[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-33849-en":3,"doc-seo-33849-105":29},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":20,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":20,"is_downloadable":20,"audit_status":20,"page_count":21,"language":22,"language_code":23,"site_id":24,"html_lang":23,"table_of_contents":25,"faqs":26,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":27,"read_time":28},33849,1099514067438,"River Wang","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/100002539ee87300030?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1780474512215547542",8,"Research & Report","Parthood and Identity Across Time","The document presents J.J.Thomson’s framework for parthood and identity across time, beginning with a formal “calculus of individuals” that defines discrete-from, overlap, and fusion using set-based conditions. It then addresses Thomson’s question about material constitution and identity in cases like the tinkertoy house, arguing for a temporal-parts solution. The text outlines definitions and metaphysical principles of temporal parts, derives key results, explains a challenge about how chalk comes into existence ex nihilo, and summarizes Thomson’s answer through mutual part relations at the relevant time.","","cbCaijPwAMYqP7Yx","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaijPwAMYqP7Yx","pdf",11270,1,2,"English","en",105,"# Background: the Calculus of Individuals\n## Basic definitions and axioms\n# Thomson’s question (III)\n## Tinkertoy house case and identity sentences\n# Thomson’s presentation of the doctrine of temporal parts (IV)\n## Cross-sectional and temporal parts; metaphysical principles\n## Consequences and Sider’s response\n# Thomson’s argument against the doctrine of temporal parts (V)\n## Chalk and ex nihilo existence\n# Thomson’s answer (VI)\n## Mutual part relations at the relevant time","[{\"question\":\"How are parthood, overlap, and fusion defined in Thomson’s calculus of individuals?\",\"answer\":\"Parthood is defined so that x is part of y iff everything discrete from y is discrete from x. Overlap holds iff something is part of both x and y. Fusion for a nonempty set S is defined by matching the items discrete from x with those discrete from every member of S.\"},{\"question\":\"What is Thomson’s question using the tinkertoy house example?\",\"answer\":\"The question asks how the identity sentences about what a tinkertoy house is “made of” can be justified if the house is not identical to the relevant fusion (or to the wood alone). It motivates whether the house shares structure with the fusion alternatives.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the doctrine of temporal parts respond, and what objection does Thomson raise?\",\"answer\":\"The doctrine responds by claiming the tinkertoy house and the fusion/wood share a temporal part at the relevant time. Thomson’s objection is that, when chalk is held, new chalk seems to come into existence ex nihilo, which conflicts with the temporal-parts picture.\"}]",1782216417,5,{"code":4,"msg":30,"data":31},"ok",{"site_id":24,"language":23,"slug":32,"title":13,"keywords":15,"description":14,"schema_data":33,"social_meta":84,"head_meta":86,"extra_data":88,"updated_unix":27},"parthood-and-identity-across-time",{"@graph":34,"@context":83},[35,51,66],{"@type":36,"itemListElement":37},"BreadcrumbList",[38,42,45,48],{"item":39,"name":40,"@type":41,"position":20},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":43,"name":44,"@type":41,"position":21},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",{"item":46,"name":12,"@type":41,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":49,"name":13,"@type":41,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/parthood-and-identity-across-time/33849/",4,{"url":49,"name":13,"@type":52,"author":53,"headline":13,"publisher":55,"fileFormat":58,"inLanguage":23,"description":14,"dateModified":59,"datePublished":60,"encodingFormat":58,"isAccessibleForFree":61,"interactionStatistic":62},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":54},"Person",{"url":39,"name":56,"@type":57},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-07-01","2026-06-23",true,{"@type":63,"interactionType":64,"userInteractionCount":20},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":65},"ViewAction",{"@type":67,"mainEntity":68},"FAQPage",[69,75,79],{"name":70,"@type":71,"acceptedAnswer":72},"How are parthood, overlap, and fusion defined in Thomson’s calculus of individuals?","Question",{"text":73,"@type":74},"Parthood is defined so that x is part of y iff everything discrete from y is discrete from x. Overlap holds iff something is part of both x and y. Fusion for a nonempty set S is defined by matching the items discrete from x with those discrete from every member of S.","Answer",{"name":76,"@type":71,"acceptedAnswer":77},"What is Thomson’s question using the tinkertoy house example?",{"text":78,"@type":74},"The question asks how the identity sentences about what a tinkertoy house is “made of” can be justified if the house is not identical to the relevant fusion (or to the wood alone). It motivates whether the house shares structure with the fusion alternatives.",{"name":80,"@type":71,"acceptedAnswer":81},"How does the doctrine of temporal parts respond, and what objection does Thomson raise?",{"text":82,"@type":74},"The doctrine responds by claiming the tinkertoy house and the fusion/wood share a temporal part at the relevant time. Thomson’s objection is that, when chalk is held, new chalk seems to come into existence ex nihilo, which conflicts with the temporal-parts picture.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":49,"og:type":85,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":56,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":87,"canonical":49},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":24}]