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Documents rising leverage for investment banks, no visible increase for commercial banks and non-financial firms, off-balance-sheet items as a large asset share for large U.S. banks, procyclicality for investment banks and large U.S. commercial banks, and less deleveraging in emerging markets with tighter regulation and stronger investor protection. Concludes pre-crisis excessive risk taking was not easily detectable in aggregate data because risks reflected asset quality, not asset quantity.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & Report",3,{"item":32,"name":10,"@type":21,"position":33},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/leverage-across-firms-banks-and-countries-nber-working-paper-no-17354-august-2011/348192/",4,{"url":32,"name":10,"@type":35,"image":36,"author":41,"headline":10,"publisher":44,"fileFormat":47,"inLanguage":8,"description":12,"dateModified":48,"datePublished":49,"encodingFormat":47,"isAccessibleForFree":50,"interactionStatistic":51},"DigitalDocument",{"url":37,"@type":38,"width":39,"height":40},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/leverage-across-firms-banks-and-countries-nber-working-paper-no-17354-august-2011/348192.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":42,"@type":43},"Ophelia","Person",{"url":19,"name":45,"@type":46},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-10-27","2026-09-22",true,{"@type":52,"interactionType":53,"userInteractionCount":55},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":54},"ViewAction",12,{"@type":57,"mainEntity":58},"FAQPage",[59,65,69],{"name":60,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":62},"What leverage patterns does the paper identify before and during the 2007–2009 crisis?","Question",{"text":63,"@type":64},"The paper finds very little buildup in leverage for the average non-financial firm and commercial bank before the crisis, while large U.S. commercial banks and investment banks worldwide show different behavior, including increases during the early 2000s and stronger linkages to procyclicality.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"How does the paper explain why excessive pre-crisis risk taking was hard to detect in aggregate data?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"It argues that risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality of assets rather than the amount of assets, so aggregate leverage measures could understate underlying risk.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Do banks in emerging markets deleverage differently, and why?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Yes. Banks in emerging markets with tighter regulation and stronger investor protection experience significantly less deleveraging during the crisis, and they show a tendency to grow leverage ratios less aggressively beforehand.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},348192,1790196862,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,111,115,120,123,127],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":26,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":89,"show_sort_weight":90,"slug":91},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":33,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":93,"show_sort_weight":94,"slug":95},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":97,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":98,"show_sort_weight":99,"slug":100},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":102,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":103,"show_sort_weight":104,"slug":105},6,"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":107,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":108,"show_sort_weight":109,"slug":110},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":112,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":29,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},8,30,"research-report",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":118,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":121,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":122},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":124,"slug":126},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":128,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":129,"show_sort_weight":97,"slug":130},19,"General","general",{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":132},{"doc_id":79,"user_id":133,"nickname":42,"user_avatar":134,"doc_module":4,"category_id":112,"category_name":29,"doc_title":10,"doc_description":12,"doc_content":135,"file_id":136,"file_url":137,"file_type":138,"file_size":139,"view_count":55,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":22,"is_downloadable":22,"audit_status":22,"page_count":140,"language":141,"language_code":8,"site_id":7,"html_lang":8,"table_of_contents":142,"faqs":143,"seo_title":144,"seo_description":12,"update_tm":145,"read_time":146,"preview_page_count":102,"preview_urls":147},7971461741311,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/74000253aff267980c6?x-image-process=image/resize,m_fixed,w_180,h_180&k=1779345379180704826","NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES  \nLEVERAGE ACROSS FIRMS, BANKS, AND COUNTRIES  \nSebnem Kalemli-Ozcan  \nBent Sorensen  \nSevcan Yesiltas  \nWorking Paper 17354  \n[http://www.nber.org/papers/w17354](http://www.nber.org/papers/w17354)  \nNATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  \n1050 Massachusetts Avenue  \nCambridge, MA 02138  \nAugust 2011  \nThe authors thank NBER-MIT SLOAN Project for Global Financial Crisis for support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.