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Prepared as a joint investigation led by MAIB with SHK involvement, it sets the investigation’s objective as preventing future accidents by establishing causes and circumstances, without determining liability or apportioning blame. The report includes regulatory excerpts, admissibility notes, and a structured outline covering factual information, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations, with supporting annexes on weather data and requirements.",{"@graph":63,"@context":118},[64,80,101],{"@type":65,"itemListElement":66},"BreadcrumbList",[67,71,74,77],{"item":68,"name":69,"@type":70,"position":9},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":72,"name":10,"@type":70,"position":73},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/",2,{"item":75,"name":51,"@type":70,"position":76},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/",3,{"item":78,"name":59,"@type":70,"position":79},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/astral-part-4-investigation-report/565432/",4,{"url":78,"name":59,"@type":81,"image":82,"author":87,"headline":59,"publisher":90,"fileFormat":93,"inLanguage":57,"description":61,"dateModified":94,"datePublished":95,"encodingFormat":93,"isAccessibleForFree":96,"interactionStatistic":97},"DigitalDocument",{"url":83,"@type":84,"width":85,"height":86},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/astral-part-4-investigation-report/565432.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":88,"@type":89},"supergirl","Person",{"url":68,"name":91,"@type":92},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-25","2026-10-13",true,{"@type":98,"interactionType":99,"userInteractionCount":79},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":100},"ViewAction",{"@type":102,"mainEntity":103},"FAQPage",[104,110,114],{"name":105,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":107},"What was the main objective of the accident investigation?","Question",{"text":108,"@type":109},"The sole objective was prevention of future accidents by ascertaining the causes and circumstances. It was not intended to determine liability or apportion blame beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.","Answer",{"name":111,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":112},"Which organizations conducted the joint investigation?",{"text":113,"@type":109},"MAIB led the investigation under the IMO Code, with a joint investigation involving the Swedish Accident Investigation Board (SHK) and the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).",{"name":115,"@type":106,"acceptedAnswer":116},"What sections does the report include?",{"text":117,"@type":109},"The report is structured into a synopsis, factual information, analysis, conclusions, action taken, recommendations, and annexes including weather data and requirements relating to mooring, anchoring, and towing.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":78,"og:type":120,"og:title":59,"og:site_name":91,"og:description":61},"article",{"robots":122,"canonical":78},"index,follow",{"doc_id":124,"site_id":56},565432,1792448748,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":127},{"doc_id":124,"user_id":128,"nickname":88,"user_avatar":129,"doc_module":9,"category_id":50,"category_name":51,"doc_title":59,"doc_description":61,"doc_content":130,"file_id":131,"file_url":132,"file_type":133,"file_size":134,"view_count":79,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":9,"is_downloadable":9,"audit_status":9,"page_count":135,"language":136,"language_code":57,"site_id":56,"html_lang":57,"table_of_contents":137,"faqs":138,"seo_title":139,"seo_description":61,"update_tm":140,"read_time":141},962088121634,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_9964176cb1d06d4a9deccf72a44ae3dc","Report on the investigation of the grounding of  \nAstral  \non Princessa Shoal, East of Isle of Wight  \n10 March 2008  \nStatens haverikommission Swedish Accident Investigation Board Teknologgatan 8c  \nBox 125 38 SE-102 29 Stockholm SWEDEN  \nMarine Accident Investigation Branch Carlton House  \nCarlton Place Southampton United Kingdom SO15 2DZ  \nReport No 4/2009 January 2009  \nThis is a joint investigation report between MAIB and the Statens haverikommission  \n-The Swedish Board of Accident Investigation (hereinafter referred to as SHK) . The MAIB has taken the lead role pursuant to the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents (Resolution A.849(20))  \nExtract from  \nThe United Kingdom Merchant Shipping  \n(Accident Reporting and Investigation)  \nRegulations 2005 – Regulation 5:  \n“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”  \nNOTE  \nThis report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 13(9) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.  \nFurther printed copies can be obtained via our postal address, or alternatively by: [Email:](Email: maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk)[ ](Email: maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk)[maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk](Email: maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk)  \n[Tel: 023 8039 5500](Tel: 023 8039 5500)  \n[Fax: 023 8023 2459](Fax: 023 8023 2459)  \nAll reports can also be found on our website:  \n[www.maib.gov.uk](www.maib.gov.uk)  \nCONTENTS  \nPage  \nGLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS  \nSYNOPSIS 1  \nSECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 3  \n1.1 Particulars of Astral and accident 3  \n1.2 Narrative 4  \n1.2.1 Background 4  \n1.2.2 Anchoring 4  \n1.2.3 Events at anchor 6  \n1.2.4 Events during dragging 8  \n1.2.5 Events after the initial grounding 12  \n1.2.6 Other vessels 14  \n1.3 Ship damage 14  \n1.4 The Nab anchorage 15  \n1.5 Vessel traffic system 16  \n1.6 Princessa Shoal 16  \n1.7 Envionmental data 17  \n1.7.1 Ship’s weather forecasts 17  \n1.7.2 VTS weather forecast 17  \n1.7.3 Actual weather 18  \n1.7.4 Tides 18  \n1.8 Manning 18  \n1.8.1 Structure 18  \n1.8.2 Crew employment 20  \n1.8.3 OSM employment procedures 20  \n1.8.4 Training 21  \n1.8.5 Watchkeeping 21  \n1.8.6 Deck officers 21  \n1.9 Conduct of the anchor watch 23  \n1.9.1 Bridge equipment and passage planning 23  \n1.9.2 Anchor watchkeeping routine 23  \n1.9.3 Anchors and cables 25  \n1.9.4 IACS requirements 25  \n1.9.5 Guidance on anchoring 27  \n1.10 The ship owner and manager 28  \n1.10.1 Rederi AB Veritas Tankers 28  \n1.10.2 Organisation 28  \n1.10.3 Veritas procedures 28  \n1.10.4 Veritas internal audits 29  \n1.10.5 OCIMF SIRE programme 29  \n1.10.6 Swedish Maritime Authority 29  \n1.11 Previous accidents 30  \n1.11.1 Pasha Bulker 30  \n1.11.2 Young Lady 30  \n1.11.3 Statistics 31  \nSECTION 2 -ANALYSIS 32  \n2.1 Aim 32  \n2.2 Fatigue 32  \n2.3 Anchoring procedures 32  \n2.3.1 Master’s anchorage selection 32  \n2.3.2 Bridge procedures during anchoring 32  \n2.3.3 Position monitoring at anchor 32  \n2.4 Response to the deteriorating weather 33  \n2.4.1 Response to the weather forecast 33  \n2.4.2 Night orders 33  \n2.4.3 Main Engine Readiness 34  \n2.4.4 Reliance on anchoring equipment 34  \n2.5 Performance of the 2/ON on watch 35  \n2.5.1 Recruitment of the 2/ON 35  \n2.5.2 Monitoring of the 2/ON 35  \n2.5.3 Conduct of the anchor watch 35  \n2.6 Emergency response 36  \n2.7 Safety management 37  \n2.7.1 Safety management system 37  \n2.7.2 Auditing 37  \n2.8 VTS 37  \n2.8.1 Allocation of anchorage 37  \n2.8.2 Information flow and advice 37  \n2.8.3 Control of the anchorage 38  \n2.9 ","cbCaigfzyq1f0gRv","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaigfzyq1f0gRv","pdf",3039322,93,"English","# Synopsis\n# Section 1 - Factual Information\n## Particulars of Astral and accident\n## Narrative\n## Ship damage\n## The Nab anchorage\n## Vessel traffic system\n## Princessa Shoal\n## Envionmental data\n## Manning\n## Conduct of the anchor watch\n## The ship owner and manager\n## Previous accidents\n# Section 2 - Analysis\n## Aim\n## Fatigue\n## Anchoring procedures\n## Response to the deteriorating weather\n## Performance of the 2/ON on watch\n## Emergency response\n## Safety management\n## VTS\n## Knowledge and awareness of safe anchoring procedures\n# Section 3 - Conclusions\n## Safety issues directly contributing to the accident\n## Other safety issues identified during the investigation\n# Section 4 - Action Taken\n# Section 5 - Recommendations\n## Annexes","[{\"question\":\"What was the main objective of the accident investigation?\",\"answer\":\"The sole objective was prevention of future accidents by ascertaining the causes and circumstances. It was not intended to determine liability or apportion blame beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.\"},{\"question\":\"Which organizations conducted the joint investigation?\",\"answer\":\"MAIB led the investigation under the IMO Code, with a joint investigation involving the Swedish Accident Investigation Board (SHK) and the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).\"},{\"question\":\"What sections does the report include?\",\"answer\":\"The report is structured into a synopsis, factual information, analysis, conclusions, action taken, recommendations, and annexes including weather data and requirements relating to mooring, anchoring, and towing.\"}]","Astral - Part 4 - Investigation Report | PDF",1791853542,33]