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there is anything except physics, intending to challenge whether physics is fundamental and complete such that autonomous special-science laws could exist.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How does the paper characterize Fodor’s view of autonomy?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"It distinguishes epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of special sciences, then develops the metaphysical construal as the main target of the argument.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why does the paper argue Fodor’s answer is implausible?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Because, given physicalism’s claims about special-science entities being realized by microphysical ontology and microphysics being dynamically complete, special-science laws should be reducible to physics—yet such reductions are described as very 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\nSource:Synthese,Vol.170,No.2(Sep.,2009),pp.217-233  \nPublished by:Springer  \nStable URL:https://www.jstor.org/stable/40271331  \nAccessed:12-06-201912:51 UTC  \nJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a widerange of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity andfacilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org.  \nYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms &Conditions of Use,available athttps://about.jstor.org/terms  \nSpringer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Synthese  \n# Why is there anything except physics?\n\nBarry Loewer  \nReceived:2 June 2009/Accepted:2 June 2009/Published online:4 August 2009◎ Springer Science+Business Media B.V.2009  \nAbstract In the course of defending his view of the relation between the specialsciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim's objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then,whyis there anything except physics?”By which he seems to mean to ask if physics isfundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special sciencelaws.Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of theautonomy of the special sciences.In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construalof his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor's question it is immenselyimplausible.  \nKeywords Fodor·Special sciences·Physicalism  \nOnly God gets to decide whether there is anything,and likewise only God gets to decide whetherthere are laws about pains;or whether,if there are,the pains that the laws are about are MR ..Here,for once,metaphysics actually matters.(Fodor 1997,p.161)  \nEverything is physical perhaps,but surely there are many different kinds of physical things.Someare protons;some are constellations;some are trees or cats;and some are butchers,bakers or can-dlesticks.For each kind of thing,there are the proprietary generalizations by which it is subsumed,and in terms of which its behavior is to be explained.For each such generalization,there is theproprietary vocabulary that is required in order for our discourse to express it.Nothing can happenexcept what the laws of physics permit,of course;but much goes on that the laws of physics donot talk about.It would not be entirely surprising if the explanatory apparatus that our higher-leveltheories require in order to say the sorts of thing that physics doesn't,cross-classifies the taxonomythat physical explanation employs.Maybe this kind of picture is a viable alternative to consilience.Or maybe it's not.Or maybe both are wrong.Or maybe it's still too soon to tell.LRB |Vol.20,No.21 dated 29 October 1998|Jerry Fodor  \nIn the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences andphysics from Jaegwon Kim's objections Jerry Fodor asks  \nSo then,why is there anything except physics?That,I think,is what is reallybugging Kim.Well,I admit that I don't know why.I don't even know how tothink about why.I expect to figure out why there is anything except physics theday before I figure out why there is anything at all,another(and presumablyrelated)metaphysical conundrum that I find perplexing(Fodor 1997,p.161)  \nWhy are Fodor perplexed and Kim bugged by the existence of anything,i.e.anysciences,other than physics?I think the explanation may be this.Fodor and Kim bothbelieve  \n(1)All items belonging to the ontology of the special sciences(all special scienceindividuals,events,properties etc.)are constituted or realized by microphysicalontology(particles,fields,quantum states etc.)  \n(2)The dynamical laws of micro physics are complete in the domain of microphysics.  \nFodor but not Kim also thinks that  \n(3)There are special sciences whose subject matters include natural kinds,laws,explanations,causal relations,confirmation relations etc.t","cbCaia4WfSZQTDgv","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaia4WfSZQTDgv","pdf",2316983,18,"English","# Introduction\n## Fodor’s question and Kim’s objections\n# Metaphysical framing of autonomy\n## Epistemological vs metaphysical autonomy\n# Constraints from physicalism\n## Ontology and completeness of microphysics\n# Reduction vs scarcity of reductions\n## Why special-science laws remain puzzling","[{\"question\":\"What question does Fodor raise regarding physics?\",\"answer\":\"Fodor asks why there is anything except physics, intending to challenge whether physics is fundamental and complete such that autonomous special-science laws could exist.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper characterize Fodor’s view of autonomy?\",\"answer\":\"It distinguishes epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of special sciences, then develops the metaphysical construal as the main target of the argument.\"},{\"question\":\"Why does the paper argue Fodor’s answer is implausible?\",\"answer\":\"Because, given physicalism’s claims about special-science entities being realized by microphysical ontology and microphysics being dynamically complete, special-science laws should be reducible to physics—yet such reductions are described as very scarce.\"}]","Why Is There Anything Except Physics? | PDF",45]