[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":3,"doc-seo-623545-105":59,"doc-detail-623545-en":130},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,13,18,23,28,33,38,43,48,51,55],{"id":8,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":10,"show_sort_weight":11,"slug":12},1,"Document","Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":14,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":15,"show_sort_weight":16,"slug":17},2,"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":19,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":20,"show_sort_weight":21,"slug":22},4,"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":24,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":25,"show_sort_weight":26,"slug":27},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":29,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":30,"show_sort_weight":31,"slug":32},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":34,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":35,"show_sort_weight":36,"slug":37},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":39,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":40,"show_sort_weight":41,"slug":42},8,"Research & Report",30,"research-report",{"id":44,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":45,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":47},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":46,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":49,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":50},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":53,"show_sort_weight":52,"slug":54},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":56,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":57,"show_sort_weight":24,"slug":58},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":60,"data":61},"ok",{"site_id":62,"language":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"keywords":66,"description":67,"schema_data":68,"social_meta":123,"head_meta":125,"extra_data":127,"updated_unix":129},105,"en","the-nature-of-mental-states-hilary-putnam-identity-questions","The Nature of Mental States - Hilary Putnam - Identity Questions","","Hilary Putnam’s paper examines three classic philosophical questions about pain, explicitly setting aside questions of how we know other people’s pains and the analysis of the concept pain. The focus becomes whether pain is a brain state, especially what rules of analytical philosophy require for identity claims between properties. Putnam argues that understanding such identity depends on rules linking meanings and the requirement that identity statements be reductive and informative. The discussion also distinguishes properties from concepts and critiques views that treat them as collapse into one notion.",{"@graph":69,"@context":122},[70,84,105],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":15,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/literature/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/the-nature-of-mental-states-hilary-putnam-identity-questions/623545/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-nature-of-mental-states-hilary-putnam-identity-questions/623545.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"moss~","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-22","2026-10-20",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":81},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",{"@type":106,"mainEntity":107},"FAQPage",[108,114,118],{"name":109,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":111},"Which three questions about pain does Putnam reference at the start, and which does he exclude?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"He lists how we know other people have pains, whether pains are brain states, and the analysis of the concept pain. He states he will not discuss questions (1) and (3) and will instead address question (2).","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"What rules does Putnam say must be mentioned to discuss whether pain is a brain state?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"He says the discussion relies on implicit rules of analytical philosophy: an “A is B” claim is correct only if it follows in some sense from the meanings of A and B, and such a claim is philosophically informative only if it is reductive in the relevant way.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"How does Putnam distinguish properties from concepts in relation to identity statements?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"He uses ‘property’ for things expressible by predicates or functors and ‘concept’ for items identifiable with synonymy-classes. He argues that collapsing concepts and properties is an unfortunate view, since some true property identities do not yield corresponding identities between concepts.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},623545,1792600846,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":14,"category_name":15,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":81,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":39,"language":139,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":140,"faqs":141,"seo_title":142,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":143,"read_time":144},962090895452,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_a8503ba1806abce46bf441b54a3ca4cd","D Foocton  \nbywis  \n# The Nature of Mental States\n\n1  \nHilary Putnam  \nina  \nThe typical concerns of the Philosopher ofMind might be represented by three questions:  \n(1)How do we know that other people havepains?