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The results show that trade improves institutional quality, strengthens equilibrium institutions versus autarky, and produces better infrastructure than a closed economy, with related effects on corruption and investment incentives.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/trade-institutions-and-economies-in-transition-abstract/513434/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/trade-institutions-and-economies-in-transition-abstract/513434.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Genevieve","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-11-07","2026-10-06",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",10,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"How does opening to trade affect market institutions in the paper?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"Opening an economy to trade improves the quality of institutions, leading to stronger equilibrium institutions compared with autarky.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"What role does public infrastructure spending play in the analysis?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"Public spending on infrastructure is modeled as affecting firms’ costs and productivity, and trade changes both the level of infrastructure investment and how its burden is distributed across firms.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"How do connected entrepreneurs and corruption relate to the paper’s results?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Some firms with ties to the ruling government benefit from weaker institutions and face lower fixed production costs; trade supports stronger institutions and is associated with less corruption and a more even infrastructure burden across firms.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},513434,1791425875,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,111,115,120,123,126],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":26,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":89,"show_sort_weight":90,"slug":91},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":33,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":93,"show_sort_weight":94,"slug":95},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":97,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":102,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":103,"show_sort_weight":104,"slug":105},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":107,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":108,"show_sort_weight":109,"slug":110},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":112,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},8,30,"research-report",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":118,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":121,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":122},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":55,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":124,"show_sort_weight":55,"slug":125},"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":127,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":128,"show_sort_weight":97,"slug":129},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":131},{"doc_id":79,"user_id":132,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":112,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":55,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":144,"read_time":145,"preview_page_count":33,"preview_urls":146},1374391974585,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_276721f389ce27ea32af1340a28f341c","Trade, Institutions, and Economies in Transition Gal Hochman􀀃, Chrysostomos Tabakisy, and David Zilbermanz  \nDecember 2008  \nAbstract  \nIn the paper governments a􀀋ect 􀀌rms' pro􀀌ts by spending on public goods and by the introduction and enforcement of law. The elite in the paper may have close ties to the ruling government. One key question, which is investigated in the paper, is how opening to trade a􀀋ects the market institutions and the amount of public spending on infrastructure. We 􀀌nd that opening an economy to trade improves the quality of its institutions and increases the attractiveness of its business environment. More speci􀀌cally, the equilibrium institutions are stronger under trade in comparison to the one that would have prevailed in autarky. Finally, an open economy ends up with better infrastructure relative to a closed one.  \nJEL Classi􀀌cation Codes:F12, O19  \nKey words: Trade, autarky, public spending, market institutions, corruption, connected entrepreneurs  \n􀀃 UC Berkeley | Berkeley | CA, 94702 | [email:galh@berkeley.edu](email:galh@berkeley.edu)  \ny New University of Lisbon | Lisbon | Portugal, [1099-032 | email:ctabakis@fe.unl.pt](1099-032 | email:ctabakis@fe.unl.pt)zUC Berkeley | Berkeley | CA, [94702 | email:zilber@are.berkeley.edu](94702 | email:zilber@are.berkeley.edu)  \n1 Introduction  \nThe quality of domestic institutions, such as property rights or rule of law, is a key determinant of long-run economic growth and can therefore help explain the underperformance of many developing countries (see, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005a) . Institutions are important in explaining income di􀀋erences across countries. But it is still unclear what determines institutional di􀀋erences across countries. 1 To this end, we investigate how international trade a􀀋ects domestic institutions. A secondary but important question we address is how the former a􀀋ects investment in public infrastructure, which is widely viewed as another critical factor for long-term economic performance (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Francois and Manchin 2007) .  \nWe build an economic model in which the quality of market institutions and public infrastructure investment are both endogenously determined by a government that seeks to maximize real income. We compare the outcomes in both autarky and trade, and show numerically that opening an economy to trade leads to both higher investment in infrastructure and better domestic institutions. Therefore, our work suggests that international trade might have a bene􀀌cial (indirect) e􀀋ect on long-term growth through the latter channels. Trade creates additional rents and supports stronger institutions, public spending is larger and the infrastructure burden is distributed more evenly across 􀀌rms (i.e., less corruption) . Trade increases the bene􀀌t from public spending on infrastructure, a public good that reduces variable costs. On the other hand, reducing corruption and improving market institutions decrease, on average, the cost from public spending to a 􀀌rm. Di􀀋erent from existing literature, we introduce two policy choices; in addition to the choice of domestic institutions, the ruling government decides how much to spend  \n1 Although some papers demonstrated that greater trade openness could raise institutional quality (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005b; and Levchenko 2007) . Other recent papers demonstrated that in a country with weak political institutions, opening up to trade could make things worse with regard to both economic institutions and policies (e.g., B and B 2004; Segura-Cayuela 2006; and Stefanadis 2006) .  \non infrastructure. Furthermore, we focus on owners' ability to cope with corruption and bureaucracy, and not on the elite's ability to expropriate others.  \nTo investigate the relationship between trade openness, institutions, and public spending on infrastructure, we assume in the paper that a (new) ruling government wants to reform the economy, and is co","cbCaipdkPMiOmVzj","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaipdkPMiOmVzj","pdf",308364,31,"English","# Abstract\n## Introduction\n## Economic model and main mechanisms\n## Firms, institutions, and infrastructure","[{\"question\":\"How does opening to trade affect market institutions in the paper?\",\"answer\":\"Opening an economy to trade improves the quality of institutions, leading to stronger equilibrium institutions compared with autarky.\"},{\"question\":\"What role does public infrastructure spending play in the analysis?\",\"answer\":\"Public spending on infrastructure is modeled as affecting firms’ costs and productivity, and trade changes both the level of infrastructure investment and how its burden is distributed across firms.\"},{\"question\":\"How do connected entrepreneurs and corruption relate to the paper’s results?\",\"answer\":\"Some firms with ties to the ruling government benefit from weaker institutions and face lower fixed production costs; trade supports stronger institutions and is associated with less corruption and a more even infrastructure burden across firms.\"}]","Trade, Institutions, and Economies in Transition - Abstract | PDF",1791284961,78,[147,151,155,159],{"page_no":22,"url":148,"width":149,"height":150},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/960c20fb2b2803b4e8b7702cb391c09e.webp",983,1272,{"page_no":26,"url":152,"width":153,"height":154},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/9801b89aa01ace6c6653878e1cadb47a.webp",982,1270,{"page_no":30,"url":156,"width":157,"height":158},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/2ee2314cbc81051466ec7646dde4c283.webp",981,1269,{"page_no":33,"url":160,"width":161,"height":162},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-17/0523306f2d7e8dda8c7ce096a0a015ba.webp",980,1268]