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The study shows that, in New York City’s mechanism, uncoordinated offers produced mismatches: one-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed into less desirable schools. Using a deferred-acceptance evaluation with estimated student preferences, the coordinated mechanism captures about 80% of the gains achievable under a no-choice neighborhood extreme utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates changes from further algorithm modifications, and students previously administratively assigned gain the most in welfare and subsequent achievement.",{"@graph":69,"@context":122},[70,84,105],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/the-welfare-effects-of-coordinated-assignment-evidence-from-the-new-york-city-high-school-match/274483/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-welfare-effects-of-coordinated-assignment-evidence-from-the-new-york-city-high-school-match/274483.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Aria","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-20","2026-09-15",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":44},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",{"@type":106,"mainEntity":107},"FAQPage",[108,114,118],{"name":109,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":111},"What problem does the paper identify with New York City’s prior (uncoordinated) school assignment mechanism?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"Uncoordinated offers generated mismatches, including a large share of applicants who were left unassigned after the main round and later placed administratively into less desirable schools.","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"How does the study evaluate the welfare effects of the coordinated single-offer mechanism?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"It assesses outcomes using deferred acceptance and an estimated model of student preferences, tracking applications through assignments.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"Which factor has the biggest impact: coordinated offers or further algorithm modifications?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"Coordinating offers dominates the effects of additional algorithm modifications in improving welfare.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},274483,1789477891,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":44,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":129,"read_time":144,"preview_page_count":4},2336464648322,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/2200025388227c56fec?_k=1778556882303663488","American Economic Review 2017, 107(12): 3635–3689  \n[https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425)  \nThe Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match†  \nBy Atila Abdulkadiro ˘glu, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak*  \nCoordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme toa utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)  \nIn recent years, market design theory has inspired dramatic changes in how children are assigned to public schools across numerous American cities and around the world. The first new system adopted was for placing eighth graders into high schools in New York City (NYC). NYC’s new system has not only received widespread scientific and popular acclaim (Economic Sciences Prize Committee 2012; Tullis 2014; Roth 2015), but also became a template for reforms in other cities.1 Despite widespread adoption of and apparent consensus on the value of market-design-inspired  \n* Abdulkadiro˘glu: Department of Economics, Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Building, Durham, NC 27708, and NBER ([email: atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu](email: atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu)); Agarwal: Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, and NBER (email: [agarwaln@mit.edu](agarwaln@mit.edu)); Pathak: Department of Economics, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, E52-426, Cambridge, MA 02139, and NBER ([email: ppathak@mit.edu](email: ppathak@mit.edu)). This paper was accepted to the AER under the guidance of Pinelopi Goldberg, Coeditor. We thank Neil Dorosin, Jesse Margolis, Sonali Murarka, and Elizabeth Sciabarra for their expertise and for facilitating access to the data used in this study. Special thanks to Alvin E. Roth for his collaboration, which made this study possible. Jesse Margolis provided extremely helpful comments. We also thank Josh Angrist, Steve Berry, Stefan Bonhomme, Eric Budish, Francesco Decarolis, Matt Gentzkow, Arda Gitmez, Jerry Hausman, Phil Haile, Hortaçsu, Peter Hull, Yusuke Narita, Derek Neal, Alex Olssen, Ariel Pakes, Amy Ellen Schwartz, Jesse Shapiro, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, Federal Reserve Bank of NY, London School of Economics, Yale University, and the NBER Market Design conference for input. We received excellent research assistance from Alonso Bucarey, Red Davis, Weiwei Hu, Danielle Wedde, and a hard-working team of MIT undergraduates. Agarwal acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-1427231) . Pathak acknowledges support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (grant BR2012-068), National Science Foundation (grant SES-1056325), and the William T. Grant Foundation. Abdulkadirog˘ lu and Pathak are on the Scientific Advisory Board of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research in this paper.  \n†Go to [https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425) to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statement(s) .  \n1 Cities that adopted new coordinated matching systems following NYC include Camden, Denver, New Orleans, Newark, and Washington, DC.  \n3636 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2017  \ncentralized assign","cbCaifbvFCQQrBKO","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaifbvFCQQrBKO","pdf",1102375,55,"English","# Background and research questions\n## Market design and NYC’s assignment reforms\n## Why coordinated assignment may change welfare\n# Data and methodology\n## Pre-2003 uncoordinated system\n## Estimated student preferences and deferred acceptance evaluation\n# Findings and implications\n## Mismatches under uncoordinated offers\n## Welfare gains from coordinated offers\n## Comparison with further algorithm modifications","[{\"question\":\"What problem does the paper identify with New York City’s prior (uncoordinated) school assignment mechanism?\",\"answer\":\"Uncoordinated offers generated mismatches, including a large share of applicants who were left unassigned after the main round and later placed administratively into less desirable schools.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the study evaluate the welfare effects of the coordinated single-offer mechanism?\",\"answer\":\"It assesses outcomes using deferred acceptance and an estimated model of student preferences, tracking applications through assignments.\"},{\"question\":\"Which factor has the biggest impact: coordinated offers or further algorithm modifications?\",\"answer\":\"Coordinating offers dominates the effects of additional algorithm modifications in improving welfare.\"}]","The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment - Evidence from the New York City High School Match | PDF",139]