[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-1-en-105":3,"doc-seo-237844-105":53,"doc-detail-237844-en":127},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,14,19,24,29,34,39,44,49],{"id":8,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":11,"show_sort_weight":12,"slug":13},11,1,"Template","Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":15,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":16,"show_sort_weight":17,"slug":18},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":20,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":21,"show_sort_weight":22,"slug":23},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":25,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":26,"show_sort_weight":27,"slug":28},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":30,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":31,"show_sort_weight":32,"slug":33},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":35,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":36,"show_sort_weight":37,"slug":38},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":40,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":41,"show_sort_weight":42,"slug":43},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":45,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":46,"show_sort_weight":47,"slug":48},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":50,"doc_module":9,"doc_module_name":10,"category_name":51,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":52},158,"General","general-158",{"code":4,"msg":54,"data":55},"ok",{"site_id":56,"language":57,"slug":58,"title":59,"keywords":60,"description":61,"schema_data":62,"social_meta":120,"head_meta":122,"extra_data":124,"updated_unix":126},105,"en","delay-in-trade-networks","Delay in Trade Networks","","Delay in trade is analyzed in decentralized markets where producers and consumers interact through middlemen. The study models a non-cooperative networked bargaining game with complete information about network structure, consumer values, and transaction costs, while allowing search friction during trades with middlemen. The results show that sunk cost problems and heterogeneous network connectivity can generate strategic delay or negotiation failure, reducing total trade capacity. In the limit of extremely patient agents, a sharp characterization of trade segmentation is obtained via directed cuts.",{"@graph":63,"@context":119},[64,80,102],{"@type":65,"itemListElement":66},"BreadcrumbList",[67,71,74,77],{"item":68,"name":69,"@type":70,"position":9},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":72,"name":10,"@type":70,"position":73},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/",2,{"item":75,"name":11,"@type":70,"position":76},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/presentations/",3,{"item":78,"name":59,"@type":70,"position":79},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/delay-in-trade-networks/237844/",4,{"url":78,"name":59,"@type":81,"image":82,"author":87,"headline":59,"publisher":90,"fileFormat":93,"inLanguage":57,"description":61,"dateModified":94,"datePublished":95,"encodingFormat":93,"isAccessibleForFree":96,"interactionStatistic":97},"DigitalDocument",{"url":83,"@type":84,"width":85,"height":86},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/delay-in-trade-networks/237844.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":88,"@type":89},"Noah","Person",{"url":68,"name":91,"@type":92},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-11-02","2026-09-11",true,{"@type":98,"interactionType":99,"userInteractionCount":101},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":100},"ViewAction",8,{"@type":103,"mainEntity":104},"FAQPage",[105,111,115],{"name":106,"@type":107,"acceptedAnswer":108},"What market setting does the paper study?","Question",{"text":109,"@type":110},"It studies decentralized trade among producers and consumers facilitated by middlemen, with a heterogeneous interconnection network and some search friction in trades with middlemen.","Answer",{"name":112,"@type":107,"acceptedAnswer":113},"Why can trade negotiations fail or be delayed in this model?",{"text":114,"@type":110},"Sunk cost effects make middlemen more conservative, and heterogeneous network structure can create strategic delay or prevent agreement, lowering total trade capacity.",{"name":116,"@type":107,"acceptedAnswer":117},"How does the paper characterize trade patterns for extremely patient agents?",{"text":118,"@type":110},"It derives a sharp characterization based on directed cuts: if the network admits a partition into two node sets where goods can only be traded from one side to the other, the trade segmentation and delay pattern follow.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":78,"og:type":121,"og:title":59,"og:site_name":91,"og:description":61},"article",{"robots":123,"canonical":78},"index,follow",{"doc_id":125,"site_id":56},237844,1791733564,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":128},{"doc_id":125,"user_id":129,"nickname":88,"user_avatar":130,"doc_module":9,"category_id":8,"category_name":11,"doc_title":59,"doc_description":61,"doc_content":131,"file_id":132,"file_url":133,"file_type":134,"file_size":135,"view_count":101,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":9,"is_downloadable":9,"audit_status":9,"page_count":136,"language":137,"language_code":57,"site_id":56,"html_lang":57,"table_of_contents":138,"faqs":139,"seo_title":140,"seo_description":61,"update_tm":141,"read_time":35},8796095462418,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/80000253c1241d02b47?