[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-35815":3,"doc-seo-35815":29},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":4,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":20,"is_downloadable":20,"audit_status":20,"page_count":21,"language":22,"language_code":23,"site_id":24,"html_lang":23,"table_of_contents":25,"faqs":26,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":27,"read_time":28},35815,1374391974468,"Eden","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_29158cc5080c5b710cf443261637dec0",8,"Research & Report","The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility","Responsibility for character is often tied to an epistemic condition: judging the quality of one’s character requires knowing at least some good character aspects. This framing yields two unsettling consequences—moral deterioration appears to reduce responsibility, and the truly morally bad seem excused. Marcella Linn challenges Neil Levy’s view by arguing that the badness-to-responsibility link does not follow and by showing that most people can meet the epistemic condition through partial moral understanding, developed voluntarily in ordinary circumstances.","","cbCaihUwHUYtRFiM","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaihUwHUYtRFiM","pdf",650495,1,20,"English","en",105,"# Abstract\n# Introduction","[{\"question\":\"What epistemic condition is central to the debate about character responsibility?\",\"answer\":\"The debate centers on the idea that being responsible for one’s character requires having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and that such knowledge needs at least some good aspects of character.\"},{\"question\":\"What surprising conclusions does Levy’s argument lead to?\",\"answer\":\"Levy’s view suggests that the morally worse a person is, the less responsible she is for being morally bad, and that truly morally bad people are excused for their bad characters.\"},{\"question\":\"How does Linn respond to Levy’s conclusions?\",\"answer\":\"Linn argues that the initial badness-implies-less-responsibility conclusion does not follow because people may have other character aspects enabling them to meet the epistemic condition. She also contends that most people voluntarily develop their characters and that partial moral understanding is sufficient for meeting the epistemic condition.\"}]",1782594580,50,null]