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Focuses on comparative statics of how reduced divorce costs change divorce propensity for couples at any marriage duration. Divorce costs shape both incentives for existing married couples and selection into marriage. Uses US marriage and divorce certificate data and exploits variation in unilateral divorce adoption across states to identify incentive and selection effects; results support commitment as the dominant motive.",{"@graph":69,"@context":122},[70,84,105],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/the-economics-of-the-marriage-contract-theories-and-evidence/138743/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/the-economics-of-the-marriage-contract-theories-and-evidence/138743.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Ethan Miller","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-09-20","2026-08-23",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":52},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",{"@type":106,"mainEntity":107},"FAQPage",[108,114,118],{"name":109,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":111},"What main question does the paper address about marriage contracts?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"The paper asks what role the marriage contract plays in people’s decisions to marry.","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"Which three hypotheses does the paper formalize to explain why people marry?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"It formalizes marriage as providing an exogenous payoff, as a commitment device, and as a signaling device.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"How does the paper use data to estimate the effects of divorce costs?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"It uses US marriage and divorce certificate records and exploits differences in when states adopted unilateral divorce law to proxy a permanent reduction in divorce costs, identifying incentive and selection effects through variation across marriage durations within the same state and year.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},138743,1787487405,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":52,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":129,"read_time":144},687207017582,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_994ba38a5ba835b3df7d355c54d3ed8d","the economics of the marriage contract:  \ntheories and evidence ∗  \nniko matouschek† imran rasul‡  \noctober 2006  \nAbstract  \nIn this paper we ask, what is the role of the marriage contract? We address this question by first formalizing three prominent hypotheses on why people marry. These are based on marriage providing an exogenous payoff to married partners; marriage as a commitment device; and marriage as a signaling device. The comparative static we focus on is how a reduction in the cost of divorce affects the propensity to divorce for couples at any given duration of marriage. Each theory highlights that divorce costs affect the propensity to divorce both through an effect on married couples directly — an incentive effect; and through an effect on the composition of couples that decide to marry — a selection effect. We then bring these alternative views of the marriage contract to bear on the data using individual marriage and divorce certificate data from the US. We exploit variation in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce law across states to proxy a one-off and permanent reduction in divorce costs. The disaggregated nature of the data allows us to identify the incentive and selection effects of lower divorce costs by exploiting the variation in divorce propensities across marriages of different duration within the same state and year. The results suggest the dominant reason why individuals enter marriage contracts is that they serve as a commitment device.  \nKeywords: marriage contract, divorce costs, incentive effect, selection effect.  \nJEL Classification: D10, J12 .  \n∗We have benefited from discussions with Oriana Bandiera, James Banks, Heski Bar-Isaac, Pedro Carneiro, Iftikhar Hussain, Elizabeth Peters, Riccardo Puglisi, Stéphane Mechoulan, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, Scott Schaefer, Scott Stern, Daniel Sturm, and seminar participants at the Cornell Evolving Family Conference 2006 . We also thank the editor, Dennis Carlton, and an anonymous referee for providing useful comments. All errors remain our own.  \n†Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60201, USA. Tel: 1-847-491 4166. E-mail: [n-matouschek@kellogg.northwestern.edu](n-matouschek@kellogg.northwestern.edu).  \n‡Department of Economics, University College London, Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. Telephone: +44 (0)20 7679 5853; Fax: +44 (0)20 7916 2775; E-mail: [i.rasul@ucl.ac.uk](i.rasul@ucl.ac.uk).  \n1 Introduction  \nMarriage markets have changed dramatically since Becker’s (1973, 1974) seminal theory of marriage. Foremost among these developments in both the US and Western Europe have been the large changes in divorce rates, the decline in marriage, and the general weakening of the traditional family structure. In this paper we argue that in order to understand the cause and effect of these changes, it is necessary to establish the reasons why individuals decide to marry in the first place.  \nIn Becker’s original work, and the enormous body of literature it inspired, two individuals marry when there is a positive surplus from their union relative to the two remaining single. Such gains may arise from specialization in home and market production, economies of scale, the provision of insurance, and risk sharing, among others.  \nThe motivation for this paper derives from noting that these explanations relate to why two individuals prefer to‘be together’ rather than remain single. They offer less insight on why individuals prefer to marry and enter a marriage contract rather than cohabit. In this paper we take a contractual view of marriage and directly address the question of what is the role of the marriage contract? To answer this, we formalize three prominent hypotheses on why people marry, rather than cohabit, and analyze the predictions that each underlying theory of marriage has on marriage market outcomes. We then bring these alternative models of marriage to the data and present ","cbCaikTzqZLPTAAW","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaikTzqZLPTAAW","pdf",628234,53,"English","# Introduction\n## Hypotheses on why people marry\n## Marriage contract as commitment vs incentives and selection\n## Data and identification strategy","[{\"question\":\"What main question does the paper address about marriage contracts?\",\"answer\":\"The paper asks what role the marriage contract plays in people’s decisions to marry.\"},{\"question\":\"Which three hypotheses does the paper formalize to explain why people marry?\",\"answer\":\"It formalizes marriage as providing an exogenous payoff, as a commitment device, and as a signaling device.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper use data to estimate the effects of divorce costs?\",\"answer\":\"It uses US marriage and divorce certificate records and exploits differences in when states adopted unilateral divorce law to proxy a permanent reduction in divorce costs, identifying incentive and selection effects through variation across marriage durations within the same state and year.\"}]","the economics of the marriage contract - theories and evidence | PDF",134]