Revised Introduction","","Revised introduction to David Papineau’s Philosophical Naturalism, outlining the central question of what “naturalism” means and why terminological disagreement should not precede substantive philosophical resolution. The text defends a naturalist package: opposition to dualism, rejection of epistemological internalism, and affirmation of continuity between philosophy and empirical science. A further commitment is physicalism, supplemented by a book plan across three sections—Physicalism, Mind, Knowledge—covering reductionism, mental representation, consciousness, and reliabilist knowledge.",{"@graph":63,"@context":118},[64,80,101],{"@type":65,"itemListElement":66},"BreadcrumbList",[67,71,74,77],{"item":68,"name":69,"@type":70,"position":9},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":72,"name":10,"@type":70,"position":73},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/",2,{"item":75,"name":51,"@type":70,"position":76},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/",3,{"item":78,"name":59,"@type":70,"position":79},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/philosophical-naturalism-aug-24-2013-revised-introduction/173894/",4,{"url":78,"name":59,"@type":81,"image":82,"author":87,"headline":59,"publisher":90,"fileFormat":93,"inLanguage":57,"description":61,"dateModified":94,"datePublished":95,"encodingFormat":93,"isAccessibleForFree":96,"interactionStatistic":97},"DigitalDocument",{"url":83,"@type":84,"width":85,"height":86},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/philosophical-naturalism-aug-24-2013-revised-introduction/173894.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":88,"@type":89},"Aurelia","Person",{"url":68,"name":91,"@type":92},"DocShare","Organization","application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document","2026-09-29","2026-09-02",true,{"@type":98,"interactionType":99,"userInteractionCount":79},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":100},"ViewAction",{"@type":102,"mainEntity":103},"FAQPage",[104,110,114],{"name":105,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":107},"Why does the introduction say disputes about the meaning of “naturalism” should not lead philosophical inquiry?","Question",{"text":108,"@type":109},"The text argues that nearly everyone wants to be called a naturalist, yet they disagree on core doctrines. It therefore claims substantive issues about what commitments philosophers should uphold must be settled before terminology is finalized.","Answer",{"name":111,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":112},"What main philosophical positions does the author say his naturalism supports?",{"text":113,"@type":109},"The author states he is against dualism and epistemological internalism, and he defends the view that philosophy is continuous with empirical science.",{"name":115,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":116},"How does physicalism extend the author’s naturalism in the first chapters?",{"text":117,"@type":109},"The introduction explains that physicalism—the thesis that all natural phenomena are physical, in a sense to be made precise—will be defended in the first two chapters, including an argument that physicalism leads to reductionism except for phenomena produced by selection processes.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":78,"og:type":120,"og:title":59,"og:site_name":91,"og:description":61},"article",{"robots":122,"canonical":78},"index,follow",{"doc_id":124,"site_id":56},173894,1788308321,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":127},{"doc_id":124,"user_id":128,"nickname":88,"user_avatar":129,"doc_module":9,"category_id":50,"category_name":51,"doc_title":59,"doc_description":61,"doc_content":130,"file_id":131,"file_url":132,"file_type":133,"file_size":134,"view_count":79,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":9,"is_downloadable":9,"audit_status":9,"page_count":135,"language":136,"language_code":57,"site_id":56,"html_lang":57,"table_of_contents":137,"faqs":138,"seo_title":139,"seo_description":61,"update_tm":125,"read_time":140},1099514068365,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/10000253d8d9f28188e?_k=1776742907772140068","Philosophical Naturalism\nDavid Papineau\nFor Katy\nThis is a somewhat revised version of the book I published in 1993 with Blackwell.  I have had thoughts of reworking the book for a prospective second edition.  The following text incorporates revision made so far.  For the most part, though, it is derived from the ultimate draft of the Blackwell book, though without any changes added in proof.  The Bibliography is also currently missing.  I apologize for the scruffiness of the text, which can be attributed to repeated copyings from an electronic original composed two decades ago.