[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":3,"doc-seo-638531-105":59,"doc-detail-638531-en":130},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",[7,13,18,23,28,33,38,43,48,51,55],{"id":8,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":10,"show_sort_weight":11,"slug":12},1,"Document","Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":14,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":15,"show_sort_weight":16,"slug":17},2,"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":19,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":20,"show_sort_weight":21,"slug":22},4,"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":24,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":25,"show_sort_weight":26,"slug":27},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":29,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":30,"show_sort_weight":31,"slug":32},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":34,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":35,"show_sort_weight":36,"slug":37},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":39,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":40,"show_sort_weight":41,"slug":42},8,"Research & Report",30,"research-report",{"id":44,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":45,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":47},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":46,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":49,"show_sort_weight":46,"slug":50},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":52,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":53,"show_sort_weight":52,"slug":54},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":56,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":9,"category_name":57,"show_sort_weight":24,"slug":58},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":60,"data":61},"ok",{"site_id":62,"language":63,"slug":64,"title":65,"keywords":66,"description":67,"schema_data":68,"social_meta":123,"head_meta":125,"extra_data":127,"updated_unix":129},105,"en","sleeping-with-the-enemy-a-general-equilibrium-approach-august-7-2025","Sleeping with the Enemy - A General Equilibrium Approach - August 7, 2025","","This paper develops a general equilibrium model of domestic violence based on household bargaining and economic dependence. Building on dynamics inspired by the 1991 film Sleeping with the Enemy, it formalizes exit constraints, enforcement, and social norms shaping women’s labor participation and relationship continuity. The results show that weak enforcement and limited outside options trap victims in equilibria marked by violence and dependency, reducing efficiency. Welfare policies including shelters, transfers, and employment support can shift outcomes toward safety and autonomy when private bargaining fails due to asymmetric power.",{"@graph":69,"@context":122},[70,84,105],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/sleeping-with-the-enemy-a-general-equilibrium-approach-august-7-2025/638531/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":99,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":100,"interactionStatistic":101},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/sleeping-with-the-enemy-a-general-equilibrium-approach-august-7-2025/638531.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Logic","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-31","2026-10-22",true,{"@type":102,"interactionType":103,"userInteractionCount":81},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":104},"ViewAction",{"@type":106,"mainEntity":107},"FAQPage",[108,114,118],{"name":109,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":111},"What core mechanism does the paper propose for domestic violence in the model?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"Domestic violence is modeled as an equilibrium outcome of intra-household bargaining under economic dependence and state enforcement. The perpetrator’s control benefits face deterrence via legal penalties and productivity losses, while the victim’s threat point depends on exit costs and protection.","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"How do enforcement and outside opportunities affect victims’ outcomes?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"Insufficient enforcement and limited outside opportunities can trap victims in stable but inefficient equilibria. These equilibria feature violence and economic dependency, reducing the likelihood of leaving.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"Which welfare policies are analyzed as solutions and what do they change?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"The paper highlights shelters, transfers, and employment support. These policies shift equilibrium outcomes toward safety and self-sufficiency by restoring efficiency and individual autonomy when private bargaining fails.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},638531,1792726735,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":81,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":139,"language":140,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":141,"faqs":142,"seo_title":143,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":144,"read_time":145},1099513958762,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/1000023916a998db790?