[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-seo-526636-105":3,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":81,"doc-detail-526636-en":130},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"ok",{"site_id":7,"language":8,"slug":9,"title":10,"keywords":11,"description":12,"schema_data":13,"social_meta":74,"head_meta":76,"extra_data":78,"updated_unix":80},105,"en","value-added-taxes-chain-effects-and-informality","Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality","","Equilibrium modeling and firm-survey evidence in Brazil examine how VAT collection rules influence tax avoidance and informality. The credit method generates informality chains, where buyers or suppliers linked to informal firms are more likely to be informal. Stronger enforcement at a production stage increases formality upstream and downstream, and correlated measures confirm these relationships. When VAT is applied at a single stage using authorities’ estimated rate, the chain effects vanish, highlighting policy design implications.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & 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model?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"The credit method used to collect VAT links firms in ways that propagate informality, making clients or suppliers of informal firms more likely to be informal.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How does enforcement change formality through the production chain?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"An increase in enforcement in one production stage raises formality both downstream and upstream, and related empirical measures are positively correlated with formality.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why do chain effects disappear under the single-stage VAT approach?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"When VAT is applied in a single production stage at a rate estimated by authorities, the inter-stage structure that sustains the propagation of informality is removed.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},526636,1791726035,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,110,114,119,122,126],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & 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\n[http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.195)[=](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.195)[10.1257/mac.2.4.195](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.195)  \nValue-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality† By Áureo de Paula and José A. Scheinkman*  \nWe present an equilibrium model of tax avoidance and test its implications using a survey of firms in Brazil. In the model, the credit method used to collect value-added tax (VAT) creates informality chains—clients or suppliers of informal firms are more likely to be informal. An increase in enforcement in a production stage increases formality downstream and upstream. Various empirical measures of formality of suppliers and buyers, and of enforcement downstream and upstream, are positively correlated with formality. When the VAT is applied in a single stage of production at a rate estimated by the authorities, these chain effects disappear. (JEL H25, H26, L14, L21, O14, O17)  \nIn this paper, we investigate determinants of informality. It is difficult to define  \ninformal activities unambiguously, but estimates indicate that in the period 1990–1993 approximately 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States was produced by individuals or firms that evaded taxes or engaged in illegal pursuits. These activities may produce 25–35 percent of aggregate output in Latin America, between 13 and 70 percent in Asian countries, and about 15 percent in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (see Table 2 in Friedrich Schneider and Dominick H. Enste 2000). The underground economy is also estimated to have comprised between 6 and 63.5 percent in countries in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern and Central European nations during the first half of the 1990s (see Table 1 in Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Andrei Shleifer 1997).  \nInformality creates a fiscal problem, but there is also growing evidence that informal firms are less efficient, perhaps because of their necessarily small scale, perhaps because of their lack of access to credit or access to the infrastructure of legal  \n* de Paula: University of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk, 160 McNeil Building, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 (e-mail: [aureo@sas.upenn.edu](aureo@sas.upenn.edu)). Scheinkman: Princeton University, Department of Economics, 26 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, NJ 08544-5296 and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: [joses@princeton.edu](joses@princeton.edu)). Most of the analysis in this paper appeared earlier in de Paula and Scheinkman (2008). We thank Rita Almeida and Sandra Brandão for their help with the enforcement data, and Joana Monteiro and Juliano Assuncão for providing us with the ECINF dataset and clarifying its methodology. We also thank Julio Cacho, Paulo Natenzon, Justinas Pelenis, and Glen Weyl for research assistance. We benefited from comments by seminar participants at several institutions and conferences and especially from conversations with William Maloney, Nicola Persico, and Ken Wolpin. The current version particularly benefited from detailed comments by the referees. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Award Numbers SES0350770 and SES0718407. Portions of this work were done while Scheinkman was a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.  \n† To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the articles page at [http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.1)[=](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.1)[10.1257/mac.2.4.1](http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.4.1).  \n196 AMErIcAn EcOnOMIc JOurnAL: MAcrOEcOnOMIcs OcTOBEr 2010  \nprotection provided by the state. In many ","cbCaic8d6qV8YemR","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaic8d6qV8YemR","pdf",745696,27,"English","# Model of informality and VAT collection\n## Informality chains from the credit method\n## Enforcement effects upstream and downstream\n## Single-stage VAT and disappearance of chain effects\n# Empirical context and measurement of informality\n## Estimates across regions and time\n## Efficiency and fiscal implications\n# Literature background and theoretical foundations","[{\"question\":\"What mechanism creates informality chains in the paper’s model?\",\"answer\":\"The credit method used to collect VAT links firms in ways that propagate informality, making clients or suppliers of informal firms more likely to be informal.\"},{\"question\":\"How does enforcement change formality through the production chain?\",\"answer\":\"An increase in enforcement in one production stage raises formality both downstream and upstream, and related empirical measures are positively correlated with formality.\"},{\"question\":\"Why do chain effects disappear under the single-stage VAT approach?\",\"answer\":\"When VAT is applied in a single production stage at a rate estimated by authorities, the inter-stage structure that sustains the propagation of informality is removed.\"}]","Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality | PDF",1791499652,68,[147,151,155,159],{"page_no":22,"url":148,"width":149,"height":150},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/aeddaba5e7c446664bbaeea29bacd4ef.webp",983,1415,{"page_no":26,"url":152,"width":153,"height":154},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/d43a95753cd2ad33793a0479e68fc959.webp",982,1414,{"page_no":30,"url":156,"width":157,"height":158},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/5abce3b49e54a8737620b5eedc58d48c.webp",981,1412,{"page_no":33,"url":160,"width":161,"height":162},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/3227128b8184622bec1dbbce9106f47a.webp",980,1411]