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Despite these stakes, MMMapps’ data practices and software code provenance—and how affected users understand and mitigate the risks—are insufficiently studied. This paper combines large-scale app analysis with a user study of 103 participants to evaluate perceived inappropriateness, threat scenarios, and mitigations.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/no-privacy-for-privates-how-military-communities-experience-and-perceive-the-privacy-risks-of-military-marketed-mobile-apps/330978/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/no-privacy-for-privates-how-military-communities-experience-and-perceive-the-privacy-risks-of-military-marketed-mobile-apps/330978.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Mali","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-11-03","2026-09-21",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",15,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"What makes Military-Marketed Mobile Apps (MMMapps) a privacy risk?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"MMMapps collect privacy-sensitive data and may expose it in ways that are especially dangerous when the data belongs to military-affiliated personnel. The paper links such exposure to threats to personal safety, unit operations, and national security.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How does the study measure participants’ perceptions of privacy risk?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"The study combines large-scale analysis of 242 MMMapps with a user study of 103 military-affiliated participants. It examines which data practices and code provenance characteristics they consider inappropriate, which threat scenarios they believe those practices enable, and which mitigations they view as most effective.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"What are the key results about data practices and code provenance?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"MMMapps often show practices and provenance characteristics misaligned with users’ privacy expectations. 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Berkay Celik Purdue University [zcelik@purdue.edu](zcelik@purdue.edu)  \nAbstract  \nA subset of mobile applications is explicitly marketed to militaryaffiliated personnel. These Military-Marketed Mobile Apps (MMMapps) collect privacy-sensitive data using the same mechanisms as general-purpose apps. However, when such data belongs to militaryaffiliated personnel, it may be exploited by malicious actors in ways that threaten personal safety, unit operations, and national security. Despite these risks, the data practices and code provenance of MMMapps, as well as how this population perceives and attempts to mitigate these risks, remain poorly understood. In this paper, we address this gap by combining large-scale app analysis with a user study. We first curate a dataset of 242 MMMapps and leverage app analysis techniques to characterize their data practices and code provenance. Then, we conduct a user study with 􀀽 = 103 militaryaffiliated participants in the United States to examine which data practices and code provenance characteristics they consider inappropriate, what threat scenarios they believe those practices enable, and which mitigations they view as most effective.  \nOur results show that MMMapps frequently exhibit data practicesand code provenance characteristics that are misaligned with the privacy expectations of military-affiliated personnel. For instance, 40% of MMMapps collect more data than they disclose in their privacy labels or data safety sections. 83.5% of our study participants report using at least one MMMapp that engages in data practices they are uncomfortable with. Additionally, although military-affiliated personnel are generally concerned about third-party libraries accessing their data, 64% of MMMapps include third-party SDKs, some developed in countries perceived as adversarial by a majority of the participants. Overall, our findings reveal a substantial misalignment between the privacy expectations of military-affiliated personnel and the data practices and software supply chains of MMMapps. We propose recommendations at the federal, DoD, app store, and device levels to improve privacy risk mitigation for this at-risk population.  \nThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license visit [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ or](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ or) send a  \nletter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2026(4), 772–792  \n© 2026 Copyright held by the owner/author(s) . [https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2026-0144](https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2026-0144)  \nAlexander Master United States Military Academy [alexander.master@westpoint.edu](alexander.master@westpoint.edu)  \nKeywords  \ndata privacy, at-risk populations, mobile app analysis, data disclosure, mobile security, user study, perceptions, third-party SDKs  \n1 Introduction  \nWhen a fitness app leaks location data from a civilian jogger, it creates a privacy concern. When the same app leaks location data from a service member stationed at a military base, it can reveal military secrets, potentially costing people their lives [57] . This distinction highlights a critical gap in mobile privacy research: while data collection practices in consumer apps have been exten","cbCaibDM3eDFwjZ5","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaibDM3eDFwjZ5","pdf",1395020,21,"English","# Introduction\n## Background and research gap\n## Privacy risks for military-affiliated personnel\n## Limitations of existing protections\n# Method overview\n## Curating a dataset of MMMapps\n## User study design and participant perceptions\n# Findings\n## Misalignment between privacy expectations and app practices\n## Prevalence of excessive data collection and third-party SDKs\n# Recommendations\n## Federal, DoD, app store, and device-level mitigation","[{\"question\":\"What makes Military-Marketed Mobile Apps (MMMapps) a privacy risk?\",\"answer\":\"MMMapps collect privacy-sensitive data and may expose it in ways that are especially dangerous when the data belongs to military-affiliated personnel. The paper links such exposure to threats to personal safety, unit operations, and national security.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the study measure participants’ perceptions of privacy risk?\",\"answer\":\"The study combines large-scale analysis of 242 MMMapps with a user study of 103 military-affiliated participants. It examines which data practices and code provenance characteristics they consider inappropriate, which threat scenarios they believe those practices enable, and which mitigations they view as most effective.\"},{\"question\":\"What are the key results about data practices and code provenance?\",\"answer\":\"MMMapps often show practices and provenance characteristics misaligned with users’ privacy expectations. For example, 40% collect more data than disclosed in privacy labels or safety sections, 83.5% of participants report using at least one MMMapp with uncomfortable practices, and 64% include third-party SDKs.\"}]","No Privacy for Privates: How Military Communities Experience and Perceive the Privacy Risks of Military-Marketed Mobile Apps | PDF",1789990967,53]