[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"doc-detail-86182-en":3,"doc-seo-86182-105":30,"detail-sidebar-cat-0-en-105":92},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":6},0,"success",{"doc_id":7,"user_id":8,"nickname":9,"user_avatar":10,"doc_module":4,"category_id":11,"category_name":12,"doc_title":13,"doc_description":14,"doc_content":15,"file_id":16,"file_url":17,"file_type":18,"file_size":19,"view_count":20,"is_deleted":4,"is_public":21,"is_downloadable":21,"audit_status":21,"page_count":22,"language":23,"language_code":24,"site_id":25,"html_lang":24,"table_of_contents":26,"faqs":27,"seo_title":13,"seo_description":14,"update_tm":28,"read_time":29},86182,13056703019662,"Evangeline","https://ap-avatar.wpscdn.com/avatar/be000253a8e92610077?_k=1778726343310543188",8,"Research & Report","From PBS to ePBS: the Microstructure of Block Building","Ethereum’s Glamsterdam upgrade introduces enshrined proposer-builder separation (ePBS), moving from relay-centric PBS to direct builder bids submitted to proposers. The paper studies how this redesign alters block-building microstructure using a general imperfect-information two-stage auction with verifiable messages, where an early bid acts as both a price and a signal. PBS is modeled with exogenous stopping and disclosure, while ePBS allows ex-post choices. Exact Bayesian equilibria and calibrated no-regret learning characterize equilibrium outcomes, revealing a ratchet effect and a TEE-based mechanism.","arXiv :2607 . 1 1240v 1 [ cs .GT] 13 Jul 2026  \nFrom PBS to ePBS: the Microstructure of Block Building  \nJingyu Liu 1 , Bolin Zhang 1 , Lin William Cong2 ,  \nSiguang Li 1 , and Xuechao Wang 1  \n1The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)  \n2Nanyang Technological University  \n[jliu514@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn](jliu514@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn) ; [bzhang342@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn](bzhang342@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn)  \n[will.cong@ntu.edu.sg](will.cong@ntu.edu.sg) ; [siguangli@hkust-gz.edu.cn](siguangli@hkust-gz.edu.cn)  \n[xuechaowang@hkust-gz.edu.cn](xuechaowang@hkust-gz.edu.cn)  \nAbstract  \nEthereum’s Glamsterdam upgrade introduces enshrined proposer-builder separation (ePBS), replacing relay-centric PBS with direct builder bids to proposers. We study how this shift changes the blockbuilding microstructure through a general imperfect-information two-stage auction with verifiable messages, where an early bid serves as both a price offer and a signal. PBS and ePBS are modeled as restrictions of the same block-building game: PBS fixes stopping and disclosure exogenously, while ePBS lets the proposer choose stopping and disclosure ex post. Latency heterogeneity is captured by asymmetric information updates: fast builders observe disclosed early information before rebidding, while slow builders do not. We combine exact perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterizations in tractable cases with calibrated no-regret learning in finite games. For PBS, we show that separating equilibria preserve the standard first-price-auction payoff benchmark and provide conditions for their existence. For ePBS, we demonstrate a ratchet effect: because the proposer can defer block proposal and use early bid information in the second stage, builders anticipate ex-post extraction and shade or pool early bids, generating allocation inefficiency and revenue-efficiency valleys.  \nWe interpret this ratchet distortion as a commitment failure. Under full commitment, the optimal policy collapses to the static Myerson auction and removes the ratchet channel. To realize part of this commitment advantage in a feasible mechanism, we propose a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) sidecar that enforces limited commitment. We formulate the revenue-maximizing TEE mechanism as abilinear optimization problem. In conservative finite benchmarks, the TEE design increases the proposer revenue relative to the first-price benchmark by approximately 25% .  \nKeywords: blockchain; decentralized finance; market microstructure; auction design; mechanism design  \nJEL Classification: D44; D47; G10; G23; L14  \n1 Introduction  \nEthereum block construction has become a specialized market. Professional builders assemble execution payloads, compete for the proposer’s consensus right to include a block, and monetize private order flow  \nand MEV opportunities through Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) [23, 27, 17] . The current production implementation, MEV-Boost, relies on relays to mediate fair exchange between builder payments and execution payloads. This relay layer is operationally important, but highly concentrated: by July 2026, the top five relays accounted for over 90% of block production [48] .  \nePBS, slated for Ethereum’s upcoming Glamsterdam upgrade, is motivated by reducing this relay dependence and making the proposer-builder interface more protocol-facing [21, 22, 20] . In ePBS, builders should submit signed bids through direct channels or peer-to-peer gossip.1 The key strategic changes concern block proposal timing and the resulting information structure. As illustrated in Figure 1, unlike the relay-mediated open auction in PBS, ePBS allows proposers to strategically defer winning-bid selection, equivalently delaying the beacon block proposal, and to use selective information disclosure to induce higher subsequent bids. At the same time, under the Ethereum consensus protocol, later beacon block proposal reduces the probability that the selected bid becomes canon","cbCaig6FcIr1N9Id","https://ap.wps.com/l/cbCaig6FcIr1N9Id","pdf",5615288,6,1,86,"English","en",105,"# Abstract\n# Introduction\n## Commitment Advantage\n## Latency Advantage","[{\"question\":\"What key change does ePBS introduce compared with PBS in Ethereum block building?