\nThe main revision so far is Chapter 1, which has been substantially rewritten, originally for the Greek edition (2002); some consequent changes have also been made to chapter 3 (at the end of section 3.10).\nDP\n24 Aug 2013\n\u000f\nINTRODUCTION\nWhat is philosophical \"naturalism\"?  The term i s a familiar one nowadays, but there is little consensus on its meaning.   For some philosophers, the defining characteristic of naturalism is the affirmation of a continuity between philosophy and empirical science.  For others the rejecti on of dualism is the crucial requirement.  Yet others view an externalist approach to epistemology as the essence of naturalism.\nI shall not engage directly with this issue.  It is esentially a terminological matter.  The i mportant question is which philosophical positions are right, not what to call them. I suspect that the main reason for the terminological unclarity is that nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a \"naturalist\", but the aspirants to the term nevertheless d isagree widely on substantial questions of philosophical doctrine.  The moral is that we should address the substantial philosophical issues first, and worry about the terminology afterwards.  Once we have worked out which commitments ought to b e upheld by philosophers who aspire to \"naturalism\", then we can agree to use the term accordingly.\nAs it happens, I am in favour of a naturalist answer to all the general questions raised above, as will become clear from the arguments wh ich follow:  that is, I am against dualism and epistemological internalism, and in favour of the view that philosophy is continuous with empirical science.  But there is a further strand to my naturalism, which I shall defend in the first two ch apters, and which takes it beyond these general commitments.  This further commitment is physicalism, the thesis that all natural phenomena are, in a sense to be made precise, physical.\nAt one time I intended to call this book \"Philo sophical Physicalism\" rather than \"Philosophical Naturalism\", on the grounds that \"physicalism\" is a more informative term than \"naturalism\".  But I decided against this for two reasons.  First, the title \"Physicalism\" might have carried the sug gestion that my philosphical stance is tied to the categories of current physical theory, whereas my position, as we shall see, is formulated, not in terms of current physics, but in terms of the science of whatever categories eventually turn out to be ne eded to explain the behaviour of matter.  And, second, the last two-thirds of the book move away from the details of physicalism as such, and address issues about mind and knowledge that arise, not just for strict physicalists, but for anyone of more generally naturalist inclinations.\nIn detail the plan of the book is as follows.  There are three sections -- Physicalism, Mind, Knowledge -- and each section contains two chapters.\nIn the first chapter I argue that physicalism is not a prejudice, but a consequence of some evident truths.  The second chapter then argues that physicalism also requires reductionism, except about phenomena that are the products of selection processes.\nIn the secon d section I discuss mental representation and consciousness. Chapter 3 offers a detailed version of the teleological theory of mental representation, a theory which I have defended in previous writings.  I explain the relationship between th","cbCaijmeR20C0cTf","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaijmeR20C0cTf","docx",220301,149,"English","# Introduction\n## What philosophical naturalism is\n## Papineau’s commitments: anti-dualism and continuity with science\n## Physicalism as a further commitment\n## Title choice and scope of the book\n## Plan of the book","[{\"question\":\"Why does the introduction say disputes about the meaning of “naturalism” should not lead philosophical inquiry?\",\"answer\":\"The text argues that nearly everyone wants to be called a naturalist, yet they disagree on core doctrines. It therefore claims substantive issues about what commitments philosophers should uphold must be settled before terminology is finalized.\"},{\"question\":\"What main philosophical positions does the author say his naturalism supports?\",\"answer\":\"The author states he is against dualism and epistemological internalism, and he defends the view that philosophy is continuous with empirical science.\"},{\"question\":\"How does physicalism extend the author’s naturalism in the first chapters?\",\"answer\":\"The introduction explains that physicalism—the thesis that all natural phenomena are physical, in a sense to be made precise—will be defended in the first two chapters, including an argument that physicalism leads to reductionism except for phenomena produced by selection processes.\"}]","Philosophical Naturalism - Aug 24 2013 Revised Introduction | DOCX",52]