[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-39602-en":3,"doc-seo-39602-105":30,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":84},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":20,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":21,"is_downloadable":21,"audit_status":21,"page_count":22,"language":23,"language_code":24,"site_id":25,"html_lang":24,"table_of_contents":26,"faqs":27,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":28,"read_time":29},39602,16904993612988,"Olivia Brown","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_a8503ba1806abce46bf441b54a3ca4cd",8,"Research & Report","The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment (1972)","Empirical research shows corruption can reduce investment and slow growth, but the document tests how robust these relationships are across countries using cross-country regression and growth-accounting approaches. Using four corruption datasets spanning different time periods, it finds corruption generally slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing nations, especially small ones, while increasing growth in large East Asian newly industrializing economies. The results support an East Asian paradox explanation based on stable, mutually beneficial exchanges between government promotional privileges and bribes/kickbacks.","[www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev](www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev)  \nWorld Development Vol. 32, No. 6, pp. 999–1017, 2004  \n􀀁 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain  \n0305-750X/$ - see front matter  \ndoi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.12.002  \nThe Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth and Investment  \nMICHAEL T. ROCK and HEIDI BONNETT * Hood College, Frederick, MD, USA  \nSummary.—Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that corruption reduces investment and/or slows growth. But how robust are these relationships? This question is answered by conducting a series of crosscountry regression tests using four different corruption datasets. We find that corruption slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries, particularly small developing countries, but increases growth in the large East Asian newly industrializing economies. The latter finding provides solid empirical support to a country case literature that explains the East Asian paradox––the combination of high corruption and high growth––in terms of stable and mutually beneficial exchanges of government promotional privileges for bribes and kickbacks.  \n􀀁 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.  \nKey words—East Asian NICs, growth accounting, comparative politics of corruption  \n1. INTRODUCTION  \nSeveral recent empirical studies (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000; Mauro, 1995) demonstrate that corruption reduces investment and/or slows economic growth. Several other empirical studies (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000; Wei, 2000) extend these findings by demonstrating that corruption retards foreign direct investment and shifts the composition of capital flowing into countries with more corruption in speculative directions. 1 These results are largely consistent with the neoclassical rent-seeking literature (Boycko, Shleifer,& Vishny, 1995; Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993) . Taken together, this body of theoretical and empirical work provides the basis for a new growth industry on good governance and development. 2  \nJust how robust is the relationship between corruption and investment on the one hand and corruption and economic growth on the other hand? This question is answered by conducting a series of growth accounting, or crosscountry  \nmultiple regression tests of the relationships between corruption, investment and growth. What follows differs from other work on this topic in several important ways. To begin with, we searched for and collected data on all known published measures of corruption. This yielded four corruption data sets over four different time periods that provide the basis for what appears to be one of the most comprehensive empirical tests of the impact of corruption on growth and investment. 3 Unlike several other studies on this topic, corruption is defined as the use of public office for private  \n* We would like to thank the Summer Research Institute (SRI) at Hood College for supporting this research. The SRI provides opportunities for particularly promising undergraduates to work closely with a faculty member on a research project. We would also like to thank Sang Kim, Jonathan Krieckhaus, Allen Hicken and his graduate students, as well as four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Final revision accepted: 1 December 2003 .  \n1000 WORLD DEVELOPMENT  \ngain, rather than as institutional quality, bureaucratic inefficiency or the degree of red tape within a bureaucracy. 4 This provides a clearer test of the relationship between corruption, investment and growth.  \nOur crosscountry regression tests are partially motivated by the observation that the relationship between corruption and investment and growth in our data sets appears to be different for small and large counties. 5 There are several reasons to suspect why this might be so. On the one hand, large countries have","cbCaifDyuLqxUXRZ","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaifDyuLqxUXRZ","pdf",239903,7,1,19,"English","en",105,"# Introduction\n## Research Question and Motivation\n## Data and Corruption Measurement\n## Country Size Differences (Small vs. Large)","[{\"question\":\"What is the key finding regarding East Asian newly industrializing economies compared with most developing countries?\",\"answer\":\"Corruption slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries, but increases growth in large East Asian newly industrializing economies, supporting an explanation of the East Asian paradox.\"}]",1783084900,48,{"code":4,"msg":31,"data":32},"ok",{"site_id":25,"language":24,"slug":33,"title":13,"keywords":34,"description":14,"schema_data":35,"social_meta":79,"head_meta":81,"extra_data":83,"updated_unix":28},"the-comparative-politics-of-corruption-accounting-for-the-east-asian-paradox-in-empirical-studies-of-corruption-growth-and-investment-1972","",{"@graph":36,"@context":78},[37,54,69],{"@type":38,"itemListElement":39},"BreadcrumbList",[40,44,48,51],{"item":41,"name":42,"@type":43,"position":21},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":45,"name":46,"@type":43,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":49,"name":12,"@type":43,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":52,"name":13,"@type":43,"position":53},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/the-comparative-politics-of-corruption-accounting-for-the-east-asian-paradox-in-empirical-studies-of-corruption-growth-and-investment-1972/39602/",4,{"url":52,"name":13,"@type":55,"author":56,"headline":13,"publisher":58,"fileFormat":61,"inLanguage":24,"description":14,"dateModified":62,"datePublished":63,"encodingFormat":61,"isAccessibleForFree":64,"interactionStatistic":65},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":57},"Person",{"url":41,"name":59,"@type":60},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-07-18","2026-07-03",true,{"@type":66,"interactionType":67,"userInteractionCount":20},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":68},"ViewAction",{"@type":70,"mainEntity":71},"FAQPage",[72],{"name":73,"@type":74,"acceptedAnswer":75},"What is the key finding regarding East Asian newly industrializing economies compared with most developing countries?","Question",{"text":76,"@type":77},"Corruption slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries, but increases growth in large East Asian newly industrializing economies, supporting an explanation of the East Asian paradox.","Answer","https://schema.org",{"og:url":52,"og:type":80,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":59,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":82,"canonical":52},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":25},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":85},[86,90,94,98,103,108,112,115,120,123,127],{"id":21,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":87,"show_sort_weight":88,"slug":89},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":47,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":91,"show_sort_weight":92,"slug":93},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":53,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":95,"show_sort_weight":96,"slug":97},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":99,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":100,"show_sort_weight":101,"slug":102},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":104,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":105,"show_sort_weight":106,"slug":107},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":20,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":109,"show_sort_weight":110,"slug":111},"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":11,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":12,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},30,"research-report",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":118,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":121,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":122},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":124,"slug":126},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":128,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":129},"General","general"]