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1778826106357471780","Submitted to Operations Research  \nmanuscript (Please, provide the manuscript number!)  \nAuthors are encouraged to submit new papers to INFORMS journals by means of a style 􀀌le template, which includes the journal title. However, use of a template does not certify that the paper has been accepted for publication in the named journal. INFORMS journal templates are for the exclusive purpose of submitting to an INFORMS journal and should not be used to distribute the papers in print or online or to submit the papers to another publication.  \nDelay in Trade Networks  \nTh􀀒anh Nguyen  \nKrannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 60208, [nguye161@purdue.edu](nguye161@purdue.edu)  \nVijay Subramanian  \nEECS Department, University of Michigan,Ann Arbor, MI 48109, [vgsubram@umich.edu](vgsubram@umich.edu)  \nRandall Berry  \nEECS Department, Northwestern University, Evanston IL 60201, [rberry@eecs.northwestern.edu](rberry@eecs.northwestern.edu)  \nWe study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen. We do this by analyzing a non-cooperative networked bargaining game. We assume a complete information set-up wherein all the agents know the structure of the network, the values of the consumers and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consumers trade with middlemen. In such a setting, we show that sunk cost problems and a heterogeneous network can give rise to delay or failure in negotiation, and therefore, reduce the total trade capacity of the network. In the limiting regime of extremely patient agents, we provide a sharp characterization of the trade pattern and the segmentation of these markets.  \nKey words : Noncooperative Bargaining, Supply Chain Networks, Trade Volume  \n1. Introduction  \nTrade delay is a wide-spread phenomenon of markets. In several manufacturing industries, for example, retailers often postpone contracting with certain suppliers to search for cheaper and more reliable sources. The real estate market is another well-known example where sellers (vacant house owners) and buyers may coexist but may fail to negociate a trade. Such delay, on the one hand, might allow agents to get more information and 􀀌nd better trading partners, but on the other hand, it slows down economic transactions and in􀀍uences the overall trade volume and liquidity of  \nthe market, typically leading to a reduction in both. Studying the causes of trade delay, therefore, has been an important question in economics and 􀀌nance as well as in operations management.  \nA non-cooperative bargaining model between buyers and sellers is perhaps the most common framework to study trade delay in the literature. When sellers and buyers have complete information, the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) shows that agents will reach an agreement immediately to avoid the surplus loss due to delay. Prior literature has extended Rubinstein (1982) in several directions to show that in some cases trading partners may choose not to reach an agreement and so strategically delay trade. (See the discussion on related literature in Section 1.1.) However, because of complexity, the literature has primarily focused on simple settings that often abstract away other aspects of markets. In this paper, we consider two important such aspects: middlemen and a heterogeneous interconnection network between producers and consumers involving these middlemen. Studying middlemen is important because, in most markets, trade does not involve just sellers and buyers but also includes one or more middlemen serving as intermediaries. For example, brokers and market makers 􀀌ll this role in 􀀌nancial markets as do wholesalers and retailers in many manufacturing industries. Similarly, there is a wide variety of interconnection networks seen in real-world markets. The question we ask in this paper is the following: can middlemen and the complex network structure that connects them ","cbCaiaCCZT6CMynP","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiaCCZT6CMynP","pdf",614698,48,"English","# Introduction\n## Overview of trade delay in markets\n## Bargaining models and strategic delay\n## Role of middlemen and heterogeneous networks\n## Main contributions and limiting characterization","[{\"question\":\"What market setting does the paper study?\",\"answer\":\"It studies decentralized trade among producers and consumers facilitated by middlemen, with a heterogeneous interconnection network and some search friction in trades with middlemen.\"},{\"question\":\"Why can trade negotiations fail or be delayed in this model?\",\"answer\":\"Sunk cost effects make middlemen more conservative, and heterogeneous network structure can create strategic delay or prevent agreement, lowering total trade capacity.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper characterize trade patterns for extremely patient agents?\",\"answer\":\"It derives a sharp characterization based on directed cuts: if the network admits a partition into two node sets where goods can only be traded from one side to the other, the trade segmentation and delay pattern follow.\"}]","Delay in Trade Networks | PDF",1789126738]