(2)Are pains brain states?(3)What is theanalysis of the concept pain?I do not wish todiscuss questions(1)and(3)in this paper.Ishall say something about question(2).  \nook  \nork:  \nThe  \nork:  \n## 1.Identity Questions\n\nNew  \n\"Is pain a brain state?”(Or,\"Is the property ofhaving a pain at time ta brain state?\")²It is im-possible to discuss this question sensibly with-out saying something about the peculiar ruleswhich have grown up in the course of the devel-opment of “analytical philosophy”—ruleswhich,far from leading to an end to allconcep-tual confusions,themselves represent consider-able conceptual confusion.These rules—whichare,of course,implicit rather than explicit in thepractice of most analytical philosophers--are  \nte?”  \nld &  \nlind,  \n(1)that a statement of the form \"being A isbeing B”(e.g.,\"being in pain is being in a cer-tain brain state”)can be correct only if it fol-lows,in some sense,from the meaning of theterms A and B;and (2)that a statement of theform \"being A is being B\"can be philosophical-ly informative only if it is in some sense reduc-tive(e.g.\"being in pain is having a certain un-pleasant sensation”is not philosophicallyinformative;\"being in pain is having a certainbehavior disposition”is,if true,philosophicallyinformative).These rules are excellent rules ifwe still believe that the program of reductiveanalysis (in the style of the 1930s)can be car-ried out;if we don't,then they turn analyticalphilosophy into a mug's game,at least so far asis”questions are concerned.  \nhilo-  \n501-  \nllars  \npp.  \n.949.  \nPhi-  \n5-80  \nIn this paper I shall use the term ‘property'asa blanket term for such things as being in pain,being in a particular brain state,having a partic-  \nOriginally published as\"Psychological Predicates,\"in(W.H.Capitan &D.D.Merill,eds.)Art,Mindand Religion(1973),pp.37-48.Reprinted with permission of University of Pittsburgh Press.  \nular behavior disposition,and also for magni-tudes such as temperature,etc.—i.e.,for thingswhich can naturally be represented by one-0r-more-place predicates or functors.I shall usethe term ‘concept'for things which can be iden-tified with synonymy-classes of expressions.Thus the concept temperature can be identified(I maintain)with the synonymy-class of theword 'temperature.'³(This is like saying that thenumber 2 can be identified with the class of allpairs.This is quite a different statement fromthe peculiar statement that 2 is the class of allpairs.I do not maintain that concepts are syn-onymy-classes,whatever that might mean,butthat they can be identified with synonymy-classes,for the purpose of formalization of therelevant discourse.)  \nThe question\"What is the concept tempera-ture?”is a very \"funny\"one.One might take itto mean“What is temperature?Please take myquestion as a conceptual one.\"In that case ananswer might be (pretend for a moment \"heat'and 'temperature'are synonyms)“temperatureis heat,\"or even\"the concept of temperature isthe same concept as the concept of heat.\"Or onemight take it to mean\"What are concepts,real-ly?For example,what is 'the concept of tem-perature'?”In that case heaven knows what an“answer”would be.(Perhaps it would be thestatement that concepts can be identified withsynonymy-classes.)  \nOf course,the question“What is the propertytemperature?”is also \"funny.\"And one way ofinterpreting it is to take it as a question about theconcept of temperature.But this is not the way aphysicist would take it.  \nThe effect of saying that the property P₁canbe identical with the propertyP₂only if the termsPP₂are in some suitable sense“synonyms”is,to all intents and purposes,to collapse the twonotions of “property”and \"concept\"into a sin-  \n73  \ngle notion.The view that concepts (intensions)are the same as properties has been explicitly ad-vo","cbCaiue5w7y8gmJG","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiue5w7y8gmJG","pdf",1397007,"English","# The Nature of Mental States\n## 1.Identity Questions","[{\"question\":\"Which three questions about pain does Putnam reference at the start, and which does he exclude?\",\"answer\":\"He lists how we know other people have pains, whether pains are brain states, and the analysis of the concept pain. He states he will not discuss questions (1) and (3) and will instead address question (2).\"},{\"question\":\"What rules does Putnam say must be mentioned to discuss whether pain is a brain state?\",\"answer\":\"He says the discussion relies on implicit rules of analytical philosophy: an “A is B” claim is correct only if it follows in some sense from the meanings of A and B, and such a claim is philosophically informative only if it is reductive in the relevant way.\"},{\"question\":\"How does Putnam distinguish properties from concepts in relation to identity statements?\",\"answer\":\"He uses ‘property’ for things expressible by predicates or functors and ‘concept’ for items identifiable with synonymy-classes. He argues that collapsing concepts and properties is an unfortunate view, since some true property identities do not yield corresponding identities between concepts.\"}]","The Nature of Mental States - Hilary Putnam - Identity Questions | PDF",1792468809,12]