[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-40825-en":3,"doc-seo-40825-105":30,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":91},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":20,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":21,"is_downloadable":21,"audit_status":21,"page_count":22,"language":23,"language_code":24,"site_id":25,"html_lang":24,"table_of_contents":26,"faqs":27,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":28,"read_time":29},40825,1374391974468,"Eden","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_29158cc5080c5b710cf443261637dec0",8,"Research & Report","Thailand: International Terrorism and the Muslim South","Analyzes Thailand’s policy toward international terrorism after the September 11 attacks, using the Iraq War policy shift under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an entry point. Examines the June 10, 2003 arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects and how the government reframed local unrest in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala within a regional terrorist network. Explores why Thailand functioned as a transit and “safe haven,” including geographic connectivity, visa and immigration practices, and links to document fraud and money laundering, alongside political and economic incentives.","Institute of Southeast Asian Studies(ISEAS)  \nTHAILAND:International Terrorism and the Muslim South  \nAuthor(s):Kavi Chongkittavorn  \nSource:Southeast Asian Affairs,utheast Asian Affairs(2004),pp.267-275  \nPublished by:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies(ISEAS)  \nStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913265  \nAccessed:25-10-201506:17 UTC  \nYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms &Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/pagelinfo/about/policies/terms.jsp  \nJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive.We useinformation technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org.  \nTHAILAND  \nInternational Terrorism and the Muslim South  \nKavi Chongkittavorn  \n# Introduction\n\nWhen the Iraq war started in March 2003,Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatraquickly declared Thailand's neutrality because he did not want to upset theestimated six million-strong Thai Muslim community living in southern Thai-land.After his stand was reported by the international media,he had secondthoughts.In May 2003 he reversed his position and pledged full support forthe U.S.war effort in Iraq,saying that Thailand is one of the five U.S.alliesin the Asia-Pacific region and was obliged under the Thai-U.S.defence treatyto help the United States.  \nSuch flip-flopping was not uncommon during the first three years of hispremiership.Before the start of the Iraq war,Thaksin consistently denied theexistence of terrorist cells inside Thailand.After the 11 September 2001 terrorattacks in the United States and the Bali bombing in October 2002,numerousforeign reports claimed that groups of terrorists with links to the regionalterror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),and,by extension,Al-Qaeda had passedthrough Thailand.For almost ten months after the carnage in Bali,the Thaigovernment was tight-lipped on the issue of terrorism.Thaksin dismissed thesereports as groundless,saying they were the work of crazy reporters.However,in the later half of 2003,Thaksin and the Thai military leaders started toadmit that some international terrorists might have visited Thailand while intransit or possibly even stayed in the country to regroup.This article focuseson Thailand's policy towards international terrorism following the September11 attacks as well as the implications of these policies on the Muslim-dominatedsouthern provinces of Narathiwat,Pattani,and Yala.  \nOut of the Blue:Thai Jemaah Islamiyah  \nThe arrests of JI suspects Maisuri Haji Abdullah,aged fifty,his son Muyahi HajiDoloh,aged twenty-two,and Dr Waemahadi Waedao,aged forty,on 10 June2003 were a watershed development in the Muslim-dominated South Thai-land.The men were charged with attempting to plot terrorist attacks on sev-eral embassies and tourist attractions in Bangkok and other places.In the past,  \nthe activities of suspected Muslim insurgents were linked to local separatistgroups,such as PULO(Pattani United Liberation Organization)or Bersatu(Barisan Kemerdekaan Pattani,or United Front for the Independence ofPattani).This time,the government pointed a finger at the regional terrorgroup,the JI,marking the first time the government had placed local Muslimunrest into a regional context.Before the arrests,the Thai public had neverheard of the JI,even though both the United States and the United Nationshad designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization.  \nThe high-profile arrests have turned a recalcitrant nation into a pro-activeone in the international coalition to fight terrorism.It marked a sea changeof both attitude and policy.Before that,there were numerous reports in news-papers in the West claiming that Thailand was a safe haven for internationalterrorists.Arrested Al-Qaeda operatives like Omar al-Farouk andJI commanderAli Gufron had apparently visited Thaila","cbCaij1lIvpN2OOJ","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaij1lIvpN2OOJ","pdf",915753,2,1,10,"English","en",105,"# Introduction\n## Out of the Blue: Thai Jemaah Islamiyah\n## Implications for the Muslim-Dominated South","[{\"question\":\"How did Thailand’s stance toward the U.S. war effort in Iraq change under Thaksin Shinawatra?