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The document describes a loss of around 28% consumption within the ČEPS control area following the trip of the V411 400 kV line and subsequent manual disconnection actions, leading to islanding and rapid collapse caused by a generation-load deficit. It presents system-state and market conditions, the event’s timeline, restoration steps, regional coordination, ICS-based incident classification, root causes, and a comprehensive set of resilience recommendations for the European power system.",{"@graph":69,"@context":121},[70,84,104],{"@type":71,"itemListElement":72},"BreadcrumbList",[73,77,79,82],{"item":74,"name":75,"@type":76,"position":8},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":78,"name":9,"@type":76,"position":14},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/",{"item":80,"name":40,"@type":76,"position":81},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":83,"name":65,"@type":76,"position":19},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/grid-incident-in-czech-republic-on-4-july-2025-final-report-26-june-2026/323210/",{"url":83,"name":65,"@type":85,"image":86,"author":91,"headline":65,"publisher":94,"fileFormat":97,"inLanguage":63,"description":67,"dateModified":98,"datePublished":98,"encodingFormat":97,"isAccessibleForFree":99,"interactionStatistic":100},"DigitalDocument",{"url":87,"@type":88,"width":89,"height":90},"https://docshare.wps.com/thumbnails/grid-incident-in-czech-republic-on-4-july-2025-final-report-26-june-2026/323210.png","ImageObject",300,407,{"name":92,"@type":93},"Liam","Person",{"url":74,"name":95,"@type":96},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-09-21",true,{"@type":101,"interactionType":102,"userInteractionCount":4},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":103},"ViewAction",{"@type":105,"mainEntity":106},"FAQPage",[107,113,117],{"name":108,"@type":109,"acceptedAnswer":110},"What incident occurred in the Czech Republic on 4 July 2025?","Question",{"text":111,"@type":112},"A grid incident led to an approximate 28% loss of consumption in the ČEPS control area, following events beginning with the tripping of the V411 400 kV line and ending with a manual disconnection of V208.","Answer",{"name":114,"@type":109,"acceptedAnswer":115},"How did the event evolve, and what role did generation and load imbalance play?",{"text":116,"@type":112},"Unexpected generation reductions after a transient increased grid overloads over several minutes. Manual load shedding or generation increases were not available in time, and the resulting islanding and collapse were attributed to the generation-load deficit, with RoCoF-related protection preventing recovery.",{"name":118,"@type":109,"acceptedAnswer":119},"What does the report recommend to improve resilience and prevent recurrence?",{"text":120,"@type":112},"It provides a comprehensive set of measures aimed at enhancing operational robustness, improving cross-stakeholder information exchange, and maintaining high security of supply across the European power system, while clarifying that monitoring implementation is outside the expert panel mandate.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":83,"og:type":123,"og:title":65,"og:site_name":95,"og:description":67},"article",{"robots":125,"canonical":83},"index,follow",{"doc_id":127,"site_id":62},323210,1789964623,{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":130},{"doc_id":127,"user_id":131,"nickname":92,"user_avatar":132,"doc_module":4,"category_id":39,"category_name":40,"doc_title":65,"doc_description":67,"doc_content":133,"file_id":134,"file_url":135,"file_type":136,"file_size":137,"view_count":4,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":8,"is_downloadable":8,"audit_status":8,"page_count":138,"language":139,"language_code":63,"site_id":62,"html_lang":63,"table_of_contents":140,"faqs":141,"seo_title":142,"seo_description":67,"update_tm":128,"read_time":143},8796095461564,"https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/davatar_155a257f0dc6eb9ab79c44ca47cae57d","» Grid Incident in Czech Republic on 4 July 2025  \nICS Investigation Expert Panel  \nFinal Report  \n26 June 2026  \nPreamble  \nThis final report has been prepared by the Expert Panel established to perform this technical investigation, in accordance with Article 15 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation (SOGL) and the Incident Classification Scale (ICS) methodology. The final report provides a factual, technical, and objective account of the incident that occurred on 4 July 2025 in the Czech Republic, to transparently inform stakeholders and governance bodies.  \nIts purpose is to identify the causes of the incident and to recommend measures that strengthen the resilience of the European power system. The analyses, findings, and recommendations contained in this final report are based on data, documents, and other materials provided by the impacted Transmission System Operator (TSO), distributed system operator (DSO) and significant grid users (SGUs) . While the Expert Panel has exercised due care and applied its best effort in reviewing and evaluating the information received, it does not independently verify, audit, or validate the completeness, accuracy, or reliability of the data sources. Importantly, the report isnot intended to assign liability or responsibility to any party and should not be interpreted as doing so in any way. This report has been prepared and agreed upon by the Expert Panel.  \nAny analyses, findings, and recommendations set out in this report reflect the Expert Panel’s technical assessment atthe time of writing and are without prejudice to any investigation or enforcement action that may be taken by the competent authorities. The recommendations outlined in this report represent a comprehensive set of measures designed to enhance operational robustness, improve cross stakeholder information exchange, and contribute to maintaining a high level of security of supply across the European power system. Monitoring the implementation of the recommendations’ provided in this report does not fall within the mandate or remit of the Expert Panel. While voluntary in nature, the recommendations are intended to prompt and support concrete action to help prevent the recurrence of similar events in the future. Any responsibility for the consideration, follow-up, and implementation of the recommendations lies with each addressee.  \nCONTENTS  \n1 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 4  \n1.1 Introduction 4  \n1.2 System state and market conditions before the incident 5  \n1.3 Evolution of system conditions during the event 6  \n1.4 Restoration process 7  \n1.5 Regional coordination processes 7  \n1.6 Analysis of relevant factors 8  \n1.7 Incident classification based on ICS methodology 9  \n1.8 Root causes 10  \n1.9 Recommendations 10  \n2 SYSTEM STATE AND MARKET CONDITIONS BEFORE THE INCIDENT 11  \n2.1 Information about topology 11  \n2.2 Weather conditions 33  \n2.3 Market situation 35  \n3 EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM CONDITIONS DURING THE EVENT 42  \n3.1 Factual sequence of events 42  \n3.2 Generation and load 52  \n3.3 System’s dynamic behaviour during the event 54  \n3.4 Protection system performance during the event 66  \n4 RESTORATION PROCESS 70  \n4.1 Restoration sequences 70  \n4.2 Communication and coordination during the restoration process 74  \n4.3 Generation recovery actions 74  \n4.4 Load recovery actions 76  \n4.5 End of restoration 83  \n4.6 Balancing during restoration 84  \n4.7 Market suspension and restoration 87  \n5 REGIONAL COORDINATION PROCESSES 89  \n6 ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT FACTORS 91  \n6.1 Analysis of technical reasons for theV411 disconnection 91  \n6.2 Analysis of the impact of distributed generation 92  \n6.3 Island operation capability as the ancillary service 101  \n6.4 Assessment of change in the IOCM band 105  \n6.5 Analysis of system defence measures 107  \n6.6 Analysis of manual disconnection of the overloaded line 108  \n7 INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION BASED ON ICS ME","cbCaikbLRulo3DMb","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaikbLRulo3DMb","pdf",8173953,122,"English","# Management Summary\n## Introduction\n## System state and market conditions before the incident\n## Evolution of system conditions during the event\n## Restoration process\n## Regional coordination processes\n## Analysis of relevant factors\n## Incident classification based on ICS methodology\n## Root causes\n## Recommendations\n# System state and market conditions before the incident\n## Information about topology\n## Weather conditions\n## Market situation\n# Evolution of system conditions during the event\n## Factual sequence of events\n## Generation and load\n## System’s dynamic behaviour during the event\n## Protection system performance during the event","[{\"question\":\"What incident occurred in the Czech Republic on 4 July 2025?\",\"answer\":\"A grid incident led to an approximate 28% loss of consumption in the ČEPS control area, following events beginning with the tripping of the V411 400 kV line and ending with a manual disconnection of V208.\"},{\"question\":\"How did the event evolve, and what role did generation and load imbalance play?\",\"answer\":\"Unexpected generation reductions after a transient increased grid overloads over several minutes. Manual load shedding or generation increases were not available in time, and the resulting islanding and collapse were attributed to the generation-load deficit, with RoCoF-related protection preventing recovery.\"},{\"question\":\"What does the report recommend to improve resilience and prevent recurrence?\",\"answer\":\"It provides a comprehensive set of measures aimed at enhancing operational robustness, improving cross-stakeholder information exchange, and maintaining high security of supply across the European power system, while clarifying that monitoring implementation is outside the expert panel mandate.\"}]","Grid Incident in Czech Republic on 4 July 2025 - Final Report - 26 June 2026 | PDF",307]