[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-35935":3,"doc-seo-35935":29},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":4,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":20,"is_downloadable":20,"audit_status":20,"page_count":21,"language":22,"language_code":23,"site_id":24,"html_lang":23,"table_of_contents":25,"faqs":26,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":27,"read_time":28},35935,962075006959,"Anda","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/e0002397efbe92a78e?_k=1776741047341049297",8,"Research & Report","The Parliament and Cooperative Oversight of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Why Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia is Stable but Still in Transition","Parliamentary oversight is a key democratic mechanism for controlling armed forces, yet its effect on civil-military relations is insufficiently explained. This study argues that parliaments in transitioning democracies face distinctive structural constraints in building effective oversight compared with established democracies. A three-type typology is developed, proposing cooperative oversight as a remedy. The Indonesia case shows stable, harmonious Parliament–military/executive relations while also stalling reform, weakening democratic defence management, and fostering dependence on military self-regulation.","","cbCaiobLsYmYkTes","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiobLsYmYkTes","pdf",497574,1,43,"English","en",105,"# Abstract\n# Background and Research Motivation\n## Civil-Military Relations and Oversight Gaps\n## The Role of Parliaments in Defence Sector Governance\n# Research Questions and Analytical Framework\n## Challenges in Transitioning Democracies\n## Typology of Parliamentary Oversight\n# Case Study: Indonesia\n## Cooperative Oversight and Its Effects\n## Tensions and Reform Implications\n# Contribution to CMR Literature","[{\"question\":\"What is the central focus of the study on Indonesia’s civil-military relations?\",\"answer\":\"The study examines how parliamentary oversight shapes civil-military relations in transitioning democracies, using Indonesia as a case. It connects oversight type with stability and ongoing reform problems.\"},{\"question\":\"Why do the authors argue that developing parliamentary oversight is difficult in transitioning democracies?\",\"answer\":\"They attribute the difficulty to structural challenges such as weak parliamentary institutional capacity, executive dominance in defence matters, and substantial military autonomy. These conditions make robust oversight hard to assume or replicate from advanced democracies.\"},{\"question\":\"What is cooperative oversight, and what are its main consequences in the Indonesian case?\",\"answer\":\"Cooperative oversight prioritizes good legislative-military relations and encourages voluntary information disclosure when parliamentary capacity is weak and the military remains a strong actor. It improves day-to-day harmony, but it can also stall civil-military reforms, erode democratic defence management, and increase reliance on military self-regulation and presidential appointment power.\"}]",1782766854,108,null]