[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-45374-en":3,"doc-seo-45374-105":30,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":91},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":20,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":21,"is_downloadable":21,"audit_status":21,"page_count":22,"language":23,"language_code":24,"site_id":25,"html_lang":24,"table_of_contents":26,"faqs":27,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":28,"read_time":29},45374,1099513958762,"Logic","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/1000023916a998db790?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1782109480056885918",8,"Research & Report","Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises","Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises across 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015, the study analyzes investment behavior around 82 national elections. SOEs raise corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average in election years, especially when elections are fixed in timing and closely contested. The effect intensifies in countries with low institutional quality, centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking. Matched non-SOEs show a decline in investment during election years.","Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises  \nQingyuan Li  \nEconomics and Management School, Wuhan University  \nChen Lin  \nFaculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong Kong  \nLi Xu  \nWashington State University  \nUsing a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015 . We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and statecontrolled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years. (JEL G18, G30, G32, E22)  \nReceived May 8, 2017; editorial decision March 16, 2019 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.  \nAuthors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.  \nIt is widely documented in the empirical literature that SOEs are less efficient than privately owned firms in terms of performance, productivity and profitability (e.g., Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh 1994; D’Souza and Megginson 1999; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001 ; Megginson and Netter 2001;  \nWe thank the editor (Andrew Karolyi) and the anonymous reviewer for very constructive and helpful comments. We thank Wei Lai, Bryan Cloyd, Julio Brandon, Liangdong Zhang, and Laura Xiaolei Liu and workshop participants at the SAR research forum at Washington State University, the 2016 China Financial Research Conference, University of Oregon, Tsinghua University, Sun Yat-sen University, Central University of Finance and Economics, and Wuhan University for their helpful comments and discussions. Li is grateful to the financial support from Natural Science Foundation of China (no. 71672129) and major projects of the National Social Science Fund of China (no. 18ZDA113) . Lin is grateful to the financial supports from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (no. 71790601) and the University of Hong Kong. Xu acknowledges the financial support from the College of Business at Washington State University. Supplementary data can be found on The Review of Financial Studies web site. Send correspondence to Chen Lin, Faculty of Business and Economics, the University of Hong Kong. E-mail:chenlin1@hku.hk.  \n© The Author(s) 2019 . Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [journals.permissions@oup.com](journals.permissions@oup.com).  \ndoi:10.1093/rfs/hhz090  \nDownloaded from [https://academic.oup.com/rfs/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhz090/5568310 by James Cook University user on 22 September 201](https://academic.oup.com/rfs/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhz090/5568310 by James Cook University user on 22 September 201)  \nMegginson 2005) . The theoretical literature attributes the inefficiency of SOEsto their multiple goals (e.g., political goals), in addition to profit or shareholderwealth maximization (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; Shleifer 1998), and the “dissonant objectives” between bureaucrats and politicians (Tirole 1994) . As politicians typically prefer to remain in power and enjoy the associated private benefits and perquisites, they have strong incentives to use their control of SOEs as a means of channeling benefits to their constituents in exchange for political support (Shleifer 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1994) . Empirically analyzing whether and how politicians use SOEs to further their political goals is challenging, as the relevant data are not easily available and the motivations behind corporate actions are often difficult to o","cbCainSTTblQAhcs","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCainSTTblQAhcs","pdf",343840,4,1,42,"English","en",105,"# Investment Response to National Elections\n## Study Design and Data Scope\n## Main Findings on SOE Investment\n## Heterogeneity by Political and Institutional Context","[{\"question\":\"How do state-owned enterprises’ investment levels change during national election years?\",\"answer\":\"SOEs increase corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years.\"},{\"question\":\"When is the election-year investment effect particularly strong for SOEs?\",\"answer\":\"The effect is more pronounced in fixed-timing elections and in closely contested elections.\"},{\"question\":\"How do non-SOEs’ investment behaviors compare with SOEs during election years?\",\"answer\":\"Matched non-SOEs significantly decrease corporate investment during national election years.\"}]",1783458731,106,{"code":4,"msg":31,"data":32},"ok",{"site_id":25,"language":24,"slug":33,"title":13,"keywords":34,"description":14,"schema_data":35,"social_meta":86,"head_meta":88,"extra_data":90,"updated_unix":28},"political-investment-cycles-of-state-owned-enterprises","",{"@graph":36,"@context":85},[37,53,68],{"@type":38,"itemListElement":39},"BreadcrumbList",[40,44,48,51],{"item":41,"name":42,"@type":43,"position":21},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":45,"name":46,"@type":43,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":49,"name":12,"@type":43,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":52,"name":13,"@type":43,"position":20},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/political-investment-cycles-of-state-owned-enterprises/45374/",{"url":52,"name":13,"@type":54,"author":55,"headline":13,"publisher":57,"fileFormat":60,"inLanguage":24,"description":14,"dateModified":61,"datePublished":62,"encodingFormat":60,"isAccessibleForFree":63,"interactionStatistic":64},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":56},"Person",{"url":41,"name":58,"@type":59},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-07-18","2026-07-07",true,{"@type":65,"interactionType":66,"userInteractionCount":20},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":67},"ViewAction",{"@type":69,"mainEntity":70},"FAQPage",[71,77,81],{"name":72,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":74},"How do state-owned enterprises’ investment levels change during national election years?","Question",{"text":75,"@type":76},"SOEs increase corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years.","Answer",{"name":78,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":79},"When is the election-year investment effect particularly strong for SOEs?",{"text":80,"@type":76},"The effect is more pronounced in fixed-timing elections and in closely contested elections.",{"name":82,"@type":73,"acceptedAnswer":83},"How do non-SOEs’ investment behaviors compare with SOEs during election years?",{"text":84,"@type":76},"Matched non-SOEs significantly decrease corporate investment during national election years.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":52,"og:type":87,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":58,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":89,"canonical":52},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":25},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":92},[93,97,101,105,110,115,120,123,128,131,135],{"id":21,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":94,"show_sort_weight":95,"slug":96},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":47,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":20,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":102,"show_sort_weight":103,"slug":104},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":106,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":107,"show_sort_weight":108,"slug":109},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":111,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":112,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":11,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":12,"show_sort_weight":121,"slug":122},30,"research-report",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":127},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":126,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":129,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":130},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":132,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":133,"show_sort_weight":132,"slug":134},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":136,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":137,"show_sort_weight":106,"slug":138},19,"General","general"]