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It recommends cybersecurity program governance, sector-specific control standards grounded in NIST, risk assessments aligned to organizational tolerance, and resilience investments such as distributed clean energy. It also reviews coverage limitations in private insurance and argues for a warranted federal insurance response through re-reinsurance or reinsurance structures.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & 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catastrophic cyber incident scenario is described as having severe impact?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"An attack on power grids is highlighted, including a test where a hacked control system physically destroyed a generator, illustrating long replacement times and amplified outage duration when multiple assets are affected.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"Which cybersecurity approach does the response recommend to reduce likelihood or magnitude?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"It calls for implementing controls aligned with a cybersecurity framework, establishing a formal program with board-level leadership, and pairing those controls with risk assessments and mitigation aligned to the organization’s risk tolerance.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why does the response support a federal insurance response?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"It argues that insurers and reinsurers cannot provide sufficient coverage while remaining profitable, noting widespread 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Rasmussen, CISSP, CRISC, CISA, CISM, CIPP  \nSent: Monday, October 24, 2022 3:04 PM  \nTo: 'Richard Ifft'; 'Jeremiah Pam'; 'Philip Goodman'  \nCc: Mary Rasmussen  \nSubject: Potential Federal Insurance Response to Catastrophic Cyber Incidents  \nFederal Insurance Office,  \nThanks for soliciting feedback on cyber insurance and catastrophic cyber incidents. Here is my response to your request for information:  \n“Catastrophic Cyber Incidents  \n1. Nature of Event. What type of cyber incidents could have a catastrophic effect on U.S. critical infrastructure?”  \nGTR: An attack on our power grids would have a catastrophic effect. Idaho National Labs conducted a test, physically destroying a 27-ton power generator over the Internet. They hacked into the control system and instructed the generator to tear itself apart. The generator began to shake and finally smoke appeared. At the time it took months to replace one of these custom made generators. If many generators are destroyed at once, replacement time and duration of the power outage increases. It has been years since that test and replacement of destroyed hardware may be less of an issue. However, that scenario raises reasonable concern of a simultaneous attack on our power grids and resulting impact.  \n“How likely are such incidents? Are particular sectors of U.S. critical infrastructure more susceptible to such incidents?”  \nGTR: These are questions for your partners at CISA and DHS. They have that information.  \n“3 . Cybersecurity Measures. What cybersecurity measures would most effectively reduce the likelihood or magnitude of catastrophic cyber incidents?”  \nGTR: Cybersecurity Program: It is necessary to implement controls in accordance with a cybersecurity framework to reduce the likelihood or magnitude of catastrophic cyber incidents. There must be a formal cybersecurity program, with a leader that presents to the board of directors or similar executive forum.  \nControl Standards: It is necessary for the federal government to provide sector-specific control standards. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a foundation at 108 controls. However, there are differing architectures and technology within critical infrastructure such as Operational Technology within power grids and water systems.  \nRisk Assessments: Each control framework has a requirement for a risk assessment and risk mitigation in accordance with the risk tolerance of the organization. Private sector organizations may have difficulties conducting such an assessment in practice. There is opportunity to provide clear guidance and training.  \nInnovation: We know current power grid implementations are vulnerable to attack. Increase resilience by funding fuel cells and solar at homes and office buildings. Produce power locally and feed excess capacity back into the grid. This approach would also increase resiliency in the event of a power outage due to a hurricane or other types of natural disasters. Use of clean energy is also good for the environment. Seems like this strategic approach could be a win on a few fronts.  \n“What steps could the federal government take to potentially incentivize or require policyholders to adopt these measures?”  \nGTR: Here are steps the federal government could use to influence policyholders:  \n• Provide cybersecurity control standards  \n-Embed a maturity model with levels  \n• Gather evidence of current security posture  \n• Influence good behavior  \n-Road map for enhanced security over time  \n-Reduced insurance cost to match  \nFederal funding for critical infrastructure controls will be necessary. In some cases it will be challenging for a private sector organization to fund the necessary people, processes and technology. Much of critical infrastructure relies on Operational Technology that was not designed with security in mind and may have vulnerable technology at its core. CISA published an advisory to that effect in September 2022.  \n“Potential Federal Insurance Re","cbCaihmxJSctxxaU","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaihmxJSctxxaU","pdf",168539,"English","# Potential Federal Insurance Response for Catastrophic Cyber Incidents\n## Nature and likelihood of catastrophic cyber events\n## Cybersecurity measures to reduce impact\n## Incentives for policyholder adoption\n## Limitations and availability of insurance coverage\n## Warrant for federal insurance response\n## Federal insurance response structures","[{\"question\":\"What catastrophic cyber incident scenario is described as having severe impact?\",\"answer\":\"An attack on power grids is highlighted, including a test where a hacked control system physically destroyed a generator, illustrating long replacement times and amplified outage duration when multiple assets are affected.\"},{\"question\":\"Which cybersecurity approach does the response recommend to reduce likelihood or magnitude?\",\"answer\":\"It calls for implementing controls aligned with a cybersecurity framework, establishing a formal program with board-level leadership, and pairing those controls with risk assessments and mitigation aligned to the organization’s risk tolerance.\"},{\"question\":\"Why does the response support a federal insurance response?\",\"answer\":\"It argues that insurers and reinsurers cannot provide sufficient coverage while remaining profitable, noting widespread media discussion of the coverage and payout limitations.\"}]","Potential Federal Insurance Response to Catastrophic Cyber Incidents - Response Measures and Coverage Options | PDF",13]