˛¸  \nNBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.  \n© 2011 by Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sorensen, and Sevcan Yesiltas. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.  \nLeverage Across Firms, Banks, and Countries  \nSebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sorensen, and Sevcan Yesiltas NBER Working Paper No. 17354  \nAugust 2011  \nJEL No. F3  \nABSTRACT  \nWe present new stylized facts on bank and firm leverage for 2000-2009 using extensive internationally comparable micro level data from several countries. The main result is that there was very little buildup in leverage for the average non-financial firm and commercial bank before the crisis, but the picture was quite different for large commercial banks in the United States and for investment banks worldwide. We document the following patterns: a) there was an increase in leverage ratios of investment banks and financial firms during the early 2000s; b) there was no visible increase for commercial banks and non-financial firms; c) off balance-sheet items constitute a big fraction of assets, especially for large commercial banks in the United States; d) the leverage ratio is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks in the United States; e) banks in emerging markets with tighter bank regulation and stronger investor protection experienced significantly less deleveraging during the crisis. These results show that excessive risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality rather than the amount of assets.  \nSebnem Kalemli-Ozcan University of Houston Department of Economics Houston, TX 77204  \nand NBER[sebnem.kalemli-ozcan@mail.uh.edu](sebnem.kalemli-ozcan@mail.uh.edu)  \nBent Sorensen Department of Economics University of Houston  \n204 McElhinney Hall Houston, TX 77204 [bent.sorensen@mail.uh.edu](bent.sorensen@mail.uh.edu)  \nSevcan Yesiltas  \nJohns Hopkins University Department of Economics  \n440 Mergenthaler Hall 3400 N. Charles Street  \nBaltimore, MD 21218Johns Hopkins University[syesilt1@jhu.edu](syesilt1@jhu.edu)  \n1 Introduction  \nThe 2007{2009 global crisis started in the 􀀌nancial sector and quickly turned into a global recession with an unprecedented decline in output, employment, and trade. The lessons from previous emerging market crises indicate that banks' and 􀀌rms' 􀀌nancing conditions are key mechanisms turning 􀀌nancial crises into recessions. Higher cost of external 􀀌nancing and declining collateral values force 􀀌rms to lower leverage by lowering investment leading to lower output (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) . Changes in leverage over the business cycle is, therefore, a potentially important ampli􀀌cation mechanism propagating the initial adverse shock to the real economy (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) . Many commentators have argued that the lending boom of the early 2000s, which fueled the sub-prime crises, caused 􀀌rms and banks to increase their leverage to unprecedented levels. When the boom turned into a bust, following the banks' contraction of credit, a sharp de-leveraging accompanied the largest global 􀀌nancial meltdown since the Great Depression.  \nTo this date, no empiric","cbCaiqlwrivq8GLB","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiqlwrivq8GLB","pdf",863501,57,"English","# Abstract\n# Introduction","[{\"question\":\"What leverage patterns does the paper identify before and during the 2007–2009 crisis?\",\"answer\":\"The paper finds very little buildup in leverage for the average non-financial firm and commercial bank before the crisis, while large U.S. commercial banks and investment banks worldwide show different behavior, including increases during the early 2000s and stronger linkages to procyclicality.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper explain why excessive pre-crisis risk taking was hard to detect in aggregate data?\",\"answer\":\"It argues that risk taking before the crisis was not easily detectable because the risk involved the quality of assets rather than the amount of assets, so aggregate leverage measures could understate underlying risk.\"},{\"question\":\"Do banks in emerging markets deleverage differently, and why?\",\"answer\":\"Yes. Banks in emerging markets with tighter regulation and stronger investor protection experience significantly less deleveraging during the crisis, and they show a tendency to grow leverage ratios less aggressively beforehand.\"}]","Leverage Across Firms, Banks, and Countries - NBER Working Paper No. 17354 - August 2011 | PDF",1790071644,144,[148,152,156,160,164,168],{"page_no":22,"url":149,"width":150,"height":151},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/78cad852aed984b094ad50cc6e58950d.webp",983,1390,{"page_no":26,"url":153,"width":154,"height":155},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/79db46713cdb1215ba191626b12626fc.webp",982,1270,{"page_no":30,"url":157,"width":158,"height":159},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/c7e5be78434555ba6a46697c2b57cb65.webp",981,1269,{"page_no":33,"url":161,"width":162,"height":163},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/cffcc91b49391c612e149f950a182a51.webp",980,1268,{"page_no":97,"url":165,"width":166,"height":167},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/ac4714269d1eb54fc3f0fa3f39d1c8ab.webp",979,1267,{"page_no":102,"url":169,"width":170,"height":171},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-16/20d6d22606767f242203db784d4f51ed.webp",978,1265]