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Argues that expansive lower-court categories enable automatic frisks across broad offenses and persons, risking the erosion of Terry’s carefully restricted language unless change is made.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/search-and-seizure-law-report-vol22-issue-7-frisking-every-suspect-th-withering-of-terry-by-david-aharris/566299/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/search-and-seizure-law-report-vol22-issue-7-frisking-every-suspect-th-withering-of-terry-by-david-aharris/566299.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"McQueen","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-11-16","2026-10-13",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",8,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"What legal standard governs frisks after Terry v. Ohio?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"Frisks are allowed only when an officer has reasonable suspicion, based on observations, that the suspect is armed and dangerous, or when the suspected crime is likely to involve weapons.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How did subsequent Supreme Court cases narrow or reinforce the limits of Terry frisks?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"Decisions following Terry emphasized that frisks are a narrow exception focused solely on determining whether the suspect is armed, rejecting generalized cursory searches for weapons.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why does the article argue that lower courts threaten Terry’s framework?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Lower courts allegedly expand the definition of “violent” offenses and treat certain people or situations as automatically dangerous, allowing frisks without individualized danger 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WITHERING OF TERRY\n\nby David A.HarrisProfessor of Law,University of Toledo  \n## Introduction\n\nIn this article,I focus on the issue of whom the policemay frisk under Terry v.Ohio,392 U.S.1(1968).  \nTerryestablished that officers could stop suspects,andthat they could do so with less than probable cause.Butthe Supreme Court has always maintained that policecould perform frisks—pat-down searches of the outerclothing of suspects—only if the officer suspected a vio-lent crime was afoot,or if the individual suspect showedsome sign of being armed and dangerous.Nevertheless,lower courts have consistently expanded the types of of-fenses always considered violent regardless of the indi-vidual circumstances.At the same time,lower courts havealso found that certain types of persons and situationsalways pose a danger of armed violence to police.Whenconfronted with these offenses,persons or situations,these lower courts have said that police may automati-cally frisk,whether or not any individualized circum-stances point to danger.  \nWithout immediate change,the lower court cases gov-erning frisks threaten to turn the language in Terry thatcarefully restricted the scope of stops and frisks intoempty words.In this article,I examine this problem indepth,and propose a solution.  \n## From Terry to the present:the Supreme Court'scases on frisks\n\nTerry case  \nIn Terry,for the first time,the Supreme Court explic-itly condoned the use of stops and frisks to address streetcrime,and allowed them without probable cause;instead,reasonable articulable suspicion would suffice.  \nThe Court analyzed police use of stops and frisks intwo steps,beginning with the stop.First,the stop mustbe reasonable at its inception.Second,once an officer  \nJuly-August 1995  \nhas properly stopped a suspect,the question becomes theconditions under which the police may frisk the suspect.The Court said that the officer may frisk if the crimethought to be afoot is “likely”to involve weapons,or ifthe officer has reasonable suspicion,based on observa-tion of the individual involved,that the suspect is armedand dangerous.The frisk could serve only to ascertainwhether weapons(not items of evidence)were present;it was therefore limited in scope to u patdown of the outerclothing.  \n## Supreme Court's cases since Terry\n\nIn the few cases since Terry in which the SupremeCourt has addressed frisks,it has tried to maintain theoriginal boundaries it set in Terry.  \nIn Sibron v.New York,392 U.S.40(1968),JusticeHarlan's concurring opinion attempted to articulate stan-dards for frisks.Although the right to frisk may be “au-tomatic\"when an officer performs a valid stop of a per-son the officer reasonably suspects of a crime“whosenature creates asubstantial likelihood that he is armed,itis not clear that suspected possession of narcotics fallsinto this category.\"In other words,police may frisk onlyin two situations:either the suspected crime,by its na-ture,requires a weapon,or the suspect shows some out-ward sign of being armed.See also Adams v.Williams,407 U.S.143(1972).  \nIn Ybarra v.Hinois,444 U.S.85(1979),the Courtexplained that Terry created a narrow exception:an of-ficer may frisk solely for weapons only when there is a\"reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person tobe frisked”that the suspect is armed.Terry did not,theCourt said,permit any kind of“generalized cursorysearch for weapons.'”  \nA number of other cases since Ybarra have dealt indi-  \nrectly with frisks.See,e.g.,Michigan v.Long,463 U.S.1032(1983)(protective “frisk of the car”held valid),and Maryland v.Buie,494 U.S.325(1993)(protectivesweep of area of arrest,without suspicion,upheld).Inboth Long and Buie,the Court went to great lengths tostress the continued vitality of the limits Terry set onfrisks:Officers may frisk only to protect themselves orothers present,and the officers must have a reasonablesuspicion of actual dangerousness.In Minnesota v.Di","cbCaiopv4u8igLRE","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiopv4u8igLRE","pdf",3199317,"English","# Introduction\n## From Terry to the present: the Supreme Court's cases on frisks\n# Supreme Court's cases since Terry\n## Proliferation of the automatic frisk","[{\"question\":\"What legal standard governs frisks after Terry v. Ohio?\",\"answer\":\"Frisks are allowed only when an officer has reasonable suspicion, based on observations, that the suspect is armed and dangerous, or when the suspected crime is likely to involve weapons.\"},{\"question\":\"How did subsequent Supreme Court cases narrow or reinforce the limits of Terry frisks?\",\"answer\":\"Decisions following Terry emphasized that frisks are a narrow exception focused solely on determining whether the suspect is armed, rejecting generalized cursory searches for weapons.\"},{\"question\":\"Why does the article argue that lower courts threaten Terry’s framework?\",\"answer\":\"Lower courts allegedly expand the definition of “violent” offenses and treat certain people or situations as automatically dangerous, allowing frisks without individualized danger assessment.\"}]","SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW REPORT - Vol.22 - Issue 7 - FRISKING EVERY SUSPECT: TH WITHERING OF TERRY - by David A.Harris | PDF",1791861790,23,[146,150,154,158],{"page_no":22,"url":147,"width":148,"height":149},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/cfdbf0b40b3a0794e21bae2da70468af.webp",983,1296,{"page_no":26,"url":151,"width":152,"height":153},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/3a906dc7a7cb9504000987ebf8d95fda.webp",982,1282,{"page_no":30,"url":155,"width":156,"height":157},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/afe8c09ee8559c4bc2a2e75775b842b0.webp",981,1280,{"page_no":33,"url":159,"width":160,"height":161},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/2c880bb2901ca15dd33dcf99ab6672df.webp",980,1277]