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It analyzes whether formal voting procedure settings change the adoption rate and duration of Commission proposals, using data on over 5,000 proposals before 1996. It also models decision probabilities based on winning coalitions to evaluate the trade-off between greater Council majority voting and increased parliamentary inclusion. Results indicate the Nice reforms do not sufficiently prepare an enlarged 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core issue does the chapter investigate regarding EU enlargement?","Question",{"text":113,"@type":114},"It assesses whether institutional reform can prevent higher status quo bias in EU legislation while maintaining common support during enlargement.","Answer",{"name":116,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":117},"How does the chapter study the effect of voting procedures on EU legislation?",{"text":118,"@type":114},"It compares adoption rate and duration for thousands of Commission proposals initiated under different Council unanimity/majority rules and with or without parliamentary participation.",{"name":120,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":121},"What trade-off does the chapter emphasize for an enlarged Union?",{"text":122,"@type":114},"It focuses on the trade-off between increasing Council majority voting and expanding parliamentary inclusion to balance policy change potential with high common support.",{"name":124,"@type":111,"acceptedAnswer":125},"What is the chapter’s main conclusion about 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ever-growingtowards an ever-slowerUnion?\n\nThomas König andThomas Bräuninger  \n# INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ENLARGEMENT\n\nFurther European(EU)enlargement by Eastern and Southern applicantcountries has drawn attention to the Union's complex institutional frame-work,originally established by six founding members in the late 1950s andreformed by the Single European Act(SEA)in 1987,the Maastricht Treatyon the EU(TEU)in 1993 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997.However,inspite of an excessive overload and increasing gridlock risk,the EuropeanCouncil(EC),consisting of the 15 member-states,postponed the institu-tional reform of the Union's decision-making system at the 1997 IGC.ECmember-states were not yet able to agree on which applicant countriesshould join the Union,and they ardently disagreed on which votingprocedure should be applied in order to guarantee the proper functioningof EU legislation in an enlarged Union.A major task of the Nice IGC inDecember 2000 was to finish the institutional reform before the first waveof applicant countries joins the Union.The results of the Nice IGC pro-voke the questions as to how the EC member-states will proceed with theupcoming enlargement by Eastern and Southern applicant countries,andwhether the reform sufficiently prepares them to cope with the Union'swidened scale.More specifically,the question arises concerning whetherthe modification of the procedural provisions enables the Union to integratemore than 20 member-states into its legislative decision-making system.  \nIn this chapter,we address the question of institutional reform andenlargement.More precisely,we assess how to prevent a higher statusquo bias of EU legislation without endangering its common support.Weapproach this problem by focusing on two aspects.First,in order to showthe impact of institutional reform,we ask whether the formal settingsof voting procedures influence the Union's legislative decision-makingprocess or not.With the exception of rich and insightful literature on thetheoretical consequences of different procedural provisions (Steunenberg,1994;Tsebelis,1994,1996;Crombez,1996;Garrett and Tsebelis,1996;  \nKonstanzer Online-Publikations-System(KOPS)  \nURN:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-79848  \nURL:http:/kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/volltexte/2009/7984/  \nMoser,1996;Tsebelis and Garrett,1999),only a few studies have shedlight on the actual impact of these formal procedures in a quantitative andempirical way(Krislov etal.,1986;Sloot and Verschuren,1990;Schulz andKönig,2000).In a previous empirical study,Golub(1999)considersenlargement impacts;however,his database only includes directives -one of three instruments that is applied in less than 15 per cent of bindingEU legislation(König,1997,p.87).In the following,we analyze EUlegislation by examining the adoption rate and the duration of over  \n5,000 Commission proposals for all binding EU legislation introducedprior to the end of 1996.Focusing on the period since the mid-1980s,wecompare the adoption rate of all Commission proposals which wereinitiated under Council of Ministers(CM)unanimity and majority provi-sions as well as with and without parliamentary participation.  \nSecond,we confront the problem of how the institutional framework willbe threatened by further enlargement regarding a higher status quo biasand common support.Because neither present nor prospective prefer-ences of the Union's legislators are available,we calculate the decisionprobability of EU legislative decision-making using a simplifying conceptthat takes into account the number of all winning coalitions(König andBräuninger,1998).This approach certainly underestimates the fear asso-ciated with the upcoming Eastern enlargement because it is rather unlikelythat member-state preferences are uniformly distributed.This means thatour analysis will somew","cbCaigKeMY6N04Mq","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaigKeMY6N04Mq","pdf",701415,18,"English","# Institutional Reform and Enlargement\n## Constitutional Development of EU Voting Procedures\n## Institutional Reform and Enlargement: Empirical and Analytical Approach\n## Findings and Implications for an Enlarged Union","[{\"question\":\"What core issue does the chapter investigate regarding EU enlargement?\",\"answer\":\"It assesses whether institutional reform can prevent higher status quo bias in EU legislation while maintaining common support during enlargement.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the chapter study the effect of voting procedures on EU legislation?\",\"answer\":\"It compares adoption rate and duration for thousands of Commission proposals initiated under different Council unanimity/majority rules and with or without parliamentary participation.\"},{\"question\":\"What trade-off does the chapter emphasize for an enlarged Union?\",\"answer\":\"It focuses on the trade-off between increasing Council majority voting and expanding parliamentary inclusion to balance policy change potential with high common support.\"},{\"question\":\"What is the chapter’s main conclusion about the Nice results?\",\"answer\":\"The chapter argues that the Nice reforms do not sufficiently prepare an enlarged Union for proper functioning, partly because the reforms may be inadequate for future scale and procedural demands.\"}]","Institutional Reform and Enlargement - Institutional Challenges in the European Union | PDF",45]