[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":3,"doc-seo-199410-105":59,"doc-detail-199410-en":123},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,13,18,23,28,33,38,43,48,51,55],{"id":8,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":10,"show_sort_weight":11,"slug":12},1,"Document","Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":14,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":15,"show_sort_weight":16,"slug":17},2,"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":19,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":20,"show_sort_weight":21,"slug":22},4,"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":24,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":25,"show_sort_weight":26,"slug":27},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":29,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":30,"show_sort_weight":31,"slug":32},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":34,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":35,"show_sort_weight":36,"slug":37},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":39,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":40,"show_sort_weight":41,"slug":42},8,"Research & Report",30,"research-report",{"id":44,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":45,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":47},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":46,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":49,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":50},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":53,"show_sort_weight":52,"slug":54},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":56,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":57,"show_sort_weight":24,"slug":58},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":60,"data":61},"ok",{"site_id":62,"language":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"keywords":66,"description":67,"schema_data":68,"social_meta":116,"head_meta":118,"extra_data":120,"updated_unix":122},105,"en","why-hunger-is-not-a-desire","Why Hunger Is Not A Desire","","This paper argues, using psychology and neuroscience, that hunger is not a desire. It contrasts its account with Timothy Schroeder’s empirically informed theory of desire, emphasizing a sharp distinction between desires and basic drives such as the drive for food. Drawing on evidence from incentive learning experiments, it shows that desires and basic drives influence action through different mechanisms, supporting a natural-kind approach to what counts as a desire.",{"@graph":69,"@context":115},[70,84,106],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/why-hunger-is-not-a-desire/199410/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/why-hunger-is-not-a-desire/199410.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Clementine","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-11-02","2026-09-04",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":105},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",12,{"@type":107,"mainEntity":108},"FAQPage",[109],{"name":110,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":112},"What evidence is used to distinguish desires from basic drives?","Question",{"text":113,"@type":114},"The paper points to experiments on incentive learning, claiming that desires and basic drives affect action in different ways, which motivates the theoretical distinction.","Answer","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":117,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":119,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":121,"site_id":62},199410,1788505898,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":124},{"doc_id":121,"user_id":125,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":126,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":127,"file_id":128,"file_url":129,"file_type":130,"file_size":131,"view_count":105,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":132,"language":133,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":134,"faqs":135,"seo_title":136,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":122,"read_time":137,"preview_page_count":4},1374391974564,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/14000253aa45c000a9e?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1779874745381141002","Why Hunger Is Not A Desire  \nPatrick Butlin  \nAbstract  \nThis paper presents an account of the nature of desire, informed by psychology and neuroscience, which entails that hunger is not a desire. The account is contrasted with Schroeder’s well-known empirically-informed theory of desire. It is argued that one significant virtue of the present account, in comparison with Schroeder’s theory, is that it draws a sharp distinction between desires and basic drives, such as the drive for food. One reason to draw this distinction is that experiments on incentive learning show that desires and basic drives influence action in different ways.  \nKeywords: desire, drive, hunger, incentive learning, goal-directed behaviour  \n1. Introduction  \nIt cannot be said, however, that hunger is the desire or appetite for food. After consuming three-quarters of a delicious meal, I may still have an appetite – a desire to eat – even though I am no longer hungry. Furthermore, hunger typically explains a desire for food. But there are other possible explanations…and explanation isirreflexive. Finally, a being without the concept of food (such as a newborn baby) could perfectly well be hungry yet not be seriously said to have a desire specifically for food.  \n- from Wayne A. Davis (1986), ‘Two senses of desire’, p. 65.  \nIn this passage, Wayne Davis argues for the claim that hunger is not a desire, and his arguments get close to the heart of the matter. In this paper I will defend Davis’claim, by setting out an account of the nature of desire based on evidence from psychology and neuroscience, according to which hunger, thirst, and other basic drives (as I call them) are not desires. This is a particularly noteworthy feature of my theory, since it is one major way in which it differs from Timothy Schroeder’s‘Reward Theory of Desire’ (2004, p. 131), which is by far the best-known and most detailed empirically-informed account of the nature of desire in the philosophical literature.  \nExisting theories of desire often give necessary and sufficient conditions for a state’s being a desire, which describe relationships with other psychological states or processes, or at least hint at such conditions. For example, Smith (1987, 1994) argues that desires are mental states with the world-to-mind direction of fit, which he takes to amount to a functional role in which the disposition to act so as to bring about the object of desire is central. Desires are therefore defined by their role in motivation. Similary, Schroeder specifies a role in reinforcement learning which he claims is constitutive of desire. But my theory takes a different approach. I assume that if there is at least one natural kind of  \npsychological state which fits the way that philosophers and the folk think of desires sufficiently well, then what it is to be a desire is to be a member of whichever natural kind best fits the existing philosophical and folk conception. So desires are not characterised on my view by their role in motivation, evaluation, reinforcement learning or the generation of pleasure, but by their membership of a particular natural kind. Psychological natural kinds, as I think of them, are sets of entities with common teleofunctional roles in psychological mechanisms.  \nMy primary aim in this paper is therefore to identify and describe the most plausible candidate natural kind for this role. Natural kinds are often sub-kinds of broader kinds, and an important task for achieving this aim will be defending the relatively narrow conception of desire that I favour against broader alternatives. In particular, I will argue that the natural kind that is constitutive of desire excludes basic drives such as the drive for food, but it might be contended that Schroeder’s theory identifies a broader natural kind that includes basic drives.  \nThis may make it sound as though my dispute with Schroeder is purely verbal – that we disagree only about which of two sets of psychological states","cbCaipHTj4dAmgL8","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaipHTj4dAmgL8","pdf",233026,21,"English","# Introduction\n# A Natural Kind Theory of Desire\n## Intrinsic vs instrumental desires","[{\"question\":\"What evidence is used to distinguish desires from basic drives?\",\"answer\":\"The paper points to experiments on incentive learning, claiming that desires and basic drives affect action in different ways, which motivates the theoretical distinction.\"}]","Why Hunger Is Not A Desire | PDF",53]