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The narrative explains how Singlaub believed his assessment was consistent with senior Armed Forces consensus, emphasizes intelligence indicating North Korea’s forward deployment near the DMZ, and argues that consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not properly sought. It further describes three withdrawal proposals and why all were considered 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does Singlaub emphasize about the basis of his position on national security?","Question",{"text":112,"@type":113},"He stresses that his view was not unique and that it was grounded in fresh, in-controvitable intelligence information.","Answer",{"name":115,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":116},"Why does Singlaub say the President’s decision involved high risk?",{"text":117,"@type":113},"Because the intelligence described forward deployments by North Korea’s air and ground forces near the DMZ, indicating an offensive intent and implying danger if U.S. forces withdrew.",{"name":119,"@type":110,"acceptedAnswer":120},"How does the document describe the JCS consultation and proposal evaluation?",{"text":121,"@type":113},"It states the White House sent three withdrawal proposals to the JCS for comment, all deemed unsatisfactory, and that the JCS was not asked to comment specifically on the President’s considered decision or prepare a long-term security plan.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":124,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":126,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":128,"site_id":62},321612,1790523364,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":131},{"doc_id":128,"user_id":132,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":133,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":134,"file_id":135,"file_url":136,"file_type":137,"file_size":138,"view_count":34,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":34,"language":139,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":140,"faqs":141,"seo_title":142,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":143,"read_time":144,"preview_page_count":4},962075006959,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/e0002397efbe92a78e?_k=1776741047341049297","Tickets—$7.50 at the door.  \nFRIDAY FLASHES—JULY 14,1978From Address byMajor General John Kirk Singlaub  \nI would like to stress at the outset that Ido not consider my position on nationalsecurity to be unique.To the contrary,Iam confident that my views are consistentwith the consensus of the senior officers inthe Armed Forces.  \nBriefly,the facts are these.Last May Iprovided a reporter for the WashingtonPost with a background briefing on the mil-itary posture of the North and South Ko-rean forces.And in response to a ques-tion,I expressed_the view that a rapidwithdrawal of U.S.ground forces couldlead to an invasion by North Korea.WhenI made this comment,I believed that I wasspeaking off the record.When the reportertold me that he was going to print my opin-ion,my first concern was over the misun-  \nFriday,July 28,Noon  \nFRANK HERRINGER  \nGeneral ManagerBay Area Rapid Transit District  \n# \"U.S.URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATIONAND BART”\n\nNamed BART general manager in 1975 as \"absolutely the top man in the industry,\"35-year oldFrank Herringer resigned effective at the end of the year on June 29.Frustrated,Herringer wasquoted as saying there \"will never be trains every 90 seconds and a seat for every passenger.The system will never achieve the promises made in 1962.\"In his first Commonwealth Clubappearance,Herringer willcompare BART with other urban transportation systems.  \nSTEVEN A.DIAZ,Quarterly Chairman  \nderstanding about the ground rules associ-ated with my briefing.I was not worriedabout the fact that the reporter was goingto attribute my statement to me.  \nMy position was based on fresh and in-controvertible intelligence information.Iknew I was on solid ground.Specifically,anew and comprehensive intelligence re-port showed a major deployment south-ward,close to the DMZ,of air and groundforces of North Korea.In their forwardpositions,they posed a serious and im-mediate challenge to the capital city ofSeoul and to U.S.and Republic of Koreaforces near the DMZ.The deployment ofthe air and ground units to new forwardbases clearly indicated an offensive intent.And,therefore,the intelligence reportmade clear the exceedingly high level ofrisk that would be associated with a majorU.S.troop withdrawal.(Coninued on next pagej  \n# Singlaub Outlines Events SurroundingHis Confrontation with Carter\n\n(Continued from preceding puge,  \nNow,I knew that that intelligence re-port was available to officials in Washing-ton and that the substance of it had beenreleased to the press.  \nVisit was a Sham  \nIn addition,I had been monitoring mili-tary and diplomatic correspondence withWashington,and there was no indicationin those highest level documents to sug-gest that the President had already made adecision to withdraw U.S.ground forcesfrom South Korea.Indeed,the upcomingvisit of the Under Secretary of State,Philip Habib,and the Chairman of theJCS,General George Brown,was for thespecific purpose of gathering the views ofU.S.and Republic of Korea military andpolitical officials for relay to the Presidentso that he could consider their concernsand feelings in reaching his decision.  \nMany months later,after my return tothe United States,I discovered by review-ing the testimony which had been pre-sented to several Congressional commit-tees that the decision to withdraw U.S.ground forces had already been reached,which meant that the visit of SecretaryHabib and General Brown was in fact asham.It was precisely because the Presi-dent was aware that I could not possiblyhave known about his decision that hechose not to discipline me but simply toreassign me within the United States.  \nIn short,I did not challenge a policy ofthe President after it had been announced.  \nNor did I seek to embarrass him in anyway.What caused the President embar-rassment was that he was engaged in a dip-lomatic ruse,and the Washington Poststory inadvertantly exposed him.  \n## Three Proposals to JCS\n\nIn regard to the subject of consultationbetween the President and the JCS,theepisode i","cbCaijYvnh3YSYXs","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaijYvnh3YSYXs","pdf",1277823,"English","# Singlaub Outlines Events SurroundingHis Confrontation with Carter\n## Three Proposals to JCS","[{\"question\":\"What does Singlaub emphasize about the basis of his position on national security?\",\"answer\":\"He stresses that his view was not unique and that it was grounded in fresh, in-controvitable intelligence information.\"},{\"question\":\"Why does Singlaub say the President’s decision involved high risk?\",\"answer\":\"Because the intelligence described forward deployments by North Korea’s air and ground forces near the DMZ, indicating an offensive intent and implying danger if U.S. forces withdrew.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the document describe the JCS consultation and proposal evaluation?\",\"answer\":\"It states the White House sent three withdrawal proposals to the JCS for comment, all deemed unsatisfactory, and that the JCS was not asked to comment specifically on the President’s considered decision or prepare a long-term security plan.\"}]","Singlaub Outlines Events SurroundingHis Confrontation with Carter | PDF",1789959802,18]