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The findings support the view that higher welfare can result when executives do not capture excess value.",{"@graph":14,"@context":72},[15,34,55],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/","Template",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/general/","General",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/template/are-college-presidents-like-football-coaches-evidence-from-their-employment-contracts/572471/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/are-college-presidents-like-football-coaches-evidence-from-their-employment-contracts/572471.png","ImageObject",442,249,{"name":42,"@type":43},"xXChrisXx","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-22","2026-10-13",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":30},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",{"@type":56,"mainEntity":57},"FAQPage",[58,64,68],{"name":59,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":61},"What is the paper’s main argument about compensation for college presidents and football coaches?","Question",{"text":62,"@type":63},"The paper argues that criticisms of high compensation are unmerited because both markets show properties consistent with a competitive labor market. Compensation varies with program size and the executives’ potential for value creation.","Answer",{"name":65,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":66},"How do the study’s findings compare job tenure between university presidents and football coaches?",{"text":67,"@type":63},"University presidents stay in their jobs significantly longer than football coaches. The paper highlights large differences in tenure between the two groups.",{"name":69,"@type":60,"acceptedAnswer":70},"What differences does the paper report in employment contract structure between college presidents and football coaches?",{"text":71,"@type":63},"The paper reports significant differences in how college presidents’ employment contracts are structured compared with football coaches’ contracts. It further analyzes contract length, termination provisions, and noncompetition and arbitration clauses.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":74,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":76,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":78,"site_id":7},572471,1792208510,{"code":4,"msg":81,"data":82},"success",[83,88,93,98,103,108,113,118,123],{"id":84,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},11,"Presentations",90,"presentations",{"id":89,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":90,"show_sort_weight":91,"slug":92},12,"Resumes",80,"resumes",{"id":94,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":95,"show_sort_weight":96,"slug":97},14,"Invoices",70,"invoices",{"id":99,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":100,"show_sort_weight":101,"slug":102},15,"Posters",60,"posters",{"id":104,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":105,"show_sort_weight":106,"slug":107},16,"Social Media",50,"social-media",{"id":109,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":110,"show_sort_weight":111,"slug":112},17,"Forms",40,"forms",{"id":114,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":115,"show_sort_weight":116,"slug":117},18,"Letters",30,"letters",{"id":119,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":120,"show_sort_weight":121,"slug":122},21,"Paper Templates",5,"papers-templates",{"id":124,"doc_module":22,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":4,"slug":125},158,"general-158",{"code":4,"msg":81,"data":127},{"doc_id":78,"user_id":128,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":129,"doc_module":22,"category_id":124,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":130,"file_id":131,"file_url":132,"file_type":133,"file_size":134,"view_count":30,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":135,"language":136,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":137,"faqs":138,"seo_title":139,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":140,"read_time":141},8796112263567,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_3d24733baf745e90a7e4bdd5f77d97b2","ARE COLLEGE PRESIDENTS LIKE FOOTBALL COACHES? EVIDENCE FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS  \nRandall S. Thomas * & R. Lawrence Van Horn**  \nCollege presidents and football coaches are frequently criticized for their high compensation. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms are unmerited, as the markets for both college presidents and football coaches exhibit properties consistent with a competitive labor market. Both parties’ compensation varies insensible ways related to the size of the programs they manage, as well as their potential for value creation. Successful college presidents and football coaches can greatly increase the value of their schools well beyond the amount they receive in compensation. If these higher education executives’ compensation is the result of a competitive labor market, and they do not capture compensation in excess of the incremental value they create, the overall welfare of their universities is increased.  \nTo shed light on these issues, we engaged in a comprehensive examination and comparison of college president and football coach compensation levels and employment contracts across FBS Division I universities. We found a number of noteworthy results. First, we see large differences in job tenure of these two groups: university presidents stay in their jobs significantly longer than football coaches. Second, we observe that football coaches are paid significantly more and their pay is rising at a much faster rate than college presidents. Third, larger schools pay these top executives much more than their smaller counterparts, especially for football coaches. Furthermore, Power Five conference schools pay their coaches far more than the other football conferences. Finally, we note significant differences in the structure of the college presidents’ employment contracts compared to football coaches ’ contracts.  \nFor each of these major findings, we provide a detailed analysis of why they exist and how they can be explained by economic theory.  \n* John S. Beasley, II, Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School, Vanderbilt University.  \n** Associate Professor of Economics and Management, Owen Graduate School of Business, Vanderbilt University. We would like to thank Jessica Day and Eric Shlifer for their outstanding assistance in the collection and coding of the data for this project, and Eric Shlifer again for his help in researching several aspects of the paper.  \nTABLE OF CONTENTS  \nINTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 902  \nI. ECONOMIC THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES, AND COLLEGE PRESIDENTS’CONTRACTS ................................................................................................. 907  \nII. COLLEGE PRESIDENTS: RECRUITING, HIRING, AND NEGOTIATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS .......................................................................... 913  \nA. Creating the Search Committee to Hire a New College President ............. 914  \nB. Planning the Search and Creating a Pool of Candidates............................. 915  \nC. Interviewing Candidates and Developing the Finalists .............................. 917  \nD. Picking the President .................................................................................. 918  \nE. Negotiating the New President’s Contract ................................................. 919  \nF. Selecting Football Coaches......................................................................... 921  \nG. Comparing College President and Football Coach Hiring Processes......... 923  \nIII. COLLEGE PRESIDENT VS. FOOTBALL COACH CONTRACTS .............................. 923  \nA. Data Collection and Comparison of the Samples....................................... 924  \nB. Comparing College President and Football Coach Compensation............. 928  \n1. Year-By-Year Comparisons ................................................................... 928  \n2. Compensation Comp","cbCaiav0IFvlAiFP","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiav0IFvlAiFP","pdf",946906,57,"English","# INTRODUCTION\n# Economic theory, institutional features, and college presidents’ contracts\n# College presidents: recruiting, hiring, and negotiation of employment contracts\n## Creating the search committee to hire a new college president\n## Planning the search and creating a pool of candidates\n## Interviewing candidates and developing the finalists\n## Picking the president\n## Negotiating the new president’s contract\n## Selecting football coaches\n## Comparing college president and football coach hiring processes\n# College president vs. football coach contracts\n## Data collection and comparison of the samples\n## Comparing college president and football coach compensation\n## Contract length comparisons\n## Termination provisions: with cause and without cause\n## Noncompetition and arbitration provisions\n# CONCLUSION","[{\"question\":\"What is the paper’s main argument about compensation for college presidents and football coaches?\",\"answer\":\"The paper argues that criticisms of high compensation are unmerited because both markets show properties consistent with a competitive labor market. Compensation varies with program size and the executives’ potential for value creation.\"},{\"question\":\"How do the study’s findings compare job tenure between university presidents and football coaches?\",\"answer\":\"University presidents stay in their jobs significantly longer than football coaches. The paper highlights large differences in tenure between the two groups.\"},{\"question\":\"What differences does the paper report in employment contract structure between college presidents and football coaches?\",\"answer\":\"The paper reports significant differences in how college presidents’ employment contracts are structured compared with football coaches’ contracts. It further analyzes contract length, termination provisions, and noncompetition and arbitration clauses.\"}]","ARE COLLEGE PRESIDENTS LIKE FOOTBALL COACHES? EVIDENCE FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS | PDF",1791927561,20]