[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-33893-en":3,"doc-seo-33893-105":29},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":4,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":20,"is_downloadable":20,"audit_status":20,"page_count":21,"language":22,"language_code":23,"site_id":24,"html_lang":23,"table_of_contents":25,"faqs":26,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":27,"read_time":28},33893,687197207057,"Sage","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_29158cc5080c5b710cf443261637dec0",2,"Literature","Warrant and Proper Function","Warrant and Proper Function by Alvin Plantinga examines the philosophical problem of what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. The preface revisits the “warrant” debate introduced in Warrant: The Current Debate and argues that common twentieth-century accounts—often tied to internalism and to justification—remain inadequate. It outlines how internalist epistemic access and the link between justification, evidence, and epistemic duty have produced a confusing variety of theories, motivating a more developed account of warrant.","","cbCaiapNmDmppjAk","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiapNmDmppjAk","pdf",18696636,1,256,"English","en",105,"# Preface\n## Warrant and the agenda of Western epistemology\n## Internalism, justification, and epistemic duty\n## Diversity of theories of justification","[{\"question\":\"What philosophical agenda does Plato set for epistemology in the preface?\",\"answer\":\"Plato’s agenda concerns what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief and what quality—called “warrant”—is sufficient, together with truth and belief, for knowledge.\"},{\"question\":\"How does internalism relate to warrant and justification in the preface?\",\"answer\":\"Internalism is presented as a set of views about privileged epistemic access to the conditions that make a belief warranted, and it is paired with the idea that justification is necessary for warrant and nearly sufficient (pending concerns like Gettier).\"},{\"question\":\"Why does the preface claim twentieth-century views of justification are confusing?\",\"answer\":\"The preface argues that twentieth-century epistemology varies widely on what justification is—duty and responsibility, possession of evidence, fulfillment of epistemic goals, correctness with respect to the knower, or reliable belief-production—while still connecting justification closely to warrant.\"}]",1782217702,394,{"code":4,"msg":30,"data":31},"ok",{"site_id":24,"language":23,"slug":32,"title":13,"keywords":15,"description":14,"schema_data":33,"social_meta":83,"head_meta":85,"extra_data":87,"updated_unix":27},"warrant-and-proper-function",{"@graph":34,"@context":82},[35,51,65],{"@type":36,"itemListElement":37},"BreadcrumbList",[38,42,45,48],{"item":39,"name":40,"@type":41,"position":20},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":43,"name":44,"@type":41,"position":11},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",{"item":46,"name":12,"@type":41,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/literature/",3,{"item":49,"name":13,"@type":41,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/warrant-and-proper-function/33893/",4,{"url":49,"name":13,"@type":52,"author":53,"headline":13,"publisher":55,"fileFormat":58,"description":14,"dateModified":59,"datePublished":59,"encodingFormat":58,"isAccessibleForFree":60,"interactionStatistic":61},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":54},"Person",{"url":39,"name":56,"@type":57},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-06-23",true,{"@type":62,"interactionType":63,"userInteractionCount":4},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":64},"ViewAction",{"@type":66,"mainEntity":67},"FAQPage",[68,74,78],{"name":69,"@type":70,"acceptedAnswer":71},"What philosophical agenda does Plato set for epistemology in the preface?","Question",{"text":72,"@type":73},"Plato’s agenda concerns what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief and what quality—called “warrant”—is sufficient, together with truth and belief, for knowledge.","Answer",{"name":75,"@type":70,"acceptedAnswer":76},"How does internalism relate to warrant and justification in the preface?",{"text":77,"@type":73},"Internalism is presented as a set of views about privileged epistemic access to the conditions that make a belief warranted, and it is paired with the idea that justification is necessary for warrant and nearly sufficient (pending concerns like Gettier).",{"name":79,"@type":70,"acceptedAnswer":80},"Why does the preface claim twentieth-century views of justification are confusing?",{"text":81,"@type":73},"The preface argues that twentieth-century epistemology varies widely on what justification is—duty and responsibility, possession of evidence, fulfillment of epistemic goals, correctness with respect to the knower, or reliable belief-production—while still connecting justification closely to warrant.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":49,"og:type":84,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":56,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":86,"canonical":49},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":24}]