\",\"answer\":\"ePBS replaces relay-mediated PBS with direct builder bids to proposers. It also enables proposers to defer proposal timing and use selective disclosure to affect later bidding.\"},{\"question\":\"How does the paper model the strategic interaction under PBS and ePBS?\",\"answer\":\"It uses a general imperfect-information two-stage auction with verifiable messages. Early bids serve both as price offers and as signals, while stopping and disclosure differ between PBS (exogenous) and ePBS (chosen ex post).\"},{\"question\":\"What is the ratchet effect found for ePBS, and how is it addressed?\",\"answer\":\"Because proposers can defer selection and use early bid information in the second stage, builders anticipate ex-post extraction and shade or pool early bids. This creates allocation inefficiency and revenue-efficiency valleys; under full commitment the optimal policy collapses to a static Myerson auction, and a TEE sidecar is proposed to realize part of the commitment advantage.\"}]",1784209173,217,{"code":4,"msg":31,"data":32},"ok",{"site_id":25,"language":24,"slug":33,"title":13,"keywords":34,"description":14,"schema_data":35,"social_meta":87,"head_meta":89,"extra_data":91,"updated_unix":28},"from-pbs-to-epbs-the-microstructure-of-block-building","",{"@graph":36,"@context":86},[37,54,69],{"@type":38,"itemListElement":39},"BreadcrumbList",[40,44,48,51],{"item":41,"name":42,"@type":43,"position":21},"https://docshare.wps.com","Home","ListItem",{"item":45,"name":46,"@type":43,"position":47},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/","Document",2,{"item":49,"name":12,"@type":43,"position":50},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/research-report/",3,{"item":52,"name":13,"@type":43,"position":53},"https://docshare.wps.com/document/from-pbs-to-epbs-the-microstructure-of-block-building/86182/",4,{"url":52,"name":13,"@type":55,"author":56,"headline":13,"publisher":58,"fileFormat":61,"inLanguage":24,"description":14,"dateModified":62,"datePublished":63,"encodingFormat":61,"isAccessibleForFree":64,"interactionStatistic":65},"DigitalDocument",{"name":9,"@type":57},"Person",{"url":41,"name":59,"@type":60},"DocShare","Organization","application/pdf","2026-07-27","2026-07-16",true,{"@type":66,"interactionType":67,"userInteractionCount":20},"InteractionCounter",{"@type":68},"ViewAction",{"@type":70,"mainEntity":71},"FAQPage",[72,78,82],{"name":73,"@type":74,"acceptedAnswer":75},"What key change does ePBS introduce compared with PBS in Ethereum block building?","Question",{"text":76,"@type":77},"ePBS replaces relay-mediated PBS with direct builder bids to proposers. It also enables proposers to defer proposal timing and use selective disclosure to affect later bidding.","Answer",{"name":79,"@type":74,"acceptedAnswer":80},"How does the paper model the strategic interaction under PBS and ePBS?",{"text":81,"@type":77},"It uses a general imperfect-information two-stage auction with verifiable messages. Early bids serve both as price offers and as signals, while stopping and disclosure differ between PBS (exogenous) and ePBS (chosen ex post).",{"name":83,"@type":74,"acceptedAnswer":84},"What is the ratchet effect found for ePBS, and how is it addressed?",{"text":85,"@type":77},"Because proposers can defer selection and use early bid information in the second stage, builders anticipate ex-post extraction and shade or pool early bids. This creates allocation inefficiency and revenue-efficiency valleys; under full commitment the optimal policy collapses to a static Myerson auction, and a TEE sidecar is proposed to realize part of the commitment advantage.","https://schema.org",{"og:url":52,"og:type":88,"og:title":13,"og:site_name":59,"og:description":14},"article",{"robots":90,"canonical":52},"index,follow",{"doc_id":7,"site_id":25},{"code":4,"msg":5,"data":93},[94,98,102,106,111,115,120,123,128,131,135],{"id":21,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":95,"show_sort_weight":96,"slug":97},"Story & Novel",90,"story-novel",{"id":47,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":99,"show_sort_weight":100,"slug":101},"Literature",80,"literature",{"id":53,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":103,"show_sort_weight":104,"slug":105},"Exam",70,"exam",{"id":107,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":108,"show_sort_weight":109,"slug":110},5,"Comic",60,"comic",{"id":20,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":112,"show_sort_weight":113,"slug":114},"Technology",50,"technology",{"id":116,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":117,"show_sort_weight":118,"slug":119},7,"Healthcare",40,"healthcare",{"id":11,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":12,"show_sort_weight":121,"slug":122},30,"research-report",{"id":124,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":125,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":127},9,"Religion & Spirituality",20,"religion-spirituality",{"id":126,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":129,"show_sort_weight":126,"slug":130},"World Cup","world-cup",{"id":132,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":133,"show_sort_weight":132,"slug":134},10,"Lifestyle","lifestyle",{"id":136,"doc_module":4,"doc_module_name":46,"category_name":137,"show_sort_weight":107,"slug":138},19,"General","general"]