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The results support convergence between natural language semantics and reasoning psychology.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & 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the argument?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"might is argued to function as a generator of alternatives, aligning with Hamblin-style or inquisitive semantics and thereby directing how interpretations are formed.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How does might relate to illusory inferences?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"Experiments show that might induces the same kind of illusory inference as disjunctions and indefinites, supporting the view that these inferences depend on available alternatives.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why are alternatives central to existing and proposed explanations?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"The document states that established accounts attribute the relevant illusory inferences to the presence of alternatives, complemented by matching strategies or question-answer 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alternatives: the view from reasoning *  \nSalvador Mascarenhas Ecole Normale Supérieure Department of Cognitive Studies Institut Jean-Nicod ENS, EHESS, PSL University Paris France  \nLéo Picat Ecole Normale Supérieure Department of Cognitive Studies Institut Jean-Nicod ENS, EHESS, PSL University Paris France  \nAbstract We argue that the epistemic modal `might' is a generator of alternativesin the sense of Hamblin semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002) or inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009) . Building on methodologies from the psychology of reasoning, we show that `might' patterns with disjunctionsand with indefinites in giving rise to a particular kind of illusory inference. The best extant accounts of these illusory inferences crucially involve alternatives, paired with matching strategies (Walsh & Johnson-Laird 2004) or with question-answer dynamics (Koralus & Mascarenhas 2013) . Our results constitute further steps toward convergence between theories and methodologies in natural language semantics and the psychology of reasoning.  \nKeywords: weak epistemic modals, illusory inferences, reasoning, mental models  \n1 Introduction  \nThe semantics of epistemic modals has puzzled linguists and philosophers for decades. Here we address a debate that hasn't been under the spotlight in recent years: the role of `might' as a means of directing hearer attention by generating a single alternative in the sense of Hamblin semantics or inquisitive semantics.  \nDisjunction and indefinites are generators of alternatives par excellence. They induce a particular kind of illusory inference whose extant accounts all agree must be due to the presence of alternatives. We show experimentally that `might' induces the same kind of illusory inference. Our results provide arguments from the psychology of reasoning in favor of particular theories of `might'.  \n* We thank Benjamin Spector and the audience of WIP-LANG at Ecole Normale Supérieure for extremely useful comments. The work presented here was funded by Agence Nationale de Recherche grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 (Frontiers of Cognition) and ANR-18-CE28-0008 (Between Language and Reasoning) .  \n©2019 Salvador Mascarenhas and Léo Picat  \nSalvador Mascarenhas and Léo Picat  \nIn the remainder of this introduction, we present the minimal required background knowledge from the semantics literature on alternatives, the relevant theories from the psychology of reasoning, and the central empirical discoveries about the kinds of illusory inferences of interest. Section 2 presents our study and results, and section 3 examines the consequences of our results to a range of theories of the semantics of `might'. Section 4 concludes with remarks on ongoing work.  \n1.1 Illusory inferences from disjunction  \nRecent efforts to seek convergence between natural language semantics and the psychology of reasoning have led to articulated theories of interpretive processes and general-purpose reasoning. In particular, the erotetic theory of reasoning of Koralus & Mascarenhas (2013) incorporates linguistic insights into a variant of mental models theory of reasoning (Johnson-Laird 1983) to account for a class of attractive fallacies known as illusory inferences from disjunction. Consider the example in (1), heavily simplified from the original examples discovered by Walsh & Johnson-Laird (2004) .  \n(1) John speaks English and Mary speaks French, or else Bill speaks German.  \nJohn speaks English.  \nFallacious conclusion: Mary speaks French.  \nThe problem in (1), as well as multiple structurally identical problems, have acceptance rates between 80% and 85%(Walsh & Johnson-Laird 2004 ; Mascarenhas & Koralus 2017 ; Koralus & Mascarenhas 2018) . Yet, the inference in (1) is a fallacy. Suppose Bill speaks German (modeling premise 1) and John speaks English (premise 2), but Mary doesn't speak French. This is a model of the premises but not the con","cbCaioMDMv5vsM8r","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaioMDMv5vsM8r","pdf",134743,13,"English","# Introduction\n## Illusory inferences from disjunction\n## Mental models and illusory inferences\n## Alternatives in language beyond disjunction","[{\"question\":\"What role does the epistemic modal might play in the argument?\",\"answer\":\"might is argued to function as a generator of alternatives, aligning with Hamblin-style or inquisitive semantics and thereby directing how interpretations are formed.\"},{\"question\":\"How does might relate to illusory inferences?\",\"answer\":\"Experiments show that might induces the same kind of illusory inference as disjunctions and indefinites, supporting the view that these inferences depend on available alternatives.\"},{\"question\":\"Why are alternatives central to existing and proposed explanations?\",\"answer\":\"The document states that established accounts attribute the relevant illusory inferences to the presence of alternatives, complemented by matching strategies or question-answer dynamics.\"}]","Might' as a generator of alternatives - the view from reasoning | PDF",1791083353,33]