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1784791008015729253","Munich Personal RePEc Archive  \nSleeping with the Enemy: A General Equilibrium Approach  \nLoureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim  \nUniversity of Brasília (UnB), Department of Economics  \n7 August 2025  \nOnline at [https://mpra. ub. uni-muenchen. de/126612/](https://mpra. ub. uni-muenchen. de/126612/)  \n[MPRA Paper No. 126612](MPRA Paper No. 126612) , [posted 04 Dec 2025 09:44 UTC](posted 04 Dec 2025 09:44 UTC)  \nSleeping with the Enemy: A General Equilibrium  \nApproach  \nPaulo R. A. Loureiro∗  \nAugust 07, 2025  \nAbstract  \nThis paper develops a general equilibrium model of domestic violence grounded in household bargaining and economic dependence. Inspired by the dynamics portrayed in the film *Sleeping with the Enemy* (1991), the model incorporates exit constraints, enforcement, and social norms as determinants of women’s decisions regarding labor participation and relationship continuity. The analysis shows how insufficient enforcement and limited outside opportunities trap victims in stable but inefficient equilibria characterized by violence and dependency. Comparative statics demonstrate that welfare policies such as shelters, transfers, and employment support shift equilibrium outcomes toward safety and self-sufficiency. The results highlight the role of public intervention in restoring efficiency and individual autonomy when private bargaining fails due to asymmetric power and coercion.  \nKeywords: Domestic violence, general equilibrium, bargaining, enforcement, welfare policy.  \nJEL Codes: D13, I38, J12, K42 .  \n∗ Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasília. E-mail: [pauloloureiro@unb.br](pauloloureiro@unb.br)  \nDomestic Violence, Economic Dependence, and Welfare Policy Paulo R. A. Loureiro  \n1 Introduction  \nWe study domestic violence as an equilibrium outcome of intra-household bargaining under economic dependence and state enforcement. The central mechanism is that the perpetrator’s private benefit from control faces (i) expected legal penalties and (ii) an endogenous loss of household productivity; the victim’s threat point depends on exit costs and protection. We derive testable implications and a reduced-form system suitable for estimation.  \nDomestic violence represents one of the most pervasive forms of social and economic inequality across the globe. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021), approximately one in three women worldwide has experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner at least once in her lifetime. This phenomenon transcends income, culture, and education, revealing its persistence even in advanced economies. In low-and middle-income countries, the prevalence is higher, often aggravated by institutional fragility and limited enforcement capacity. Beyond its immediate human cost, domestic violence imposes long-term economic consequences, reducing labor participation, increasing health expenditures, and perpetuating cycles of dependency that distort the efficient allocation of resources. Understanding its determinants is essential to design effective welfare and enforcement policies.  \nThe economics of domestic violence has evolved from a moral concern to a structured analytical field. Following Becker (1968), who modeled crime as a rational choice under risk and deterrence, later studies such as Tauchen et al. (1991) and Bloch and Rao (2002) extended this reasoning to household conflicts. They argue that violence can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of bargaining when asymmetries of power, income, and outside options exist. Within this framework, the partner with greater economic independence has stronger bargaining leverage, thereby reducing the incidence of violence. Conversely, financial dependence and social stigma can sustain inefficient equilibria, where victims remain trapped due to high exit costs and weak institutional support. This approach has opened a bridge between household economics, behavioral theory, and public policy design.  \nIn Brazil, the problem","cbCaipy5XcvhHVTK","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaipy5XcvhHVTK","pdf",332974,13,"English","# Abstract\n# Introduction\n## Domestic violence as an equilibrium outcome\n## Global prevalence and economic impacts\n## Economics of domestic violence and theoretical foundations\n## Brazil: evidence and policy relevance\n## Extension beyond gender and intergenerational effects\n## Macroeconomic welfare losses","[{\"question\":\"What core mechanism does the paper propose for domestic violence in the model?\",\"answer\":\"Domestic violence is modeled as an equilibrium outcome of intra-household bargaining under economic dependence and state enforcement. The perpetrator’s control benefits face deterrence via legal penalties and productivity losses, while the victim’s threat point depends on exit costs and protection.\"},{\"question\":\"How do enforcement and outside opportunities affect victims’ outcomes?\",\"answer\":\"Insufficient enforcement and limited outside opportunities can trap victims in stable but inefficient equilibria. These equilibria feature violence and economic dependency, reducing the likelihood of leaving.\"},{\"question\":\"Which welfare policies are analyzed as solutions and what do they change?\",\"answer\":\"The paper highlights shelters, transfers, and employment support. These policies shift equilibrium outcomes toward safety and self-sufficiency by restoring efficiency and individual autonomy when private bargaining fails.\"}]","Sleeping with the Enemy - A General Equilibrium Approach - August 7, 2025 | PDF",1792685314,33]