[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-seo-574952-105":3,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":81,"doc-detail-574952-en":130},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"ok",{"site_id":7,"language":8,"slug":9,"title":10,"keywords":11,"description":12,"schema_data":13,"social_meta":74,"head_meta":76,"extra_data":78,"updated_unix":80},105,"en","incorporation-and-the-audit-market","Incorporation and the audit market","","This paper evaluates how allowing auditors to limit liability through incorporation affects the audit market and audited firms. A combined model predicts that, once incorporation becomes available, the least wealthy auditors under unlimited liability either exit or earn lower auditing profits, while the wealthiest earn higher profits by incorporating and reallocating wealth to their corporations. The framework also explains changing attitudes toward incorporation and why insurance and wealth-sheltering devices cannot fully substitute for incorporation.",{"@graph":14,"@context":73},[15,34,56],{"@type":16,"itemListElement":17},"BreadcrumbList",[18,23,27,31],{"item":19,"name":20,"@type":21,"position":22},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",1,{"item":24,"name":25,"@type":21,"position":26},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":28,"name":29,"@type":21,"position":30},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/","Research & 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the effects of allowing auditors to operate under unlimited or limited liability via incorporation, focusing on behavior, employment, pricing, and shareholder wealth outcomes.","Answer",{"name":66,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":67},"What does the model predict for least-wealthy and most-wealthy auditors?",{"text":68,"@type":64},"Least-wealthy auditors under unlimited liability are predicted to exit or earn lower profits, while the most wealthy auditors incorporate and earn higher profits by removing wealth into their corporations.",{"name":70,"@type":61,"acceptedAnswer":71},"Why does the paper argue that insurance and other wealth-sheltering devices are imperfect substitutes for incorporation?",{"text":72,"@type":64},"Because incorporation changes how much incorporated wealth can be attached and observed, creating incentives that insurance and similar devices do not replicate fully.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":32,"og:type":75,"og:title":10,"og:site_name":45,"og:description":12},"article",{"robots":77,"canonical":32},"index,follow",{"doc_id":79,"site_id":7},574952,1792427705,{"code":4,"msg":82,"data":83},"success",[84,88,92,96,101,106,111,115,119,122,126],{"id":22,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":25,"category_name":85,"show_sort_weight":86,"slug":87},"Story & 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School of Management,Northwestern University,Evanston,IL60208,USA(Received November 1991;final version received August 1994)  \n## Abstract\n\nThis paper evaluates the effects of allowing auditors to limit their liability by incorpo-rating.Using a model that integrates the audit market with the market for the firms beingaudited,it predicts that,once incorporation becomes an option,the least wealthyemployed auditors under unlimited liability either exit the audit market or earn lowerprofits from auditing than before.The most wealthy employed auditors earn higherprofits;they incorporate and remove wealth from their corporations.The model alsoexplains the recent shift in auditors'attitudes toward incorporation,and why insuranceand other wealth-sheltering devices imperfectly substitute for incorporation.  \nKey words:Auditors'liability;Audit quality;Audit fees;Auditing standards  \nJEL classification:M4;K13;L15;G14  \n## 1.Introduction\n\nThis paper studies the effects of allowing auditors to operate with eitherunlimited liability,in which all of an auditor's assets are subject to attachment ina lawsuit,or limited liability,in which only the incorporated portion of an  \nThis paper is a shortened and revised version of a previous working paper entitled Incorporation,Insurance,and the Audit Market'.That expanded paper is available from the author.I wish to thankthe seminar participants at the University of Minnesota,the University of Notre Dame,Ohio StateUniversity,Purdue University,Stanford University,Washington University,the University ofWaterloo,Thomas Lys,Robert Magee,Zoe Vonna Palmrose,Ross Watts,Rick Young,and ananonymous referee for their helpful comments on previous drafts,and the Accounting ResearchCenter at Northwestern University for financial support.  \nauditor's assets are subject to attachment.It is motivated by the recent (Febru-ary 1992)decision of the AICPA to allow auditors to form general corporationsand therefore be subject to only limited liability.!Taking as given the initialwealths of the set of potential auditors and postulating that audits are volunt-ary,²the paper proceeds to develop testable hypotheses regarding the effects ofchanges in auditors'liability on the behavior and employment of auditors,theprices of audit services,and aggregate shareholder wealth.If potential auditorsare assumed to be able to react to the availability of limited liability byremaining unincorporated,incorporating,and withdrawing some of theirwealth from the corporation,or else exiting or entering the audit market,thenthe following predictions emerge from the model:the least wealthy employedauditors under unlimited liability will be driven from the audit market;the mostwealthy employed auditors will incorporate and not include all of their wealth inthe corporation;the least wealthy employed auditors either will not incorporateor,if they do,they willkeep all of their wealth in the corporation;the price of anaudit of a given quality will decline;aggregate shareholder wealth will increase;the profits of the wealthiest employed auditors will increase,while the leastwealthy employed auditors'profits will decline.  \nMany of these predictions are consequences of changes in competition in theaudit market deriving from changes in the liability structure.These predictionsare easy to understand if one reverses the actual chronology of events byengaging in the following thought experiment:suppose the status quo entailedlimited liability for auditors and that auditors are then forced to convert tounlimited liability.Given such a transformation,one would expect (and thefollowing analysis proves)that very wealthy auditors who were previously activein the audit market might withdraw from the market,because they have toomuch wealth at risk.As a consequence,the less wealthy auditors who remainedin the market would experience less competition than they did before.Theiraudit fees woul","cbCaiaTXxjTwfksS","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaiaTXxjTwfksS","pdf",2117288,"English","# Abstract\n# 1. Introduction","[{\"question\":\"What is the core question of the paper?\",\"answer\":\"The paper studies the effects of allowing auditors to operate under unlimited or limited liability via incorporation, focusing on behavior, employment, pricing, and shareholder wealth outcomes.\"},{\"question\":\"What does the model predict for least-wealthy and most-wealthy auditors?\",\"answer\":\"Least-wealthy auditors under unlimited liability are predicted to exit or earn lower profits, while the most wealthy auditors incorporate and earn higher profits by removing wealth into their corporations.\"},{\"question\":\"Why does the paper argue that insurance and other wealth-sheltering devices are imperfect substitutes for incorporation?\",\"answer\":\"Because incorporation changes how much incorporated wealth can be attached and observed, creating incentives that insurance and similar devices do not replicate fully.\"}]","Incorporation and the audit market | PDF",1792012328,101,[146,150,154,158],{"page_no":22,"url":147,"width":148,"height":149},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/d7d0b96280dc56eb04b665bda4244e64.webp",983,1415,{"page_no":26,"url":151,"width":152,"height":153},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/4214fd02075ebfd4da8c0db10bcd5a2b.webp",982,1414,{"page_no":30,"url":155,"width":156,"height":157},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/561682073e032808bb62f6c0fdb31b30.webp",981,1412,{"page_no":33,"url":159,"width":160,"height":161},"https://res-academy.cache.wpscdn.com/upload/kdocshare/2026-11-18/1bf3084ddcc96b2b721975cf93ccb98e.webp",980,1411]