[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":3,"doc-seo-145606-105":59,"doc-detail-145606-en":131},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,13,18,23,28,33,38,43,48,51,55],{"id":8,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":10,"show_sort_weight":11,"slug":12},1,"Document","Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":14,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":15,"show_sort_weight":16,"slug":17},2,"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":19,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":20,"show_sort_weight":21,"slug":22},4,"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":24,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":25,"show_sort_weight":26,"slug":27},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":29,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":30,"show_sort_weight":31,"slug":32},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":34,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":35,"show_sort_weight":36,"slug":37},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":39,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":40,"show_sort_weight":41,"slug":42},8,"Research & Report",30,"research-report",{"id":44,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":45,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":47},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":46,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":49,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":50},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":53,"show_sort_weight":52,"slug":54},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":56,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":57,"show_sort_weight":24,"slug":58},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":60,"data":61},"ok",{"site_id":62,"language":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"keywords":66,"description":67,"schema_data":68,"social_meta":124,"head_meta":126,"extra_data":128,"updated_unix":130},105,"en","the-logic-of-secret-alliances-abstract","The Logic of Secret Alliances - Abstract","","Secret alliances are examined as a puzzle within alliance signaling theory, where alliances deter aggression by sending costly, observable signals of commitment to protect a protégé state. Because secrecy prevents adversaries from seeing such signals, secret pacts should eliminate deterrence. The paper argues alliances can also signal members’ alignment, potentially provoking war when a new alliance implies unaligned interests against a shared enemy. A formal model with public versus secret alliances shows this can generally undermine deterrence.",{"@graph":69,"@context":123},[70,84,106],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/the-logic-of-secret-alliances-abstract/145606/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-logic-of-secret-alliances-abstract/145606.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Jake","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-18","2026-08-26",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":105},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",15,{"@type":107,"mainEntity":108},"FAQPage",[109,115,119],{"name":110,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":112},"Why does signaling logic make secret alliances puzzling in deterrence theory?","Question",{"text":113,"@type":114},"Signaling requires adversaries to observe that alliance members make costly commitments to fight together. Secrecy hides the alliance and its costs, so deterrence through signaling cannot operate as intended.","Answer",{"name":116,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":117},"How does the paper propose secret alliances can still arise?",{"text":118,"@type":114},"Alliances can signal not only commitment but also the alignment of members’ interests. If uncertainty is resolved in a way that indicates the protector’s interests are adversarial toward a shared enemy, the enemy may be provoked into war.",{"name":120,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":121},"What does the formal model conclude about secret alliances and deterrence?",{"text":122,"@type":114},"When states choose between public and secret alliances under incomplete information about alignment, secret alliances can occur in equilibrium and can have general effects that undermine the deterrent value of concurrent public alliances.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":125,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":127,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":129,"site_id":62},145606,1787725746,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":132},{"doc_id":129,"user_id":133,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":134,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":135,"file_id":136,"file_url":137,"file_type":138,"file_size":139,"view_count":105,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":140,"language":141,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":142,"faqs":143,"seo_title":144,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":130,"read_time":145},962084928904,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_155a257f0dc6eb9ab79c44ca47cae57d","The Logic of Secret Alliances  \nPeter Bils Bradley C. Smith  \nMay 11, 2023  \nAbstract  \nAlliances are typically understood as agreements intended to deter aggression from enemy states. By signaling an ally's commitment to a prot􀀓eg􀀓e state, a shared enemy may be deterred from attacking. In light of this signaling logic, secret alliances are puzzling. Because they are not observed, secret alliances by de􀀌nition cannot achieve deterrence through signaling. So why do states enter into these secret agreements? We argue that alliances may also act asa signal of a state's intentions, potentially undermining deterrence. If a new alliance signals that the members' interests are unaligned with those of a shared enemy, the enemy may be provoked into war. As a consequence, states sometimes want to keep alliance agreements secret. To develop this argument, we analyze a formal model in which states may enter into secret or public alliance agreements. We 􀀌nd that the possibility of secret alliances has general e􀀋ects on deterrence-possibly undermining the deterrent value of concurrent public alliances.  \nIntroduction  \nA primary role of military alliances is to deter aggression from enemies. To serve this purpose, alliances must alter the strategic calculus of enemy states to make an attack less attractive. One important mechanism through which alliances in􀀍uence these calculations is signaling (Morrow, 2000, p. 68-71) . Alliances achieve this goal by serving as a costly signal of members' commitment to 􀀌ght alongside one another against a shared enemey (Morrow, 1991, 1994) . Because alliance membership is not free, it requires costly action such as policy coordination or the provision of military equipment, enemies infer that only states that are seriously committed to each other's defense would bear the costs of membership. Through this mechanism, alliances alter the calculus of deterrence, reducing an enemy's incentive to attack.  \nIn light of this signaling logic, secret alliances stand out as odd. For the signaling mechanism to operate, it is self-evident that an alliance, and the costs imposed by it, must be visible to adversaries. Secrecy undermines this mechanism by keeping these signals hidden from view, consequently eliminating the deterrent value of alliances. This is consistent with empirical evidence, which 􀀌nds that secret alliances are associated with an increased probability of con􀀍ict (Bas and Schub, 2016) .  \nOne possibility is that secret alliances are not intended for deterrence, but rather some other purpose for which secrecy is bene􀀌cial. While this may be true in the case of some types of alliances, such as o􀀋ense pacts, it is far from the norm. In fact, secret alliances have often been explicitly defensive in nature, intended to only be activated in the event of aggression from an adversary. According to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data, 63% of all secret alliances were defensive. Furthermore, in the period 1816-1918, 62% of all alliances were secret and, as Hinsley notes, in the Bismarckian era these secret alliances were \\...without exception defensive, aimed at preserving the status quo...\" (1967, p. 257-258) .1  \nAnother potential explanation is that many so-called \\secret\" alliances were not meaningfully secret, being commonly known in spite of their formal provisions requiring secrecy. Again, though this  \n1 Moreover, these estimates are a lower bound as there may be secret alliances that never become public and, thus, are not observed in the ATOP data.  \nmay explain some cases, many important alliances were meaningfully secret. For example, Ramm (1937) documents British knowledge about European alliances in the period 1879-1895, highlighting the signi􀀌cant role that uncertainty over relevant alliance commitments played in shaping British foreign policy in this era. Although British intelligence o􀀎cers identi􀀌ed the possible existence of the Franco-Russian Alliance, they were uncertain","cbCaiaXi3XIlnRLH","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiaXi3XIlnRLH","pdf",462552,51,"English","# Introduction\n## Alliance signaling and deterrence\n## Why secrecy seems puzzling\n## Alternative explanations\n## Proposed theory and model setup","[{\"question\":\"Why does signaling logic make secret alliances puzzling in deterrence theory?\",\"answer\":\"Signaling requires adversaries to observe that alliance members make costly commitments to fight together. Secrecy hides the alliance and its costs, so deterrence through signaling cannot operate as intended.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper propose secret alliances can still arise?\",\"answer\":\"Alliances can signal not only commitment but also the alignment of members’ interests. If uncertainty is resolved in a way that indicates the protector’s interests are adversarial toward a shared enemy, the enemy may be provoked into war.\"},{\"question\":\"What does the formal model conclude about secret alliances and deterrence?\",\"answer\":\"When states choose between public and secret alliances under incomplete information about alignment, secret alliances can occur in equilibrium and can have general effects that undermine the deterrent value of concurrent public alliances.\"}]","The Logic of Secret Alliances - Abstract | PDF",129]