\",\"answer\":\"Thaksin initially declared neutrality in March 2003 to avoid upsetting Thailand’s large Muslim community. In May 2003 he reversed course, pledged full support for the U.S. effort, and cited Thailand’s allied status in the Asia-Pacific and obligations under the Thai-U.S. defense treaty.\"},{\"question\":\"What milestone did the June 10, 2003 arrests represent for the Thai government’s counterterrorism approach?\",\"answer\":\"The arrests of JI suspects in the Muslim-dominated South marked a watershed moment and a policy shift. The government moved from denying the existence of terrorist cells to placing local Muslim unrest into a broader regional context connected to JI.\"},{\"question\":\"Why was Thailand considered an accessible transit and “safe haven” for international terrorists?\",\"answer\":\"Thailand’s central location in Southeast Asia and extensive air connections made transit easy. Visa-on-arrival and lax immigration policies encouraged short or long stays, while Bangkok’s reputation as a hub for passport forgery and money laundering further facilitated terrorist activity.\"}]",1783315527,25,{"code":4,"msg":31,"data":32},"ok",{"site_id":25,"language":24,"slug":33,"title":13,"keywords":34,"description":14,"schema_data":35,"social_meta":86,"head_meta":88,"extra_data":90,"updated_unix":28},"thailand-international-terrorism-and-the-muslim-south","",{"@graph":36,"@context":85},[37,53,68],{"@type":38,"itemListElement":39},"BreadcrumbList",[40,44,47,50],{"item":41,"name":42,"@type":43,"position":21},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":45,"name":46,"@type":43,"position":20},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",{"item":48,"name":12,"@type":43,"position":49},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":51,"name":13,"@type":43,"position":52},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/thailand-international-terrorism-and-the-muslim-south/40825/",4,{"url":51,"name":13,"@type":54,"author":55,"headline":13,"publisher":57,"fileFormat":60,"inLanguage":24,"description":14,"dateModified":61,"datePublished":62,"encodingFormat":60,"isAccessibleForFree":63,"interactionStatistic":64},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":56},"Person",{"url":41,"name":58,"@type":59},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-07-12","2026-07-06",true,{"@type":65,"interactionType":66,"userInteractionCount":20},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":67},"ViewAction",{"@type":69,"mainEntity":70},"FAQPage",[71,77,81],{"name":72,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":74},"How did Thailand’s stance toward the U.S. war effort in Iraq change under Thaksin Shinawatra?","Question",{"text":75,"@type":76},"Thaksin initially declared neutrality in March 2003 to avoid upsetting Thailand’s large Muslim community. In May 2003 he reversed course, pledged full support for the U.S. effort, and cited Thailand’s allied status in the Asia-Pacific and obligations under the Thai-U.S. defense treaty.","Answer",{"name":78,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":79},"What milestone did the June 10, 2003 arrests represent for the Thai government’s counterterrorism approach?",{"text":80,"@type":76},"The arrests of JI suspects in the Muslim-dominated South marked a watershed moment and a policy shift. The government moved from denying the existence of terrorist cells to placing local Muslim unrest into a broader regional context connected to JI.",{"name":82,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":83},"Why was Thailand considered an accessible transit and “safe haven” for international terrorists?",{"text":84,"@type":76},"Thailand’s central location in Southeast Asia and extensive air connections made transit easy. Visa-on-arrival and lax immigration policies encouraged short or long stays, while Bangkok’s reputation as a hub for passport forgery and money laundering further facilitated terrorist activity.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":51,"og:type":87,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":58,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":89,"canonical":51},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":25},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":92},[93,97,101,105,110,115,120,123,128,131,134],{"id":21,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":94,"show_sort_weight":95,"slug":96},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":20,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":102,"show_sort_weight":103,"slug":104},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":106,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":107,"show_sort_weight":108,"slug":109},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":111,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":112,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":11,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":12,"show_sort_weight":121,"slug":122},30,"research-report",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":127},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":126,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":129,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":130},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":132,"show_sort_weight":22,"slug":133},"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":135,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":136,"show_sort_weight":106,"slug":137},19,"General","general"]